

Weekly Summary for Meetings with Elections Infrastructure Officials

Region	State	Meeting Location	Meeting Date	DHS POC	Key Attendees & Affiliation other than POC	Key Discussion Points	Issues or Concerns	Follow-up Required	For NFPD Leadership Awareness	Leadership Action	Next Scheduled Engagement	Notes / Comments
1	Vermont		9/28/2017		(b) (6)	Comprehensive discussion on VT's process, actions, and challenges. Provided them insights/ materials on available DHS products and services.	None. Collaborative and willing to work with DHS meeting forward to enhance security/resilience.	Will continue engagement.	EISA paying FY 18 DRG funds for municipal government (town-level) training given perceived need. (b) (6) is receiving DHS products.			
1	New Hampshire		Pending		(b) (6)		(b) (5)					
1	Maine		9/27/2017		(b) (6) (b) (5)	Comprehensive discussion on ME's process, actions, and challenges. Provided them insights/materials on available DHS products and services. (b) (6) seems well-versed on election hardware and some clerks. Update paper ballot system statewide utilizing Accessible Password Solution which has no other vulnerabilities. Have done day registration capability both in-person and have upgraded town clerk password requirements. (b) (5)	None. Willing to work with DHS on additional state agency partners in enhancing security/resilience. (b) (5)	(b) (5) in requesting DHS enhance (b) (5) regarding DHS reference sharing regarding issues observed elsewhere. (b) (5)				
1	Massachusetts		10/12/2017		(b) (6)	continued connectivity between secure and RSA.			(b) (6) not directly participating			
1	Connecticut		Pending		(b) (6)		Still awaiting SecState's office response.					
1	North Dakota		10/12/2017		(b) (6)				(b) (6) declined attendance		Y	

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2	New Jersey	New Jersey Fusion Center	08/19/17		(b) (6)	Discussion security and preparedness. DHS (b) (6) presented to the interagency group on various assessments of DHS, FBI, DHS and state election officials. On-line training sessions, and scheduled in person training for state and county election officials.	None noted	Working in conjunction with NJ Homeland Security and Preparedness, an in person training agenda was developed. Training Awareness and Issue Responder Preparedness program will be presented to New Jersey Election Officials on Oct. 31, 2017 in Trenton NJ.	Nothing significant at this time.	N/A		
1	PA, NY, VA, DC, MD	PA, MD, VA	N/A			All meetings with Elections Infrastructure Officials in PA and the MDVA have been prepared and further notes.						
1	New York	NYS Governor's Office	07/06/17		EDD, EDD, (b) (6)	Discussed IT Subsector designation, and DHS support.	Main issue of concern is managing the 50 separate independent county election commissions in addition to NYS' extensive web of other issues.	NY (b) (6) will meet with NYS Chief Election Officers in Albany NY.	NYS issued a cyber election vulnerability on 7/15/17.	NSTR		
1	New Jersey	Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC) (aka NCCES), Ocean County Voting System Technology System, Ocean County Board of Election Officer	02/19/17		(b) (6)	AM Session was focused on DHS capabilities/offering and an overview of the election infrastructure call project that is being led by OCEA. Post PM Session was mainly a debriefing of voting path materials they have in place to govern voting integrity. The second PM session focused on the entire voting process from voter registration thru results reporting.	None noted	Working with OCEA to identify appropriate CSX led risk assessments that will be beneficial to both the state of NJ and OCEA.	Nothing significant at this time.	N/A		
1	New Jersey	New Jersey Fusion Center	02/19/17		(b) (6)	Initial meeting with NJ Election Officials. Purpose was to understand the election process in New Jersey.	Initially, NJ Representatives thought the meeting was a result of the E-Track Commission. Also concerned on the protection of any information shared.	A follow-up meeting is scheduled on 15 September to discuss NCATS products for the RVR and Cyber Hygiene Program.	Nothing significant at this time.	N/A		
1	New Jersey	New Jersey Fusion Center	02/19/17		(b) (6)	DHS discussed various programs, and tools that might be useful to support NJ election infrastructure.	(b) (6) discussed the PDS program and this visit was not part of the program.	(b) (6) discussed a follow up phone call, since he had a chance to meet with representatives, addressed on 2/13/17.	Nothing significant at this time.	N/A		
1	New Jersey	Ocean County Voting Machine Disposal	02/19/17		(b) (6)	How voting machines are stored, serviced, tracked, distributed, and disposed of machines, machine assets.	(b) (6) discussed the various voter programs for physical security election infrastructure.	Offered again during follow up call on 21 Aug.	Nothing significant at this time.	N/A		
1	New Jersey	Ocean County County Clerk Office/County Office of Elections	02/19/17		(b) (6)	Absentee ballot handling, requesting and security. Posting of election night systems and results.	N/A		Nothing significant at this time.	N/A		
1	New Jersey	Ocean County Office of Elections	02/19/17		(b) (6)	Meeting by NJ's Voting Requirements Committee Emergency Committee (http://www.elections.state.nj.gov)	Discussion of Cyber Security with Governor and DHS Team (b) (6)	N/A	Nothing significant at this time.	N/A		
1	New Jersey	Via Conference Call	08/21/17		(b) (6)	Prepping of services and products that DHS offers that could potentially support NJ's efforts to secure its election infrastructure.	Discussion of information shared with DHS.		Nothing significant at this time.	N/A		
1	New York	Albany, NY	08/25/17		(b) (6)	MS-55AC-19	The board of election appeared to believe that the major point of concern has been election cyber security is managed at the county level, where they have no visibility.	Interest was expressed in Cyber Hygiene and NY has no required for services was made. Also, interest in the CRB, CS, and ERM was expressed but not immediately requested with the caveat that anything in under review and that goal is the 2018 election.	Nothing significant at this time.	N/A		
1	New Jersey	Via Phone	08/28/17		(b) (6)		DHS leads coordination, presentation with NJ Homeland Security, for September in Trenton, NJ meeting with being (b) (6)	NY will have Fall Elections Official Conference in Trenton, NJ on 09/12/2017.	NSTR			

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5	Indiana				(b) (6)		(b) (5)	(b) (5)	SCJ Laveen is the President of the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASSS). She attended a Round of 10 Senate Joint Commission in June 2017. Her Department of State advised NASSS on Analysis and they are highly interested in NASSS. GOC Design prior objections to CT designations and other perceived DHS road blocks. SCJ Laveen and Indiana would review DHS' services and work with DHS on Election Infrastructure. She mentioned the strength of the Indiana "Vote Center" and Ball State University election center of excellence.	Follow-up with DHS regarding the Indiana Council on Cybersecurity as a potential Working Group for that council on 8/1.			Follow-up with Indiana DHS Agency to determine this offer to the Indiana Council on Cybersecurity as a potential Working Group for that council on 8/1.		
5	Illinois				(b) (6)		(b) (5)	Sup 11, 2017 - DHS/CAC will join B. Tom CBO and D. Patten County Clerk to brief IDP B. County Clerk as he is attending meeting on Springfield, IL.	SCJ Laveen is the President of the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASSS). She attended a Round of 10 Senate Joint Commission in June 2017. Her Department of State advised NASSS on Analysis and they are highly interested in NASSS. GOC Design prior objections to CT designations and other perceived DHS road blocks. SCJ Laveen and Indiana would review DHS' services and work with DHS on Election Infrastructure. She mentioned the strength of the Indiana "Vote Center" and Ball State University election center of excellence.	Follow-up with DHS regarding the Indiana Council on Cybersecurity as a potential Working Group for that council on 8/1.		Follow-up email from Oklahoma DHS: Goodwin. I am sorry I did not get to visit with you either before or after our meeting yesterday with the State Election Board. Had I want to thank you for taking the time to visit with them. I enjoyed a few minutes longer after the meeting and I will tell you they were very appreciative and I think will use some of your products and services. Thanks again for your help, and please let me know if there is anything I can do for you in Oklahoma.			
5	Wisconsin				(b) (6)		(b) (5)	Sup 11, 2017 - DHS/CAC will join B. Tom CBO and D. Patten County Clerk to brief IDP B. County Clerk as he is attending meeting on Springfield, IL.	SCJ Laveen is the President of the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASSS). She attended a Round of 10 Senate Joint Commission in June 2017. Her Department of State advised NASSS on Analysis and they are highly interested in NASSS. GOC Design prior objections to CT designations and other perceived DHS road blocks. SCJ Laveen and Indiana would review DHS' services and work with DHS on Election Infrastructure. She mentioned the strength of the Indiana "Vote Center" and Ball State University election center of excellence.	Follow-up with DHS regarding the Indiana Council on Cybersecurity as a potential Working Group for that council on 8/1.		Follow-up email from Oklahoma DHS: Goodwin. I am sorry I did not get to visit with you either before or after our meeting yesterday with the State Election Board. Had I want to thank you for taking the time to visit with them. I enjoyed a few minutes longer after the meeting and I will tell you they were very appreciative and I think will use some of your products and services. Thanks again for your help, and please let me know if there is anything I can do for you in Oklahoma.			
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5	Ohio				(b) (6)		(b) (5)	Sup 11, 2017 - DHS/CAC will join B. Tom CBO and D. Patten County Clerk to brief IDP B. County Clerk as he is attending meeting on Springfield, IL.	SCJ Laveen is the President of the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASSS). She attended a Round of 10 Senate Joint Commission in June 2017. Her Department of State advised NASSS on Analysis and they are highly interested in NASSS. GOC Design prior objections to CT designations and other perceived DHS road blocks. SCJ Laveen and Indiana would review DHS' services and work with DHS on Election Infrastructure. She mentioned the strength of the Indiana "Vote Center" and Ball State University election center of excellence.	Follow-up with DHS regarding the Indiana Council on Cybersecurity as a potential Working Group for that council on 8/1.		Follow-up email from Oklahoma DHS: Goodwin. I am sorry I did not get to visit with you either before or after our meeting yesterday with the State Election Board. Had I want to thank you for taking the time to visit with them. I enjoyed a few minutes longer after the meeting and I will tell you they were very appreciative and I think will use some of your products and services. Thanks again for your help, and please let me know if there is anything I can do for you in Oklahoma.			
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8	Colorado				(b) (6)	Discussed EI designation, introduction to DHS team and capabilities / resources available to support EI efforts, discussed council structure, security clearance process	(b) (5)	Will continue engagement				
8	North Dakota				(b) (6)		(b) (5) including EI officials has diverse representation to include rural states, cyber integrity of EI is primarily at the county level where polling machines and IT interface reside.	CSA will follow up late November with State CSO, PSA invited to speak at annual meeting in Feb, PSA to review current physical security documents and provide options for consideration.	There is ongoing concern over actions DHS may request from state and lack of resources to meet those requests. Overall meeting was positive with a good path forward.	Please follow up with IA on additional clearances. Please provide details on potential make-up of EI councils.		
8	Wyoming				(b) (6)		Questions from SoS (b) (5) How (b) (5) to section emergency commission? If there is a breach at county level would the SoS be notified? Additionally, the SoS was interested in understanding what this designation means, and the types of services we could offer. SoS was impressed with the resource guide we provided and intends to submit additional personnel and himself for clearance.	CSA will follow up again with (b) (5) Technology Director. PSA and CSA invited to speak at future County Clerk meeting to discuss EI security and best practices	Overall this was a positive meeting and we made a good contact with the SoS and Technology Director			
8	Montana		10/3/2017			Awaiting AAR						
8	Utah		10/12/2017									
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9	Hawaii				(b) (6)	Both HSA and CIO were appreciative of the early coordination and emphasized being kept in the loop and in the know. [REDACTED] was seeking expectations of the State and an understanding of the overall goal, beyond the shared interest in protecting the election process. At the conclusion of the call, he said he had a good understanding of the capabilities and options for support and would be keeping the Governor apprised of the collective planning.	The State asked if we had the resources to do additional assessments this year; agreed to work together on prioritizing which infrastructure elements to assess. All agreed the fusion center is the central hub of information and that the CIO's office would ensure proper distribution of relevant information from the MS-ISAC.	DHS/NPPD will followup in person to discuss more specific capabilities (likely cyber assessments) to schedule prior to the 18 election. CSA and PSA will meet with CIO and CIO later this month and RD will prep up at next opportunity to be on the island (later this fall). GETBACK: Best Practices/Guidance on information recommended leading up to an election. ITF FORAC.	Overall, very positive meeting and all sign points to a continued successful partnership on this issue as well as others.	None Required.	TBD	During the 9/22 notification call to the CIO, [REDACTED] retained HSA/CSA [REDACTED] would [REDACTED] week and would arrange to meet to discuss this service. Subsequently, the evening before, the CSAs were instructed to cancel this engagement. RD will [REDACTED] /CSA [REDACTED] (b) (5)
9	Arizona		10/3/2017	[REDACTED]	(b) (6)	The discussion started around what election infrastructure is a designated CTR sector means. We spent some time explaining the coordinating council structure, where [REDACTED] expressed interest in having her (or her [REDACTED]) engaged on the GCC. Discussion also included general best practices (Cyber Hygiene, identifying critical services and managing assets, training/awareness, etc.) as well as DHS's commitment to improving information sharing and the notification process going forward. We encouraged the SoS to work closely with the State CISO as well. Although a grueling schedule, it paid dividends to do the extra outreach with the State CISO, FBI and HSA near the same time as our SoS meeting. They all expressed extreme appreciation for the inclusion and each offered advice and guidance on how we can best support the State with respect to elections.	(b) (5)	GETBACK (1) [REDACTED] repeatedly prepared the DHS Embassy advise on the safety/security of having the nation's voter information sent centrally to the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity. ITF FORAC. GETBACK: Return [REDACTED] with the best points of contact for Secretary Reagan to proactively engage in the GCC. ITF FORAC. By now we have learned that the SoS / CIO is not the only apparatus protecting election infrastructure. Recommendation to ensure the forming GCC includes representation from non-SoS/CIO type organizations, such as Governor's offices, HSA offices, CISO, etc.	Related media reports post meeting: http://lat.com/story/1771379/non-astrom-astrom-election-hacking-was-much-ado-about-nothing/ http://www.asfamily.com/story/36578661/mar-cops-county-recorder-confident-in-election-security	See GETBACK (1).	TBD	
9	Nevada	Las Vegas	11-Oct	[REDACTED]	(b) (6)	The Secretary's staff are interested in understanding the victim notification process, with particular interest in ensuring that the Secretary's office is made aware of incidents even when they are not the system owner. We acknowledged this was the intention going forward and that details on new information sharing protocols were underway. They recognized that these protocols will be a key focus of the GCC and SOE and look forward to seeing progress in that forum, as well. The Secretary and her team inquired about the MS-ISAC, if it would be the official sector ISAC and if the Secretary should have their own membership. We explained that direct membership was an option, the services of the MS-ISAC are available to the Secretary's office, and committed to returning MS-ISAC information. Overall, the Secretary was appreciative of our meeting and of our budding partnership. She was thankful for our past support (PSA supported last year's election via the Election Integrity Tallorder). She ask for returned information on the full listing of our capabilities, points of contact and other relevant products mentioned during the meeting. She and her team - were understanding of the threats and vulnerabilities to elections and election infrastructure and asked that we advise where we can on how they can improve.	(b) (5)	GETBACK (1) Return points of contact for MS-ISAC and fusion centers send capabilities summary of DHS services. ITF FORAC. GETBACK (2) Provide feedback to NCATS from SoS team and return follow up with SoS office appropriate. ITF FORAC. GETBACK (3) [REDACTED] ITF FORAC.	Nevada repeatedly emphasized improving information sharing protocols and will be looking for noticeable change in that process in the near term.	None Required.	TBD	
9	American Samoa			[REDACTED]								
9	Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands			[REDACTED]								(b) (5)
9	Guam			[REDACTED]								(b) (5)

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18	Washington				(b) (6)	<p>Government is involved in the state (state election system history). Though, she was very gracious and positive during the meeting and there was no harm to have a working relationship with DHS.</p> <p>The State CISO works for the Governor, and not for the Office of the Secretary of State. The SEC is independently elected, in is the Governor. The idea was to have the State CISO have a great job, but that the Office of the SEC is not one of those state offices that the CISO serves.</p> <p>The SEC CISO would like to be notified directly of any other threats to state election infrastructure in addition to the State CISO's office.</p> <p>The SEC also expressed the need for "cross-state intelligence".</p>	<p>The following is their summary of the meeting and what was discussed:</p> <p>State of Washington desires from DHS to help make their election infrastructure more secure.</p> <p>1. Cybersecurity vulnerability assessments</p> <p>2. Information sharing - allow individuals to share information with election officials on the latest threats to state election infrastructure systems would be helpful.</p> <p>3. Best Practices Document for Local Election Officials - a brief guide on best practice publications on election infrastructure cybersecurity / information security measures and controls geared towards local election officials</p> <p>4. Guidance on Public Messaging - asking questions or publications on how best to inform the media and public on election infrastructure cyber threats</p> <p>5. Local Election Official Cybersecurity Training - organize and deliver a Cyber Resilience Workshop in Washington state for local and state election officials to coincide with their annual training/ certification work.</p>					
19	Alaska				(b) (6)		<p>and others expressed their desire to have more direct the state that were compromised for their systems.</p>	<p>1. Information sharing - allow individuals to share information with election officials on the latest threats to state election infrastructure systems would be helpful.</p>				
18	Idaho				(b) (6)	(b) (5)		<p>will work with the Idaho SEC IT Manager to identify which individuals are state agencies. This Paper also referenced to make access to the HR JTF for Idaho SEC officials.</p>				
19	Oregon				(b) (6)			<p>will set up a phone call with the SEC CISO.</p>				

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1	New Hampshire		Pending		(b) (6)		(b) (5)					
1	Maine		9/27/2017		(b) (6) (b) (5)	Comprehensive discussion on ME's process, actions, and challenges. Provided them insights/materials on available DHS products and services. (b) (6) seems well-versed in various run by election workers and some clerks. Update paper ballot system statewide utilizing Accessible Password Solution which limits other vulnerabilities. Have discuss day registration capabilities both in-person and have suggested some clerk password requirements. (b) (5)	None. Willing to work with our traditional state agency partners and PRA/CSA to move forward on enhancing security/resilience. (b) (5)	(b) (5) in requesting DHS enhance (b) (6) regarding DHS reference sharing regarding issues observed (b) (6) (b) (5)				
1	Massachusetts		10/12/2017		(b) (6)	continued connectivity between secure and PRA.			(b) (6) not directly participating			
1	Connecticut		Pending		(b) (6)		Still awaiting SecState's office response.					
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5	Illinois				(b) (6)	Illinois Senate testimony... (b) (6)	(b) (5)	Sup 11, 2017 DHS/CDO... (b) (5)	(b) (5)			Follow-up email from Oklahoma DHS... (b) (6)
5	Wisconsin				(b) (6)		(b) (5)	(b) (5)	(b) (5)			
5	Michigan				(b) (6)	MI interests CDO part of MI-BAC and has Albert... (b) (6)	(b) (5)					
5	Ohio				(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (5)	(b) (5)	(b) (5)			
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6	New Mexico				(b) (6)	Discussed DHS/EP mission, Critical Infrastructure, the E.I. subsector and awareness of potential vulnerabilities both cyber and physical. Provided overview of related support in their protection efforts emphasizing information sharing avenues. CSA provided overview of Cyber assessments and discussed current vulnerabilities in their system.	Very interested in the proposed SI MS-EMAC. They plan to do some research on other states on DHS involvement but wanted to make it very clear that they were open to any assistance. They are currently in the process of reviewing the document for general info. MS-EMAC is daunting every year they are obliged to provide training. Training School for County Officials, "at which they would like for us to take part in. This was an issue or concern brought forward they they desired assistance from DHS.	Will work with state officials to ensure that they are fully supported in their regional efforts.	MS State Election officials very open to DHS assistance and membership in GUC.			
6	Oklahoma				(b) (6)	Discussed DHS/EP mission, Critical Infrastructure, the E.I. subsector and awareness of potential vulnerabilities both cyber and physical. Provided overview of related support in their protection efforts emphasizing information sharing avenues. CSA provided overview of Cyber assessments and discussed current vulnerabilities in their system.	provided a detailed overview of their current state of readiness. They are currently in the process of reviewing the document for general info. MS-EMAC is daunting every year they are obliged to provide training. Training School for County Officials, "at which they would like for us to take part in. This was an issue or concern brought forward they they desired assistance from DHS.	Will work with state officials to ensure that they are fully supported in their regional efforts.	Very interested in the proposed SI MS-EMAC. They plan to do some research on other states on DHS involvement but wanted to make it very clear that they were open to any assistance. They are currently in the process of reviewing the document for general info. MS-EMAC is daunting every year they are obliged to provide training. Training School for County Officials, "at which they would like for us to take part in. This was an issue or concern brought forward they they desired assistance from DHS.	A follow-up call by the AI or DHS would be beneficial in understanding a state representative's perspective on needs while the GUC is being organized. Since this has been my experience with a GUC.		
4	Arkansas				(b) (6)	Discussed DHS/EP mission, Critical Infrastructure, the E.I. subsector and awareness of potential vulnerabilities both cyber and physical. Provided overview of related support in their protection efforts emphasizing information sharing avenues. CSA provided overview of Cyber assessments and discussed current vulnerabilities in their system.	had several questions regarding the priority of implementing against by malicious actors. After a detailed briefing on vulnerabilities and protective measures both physical and cyber, they said they would review with their CEO that they didn't believe they would be targeted. They would be interested in assistance from DHS.	Will follow up with officials after a preliminary meeting to begin the collaboration.	Although very hospitable in agreement from this meeting and all the past attempts to arrange it the Arkansas officials are not interested in any DHS assistance with the E.I.			

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Weekly Summary for Meetings with Elections Infrastructure Officials

Region	State	Meeting Location	Meeting Date	DHS POC	Key Attendees & Affiliation other than POC	Key Discussion Points	Issues or Concerns	Follow-up Required	For NPPD Leadership Awareness	Leadership Action	Next Scheduled Engagement	Notes / Comments
9	Hawaii				(b) (6)	Both HSA and CEO were appreciative of the early coordination and emphasized being kept in the loop and in the know. HSA was seeking expectations of the State and an understanding of the overall goal, beyond the shared interest in protecting the election process. At the conclusion of the call, he said he had a good understanding of the capabilities and options for support and would be keeping the Governor apprised of the collective planning.	The State asked if we had the resources to do additional assessments this year; agreed to work together on prioritizing which infrastructure elements to assess. All agreed the fusion center is the central hub of information and that the CIO's office would ensure proper distribution of relevant information from the MS-ISAC.	DHS/NPPD will followup in person to discuss more specific capabilities (likely cyber assessments) to schedule prior to the 18 election. CSAs and PSA will meet with CIO and CEO later this month and RD will reengage at next opportunity to be on the island (later this fall). GETBACK: Best Practices/Guidance on milestones recommended leading up to an election. ETF FORAC.	Overall, very positive meeting and all signpost to a continued successful partnership on this issues as well as others.	None Required.	TBD - RD (b) (6) follow back up in person at next opportunity to be on island.	During the 9/22 notification call to the CEO, (b) (6) RD (b) (6) relayed that CSAs (b) (6) (b) (6) would be on island the following week and would arrange to meet to discuss this service. Subsequently, the evening before, the CSAs were instructed to cancel this engagement. RD (b) (6) (b) (5) will
9	Arizona		10/3/2017	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	The discussion started around what election infrastructure as a designated CIK sector means. We spent some time explaining the coordinating council structure, where (b) (6) expressed interest in having her (or her office) directly engaged on the GCC. (b) (5) Discussion also included general best practices (Cyber Hygiene, identifying critical services and managing assets, training/awareness, etc.) as well as DHS's commitment to improving information sharing and the notification process going forward. We encouraged the SoS office to work closely with the State CISO as well. Although a grueling schedule, it paid dividends to do the extra outreach with the State CISO, FBI and HSA near the same time as our SoS meeting. They all expressed extreme appreciation for the inclusion and each offered advice and guidance on how we can best support the State with respect to elections.	(b) (5)	GETBACK (1): (b) (6) repeatedly requested the DHS formally advise on the safety/security of having the nation's voter information sent centrally to the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity. ETF FORAC. GETBACK: Return (b) (6) with the best points of contact for Secretary Reagan to proactively engage in the GCC. ETF / RD (b) (6) FORAC.	Related media reports post meeting: http://ktaaz.com/story/1772379/sos-arizona-election-hacking-was-much-ado-about-nothing/ http://www.azfamily.com/story/36578063/nari-copa-county-recorder-confident-in-election-security By now we have learned that the SoS / CEO is not the only apparatus protecting election infrastructure. Recommendation to ensure the forming GCC includes representation from non-SoS/CEO type organizations, such as Governor's offices, HSA offices, CISO, etc.	See GETBACK (1).	TBD.	
9	Nevada	Las Vegas	11-Oct	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	The Secretary's staff are interested in understanding the victim notification process, with particular interest in ensuring that the Secretary's office is made aware of incidents even when they are not the system owner. We acknowledged this was the intention going forward and that details on new information sharing protocols were underway. They recognized that these protocols will be a key focus of the GCC and SCC, and look forward to seeing progress in that forum, as well. The Secretary and her team inquired about the MS-ISAC, if it would be the official sector ISAC and if the Secretary should have their own 'membership'. We explained that direct membership was an option, the services of the MS-ISAC are available to the Secretary's office, and committed to returning MS-ISAC POC information. Overall, the Secretary was appreciative of our meeting and of our budding partnership. She was thankful for our past support (PSA supported last year's election via the Election Integrity Taskforce). She ask for returned information on the full listing of our capabilities, points of contact and other relevant products mentioned during the meeting. She - and her team - were understanding of the threats and vulnerabilities to elections and election infrastructure and asked that we advise where we can on how they can improve.	(b) (5)	GETBACK (1): Return points of contact for MS-ISAC and fusion center; send capabilities summary of DHS services. RD (b) (6) FORAC. GETBACK (2): Provide feedback to NCATS from SoS team and return follow up with SoS office appropriate. CS (b) (6) FORAC. GETBACK (3): (b) (5) ETF FORAC.	Nevada repeatedly emphasized improving information sharing protocols and will be looking for noticeable change in that process in the near term.	None Required.	TBD.	
9	American Samoa			(b) (6)								
9	Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands			(b) (6)								(b) (5)
9	Guam			(b) (6)								(b) (5)

