



- DOJ's Policy on Cellsite Simulators: Pen Register Device (18 U.S.C. § 3127(3))
 - LIABILITY RISKs & Best Practices



- Emergency Pen Register Authority
 - Federal v. State Orders
 - Voluntary Disclosures
- Loan of ELSUR Policy
 - Liability
- Protecting Sensitive Techniques
 - Use as evidence

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New DOJ Opinion:

DOJ/CCIPS: Pen/Trap order


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Pen Register Device) to obtain any "signaling information" transmitted from a cellular telephone to:


- 1) Identify a target phone or
- 2) Locate a phone

DOJ: <u>"signaling information"</u> is any noncontent information "transmitted by" a telephone instrument

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BEST PRACTICES:



at is Cell site location data

- is generated by the network for network purposes regardless of a LE order.
- is necessary to Provision of Service & a call cannot be processed without it.
- exists in the network as a <u>RECORD</u> prior to its being obtained by LE.
- has no relationship to the content of a communication.
- is delivered to LE under CALEA only at the beginning and end of calls.



 CALEA prohibits collecting location information "solely pursuant" to a PR/TT


- 18 USC 2703(d) (stored communication act

...

CALEA Delivery of location

- Near Real-Time: CALEA requires carriers to "expeditiously isolates"
 - "call-identifying information": includes cell site information utilized in processing calls
 - for government access "before, during, or immediately after the transmission of a [] communication" (i.e., in real-time or near realtime)
- CALEA Standard: location information is delivered after generation of data by the carrier's network and use in the provision of service (e.g., call origination, Answer, call release)

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



Alternative authority

Consent (18 USC 3121(b)(3))


Voluntary Disclosure by Provider under 18 USC 2702(c)(4): if provider "reasonably believes that an emergency involving immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person justifies the disclosure of" "a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer of such service."

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	Maintaining/Pur	ging	"Pen"	' data?	
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CELL/01					
CELL/0TD 008227					
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4th Amendment Privacy Interest

Smith v.

Maryland, 442 U.S. 435, 744 (1979).

- no legitimate expectation of privacy in information knowingly conveyed to a third party
- In re Digital Analyzer found "[n]o logical distinction between telephone numbers called and a party's own telephone number (or ESN number), all of which are regularly voluntarily exposed and known to others. 885 F. Supp. at 199 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-45 (1979)).

ELL/010 008229

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see also Jayme S. Walker "The qualified privilege to protect sensitive

investigative techniques from disclosure," LEB Vol 69 NO.5 at 26 (May 2000).

Qualified Privilege

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
Compare, United States v. Van Horn, 789 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854 (1986) (concealed microphone in office, defendant sought information about location of device claiming necessary to demonstrate that voices on tape could have been distorted by way mic was hidden and the distortion led to misidentification of the voice), recognized a qualified government privilege not to disclose sensitive investigative techniques.

With United States v. Foster, 986 F.2d 541, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(defendant sought location of observation post: officer's observation of drug transaction was key evidence implicating defendant; surveillance not taped or photographed, so no alternative evidence for jury to examine to determine whether surveillance post provided clear view from which officer could make accurate identification of defendant).

Qualified Privilege (cont).

- U.S. v. Garey, 2004 WL 2663023 (M.D.Ga. Nov. 15, 2004)
 - Defendant sought nature & details of pen register used to determine the geographical location of a cellular phone
 - Court found the information protected by qualified investigative techniques privilege & national security privilege
 - Balanced government's interest in maintaining privilege with Defendant's need for the information
- Defendant had the <u>Product of the Surveillance</u>: the cellphone used in making threatening calls was found in defendant's house during search of residence;
 - Defendant did not need to know how the technology traced the geographic location of the phone.
 - locating the phone in the residence confirmed the accuracy of the geographic surveillance;
 - Moreover, Defendant could challenge the technology used to establish that phone found in residence was the one that actually made the criminal calls.



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Contact Info:


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Office of the General Counsel

•DOJ (CCIPS): www.cybercrime.gov

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Court ISSUES:

- 1. CALEA prohibits collecting location information "solely pursuant" to a PR/TT
- 2. 18 USC 2703(d) (stored communications act)

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Carrier's use Location Data in Provision of Service

- 2 primary forms of location information are supported by wireless networks for various reasons:
 - 1. <u>Serving System:</u> Information regarding the serving system/provider.
 - 2. <u>Tower/Sector information</u> associated with the cell site tower supporting service to the user



Cell Site Data from Provider Pursuant to CALEA STD

 <u>CALEA</u>: technical standard for location parameters (J-STD-025)

(http://www.tiaonline.org/standards/search_results2.cfm?document_no=J-STD-025-A www.tiaonline.org)

- Origination (of an outgoing call from target phone)
- Answer (at answer of a call terminating to the target phone)
- Release (at the end of the call for both incoming and outgoing calls)



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 Answer, call release)



Use PR/TT order for use

- authorize installation & use
- Advise of potentia

Not retain records beyond use to locate target phone?

FBI

b3 - b5 - b7E DOJ command Center hours)

or OEO (business

- Emergencies involving:
 - Immediate danger of death or serious injury

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