

COMMENTS OF THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER to  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Supplemental Questions for Visa Applicants.

[82 FR 56099]

December 27, 2017

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By notice published November 27, 2017 the Department of State proposes to ask visa applicants questions concerning their social media use.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, the agency proposes to ask individuals to disclose information associated with their social media identifiers (handles) used during the past five years.

The State Department has indicated that the agency will use the social media identifiers “to resolve an applicant's identity or to vet for terrorism, national security-related, or other visa ineligibilities.”<sup>2</sup> Little additional information is provided.

Pursuant to the agency’s request for comments, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) submits these comments to urge the Department to: (1) withdraw its proposal to collect social media identifiers; and (2) review the appropriateness of using social media to make visa determinations.

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<sup>1</sup> *Notice of request for public comment on “Supplemental Questions for Visa Applicants,”* 82 Fed. Reg. 56099 (Nov. 27, 2017) (hereafter “Notice”), available at <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/11/27/2017-25490/30-day-notice-of-proposed-information-collection-supplemental-questions-for-visa-applicants>.

<sup>2</sup> Notice.

## I. EPIC's Interest

EPIC is a public interest research center in Washington, D.C. EPIC was established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and protect privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional values.<sup>3</sup> EPIC has a particular interest in preserving the right of people to engage in First Amendment protected activities without the threat of government surveillance. EPIC has repeatedly urged federal agencies not to use social media to make adverse determinations about individuals.<sup>4</sup>

EPIC has previously sued the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to obtain documents related to a DHS social network and media monitoring program.<sup>5</sup> These documents revealed that the agency had paid over \$11 million to an outside company, General Dynamics, to engage in monitoring of social networks and media organizations and to prepare summary reports for DHS.<sup>6</sup> According to the documents obtained by EPIC, General Dynamics would “monitor public social communications on the Internet,” including the public comments sections of NYT, LA Times, Huffington Post, Drudge, Wired’s tech blogs, and ABC News.<sup>7</sup> DHS also

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<sup>3</sup> EPIC, *About EPIC* (2016), <https://epic.org/epic/about.html>.

<sup>4</sup> Comments of EPIC, *Supplemental Questions for Visa Applicants*, Oct. 2, 2017, <https://epic.org/apa/comments/EPIC-DOS-Visas-SocialMediaID-2017.pdf>; Comments of EPIC, *Notice of Information Collection Under OMB Emergency Review: Supplemental Questions for Visa Applicants*, May 18, 2017, <https://epic.org/apa/comments/EPIC-DOS-Social-Media-ID-Collection-Comments.pdf>; Comments of EPIC, *Agency Information Collection Activities: Electronic Visa Update System*, May 30, 2017, <https://epic.org/apa/comments/EPIC-CBP-Social-Media-ID-Collection-Comments.pdf>; Comments of EPIC, *Agency Information Collection Activities: Arrival and Departure Record (Forms I-94 and I-94W), and Electronic System for Travel Authorization*, Sep. 30, 2016, <https://epic.org/apa/comments/EPIC-Comments-DHS-Social-Media-ID-Collection.pdf>; Comments of EPIC, *Privacy Act of 1974; Department of Homeland Security/ALL—038 Insider Threat Program*, Mar. 28, 2016, <https://epic.org/apa/comments/EPIC-DHS-Inisder-Threat-Comments.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> EPIC, *EPIC v. Department of Homeland Security: Media Monitoring*, <https://epic.org/foia/epic-v-dhs-media-monitoring/>.

<sup>6</sup> DHS Social Media Monitoring Documents, available at <https://epic.org/foia/epic-v-dhs-media-monitoring/EPIC-FOIA-DHS-Media-Monitoring-12-2012.pdf>; See also Charlie Savage, *Federal Contractor Monitored Social Network Sites*, New York Times, Jan. 13, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/us/federal-security-program-monitored-public-opinion.html>.

<sup>7</sup> DHS Social Media Monitoring Documents at 127, 135, 148, 193.

requested monitoring of Wikipedia pages for changes<sup>8</sup> and announced its plans to set up social network profiles to monitor social network users.<sup>9</sup>

DHS required General Dynamics to monitor not just “potential threats and hazards” and “events with operational value,” but also paid the company to “identify[] media reports that reflect adversely on the U.S. Government [or] DHS . . . .”<sup>10</sup> The DHS clearly intended to “capture public reaction to major government proposals.”<sup>11</sup> DHS instructed the media monitoring company to generate summaries of media “reports on DHS, Components, and other Federal Agencies: positive and negative reports on FEMA, CIA, DOS, ICE, etc. as well as organizations outside the DHS.”<sup>12</sup>

The documents obtained by EPIC through its Freedom of Information Act lawsuit led to a Congressional hearing on DHS social network and media monitoring program.<sup>13</sup> EPIC submitted a statement for the record for that hearing opposing the agency’s media monitoring and called for the immediate end of the program.<sup>14</sup> Members of Congress expressed concern about the federal agency’s plan to monitor social media with Congressman Bernie Thompson stating, “The public must be confident that interacting with DHS on a website, blog, or Facebook will not result in surveillance or the compromise of constitutionally protected rights.”<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> *Id.* at 124, 191.

<sup>9</sup> *Id.* at 128.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 51, 195.

<sup>11</sup> *Id.* at 116.

<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at 183, 198.

<sup>13</sup> See *DHS Monitoring of Social Networking and Media: Enhancing Intelligence Gathering and Ensuring Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security*, 112th Cong. (2012).

<sup>14</sup> Marc Rotenberg, President and Ginger McCall, EPIC Open Government Project Director, *Statement for the Record for Hearing on DHS Monitoring of Social Networking and Media: Enhancing Intelligence Gathering and Ensuring Privacy* (Feb. 16, 2012), <https://epic.org/privacy/socialmedia/EPIC-Stmt-DHS-Monitoring-FINAL.pdf>.

<sup>15</sup> Andrea Stone, *DHS Monitoring of Social Media Under Scrutiny by Lawmakers*, Huffington Post, Feb. 16, 2012, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/16/dhs-monitoring-of-social-media\\_n\\_1282494.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/16/dhs-monitoring-of-social-media_n_1282494.html); *Congress Grills Department of Homeland Security*, EPIC, Feb. 16, 2012, <https://epic.org/2012/02/congress-grills-department-of-.html>.

Given the history of government misuse of social media monitoring, EPIC is skeptical of the State Department's proposal to use social media to scrutinize visa applicants during the vetting process. EPIC opposes this proposal.

## **II. The Lack of Transparency Surrounding the Department's Proposal Increases the Prospect of Abuse, Mission Creep, and Disproportionate Risks for Marginalized Groups**

It is not clear from the information provided by the agency how the State Department intends to use the social media identifiers. The agency only vaguely refers to "established Department guidance" to address any limits on collection. However, the State Department has not disclosed this guidance so it is impossible to evaluate agency's methodology. It is also unclear what benefit to national security the government hopes to gain from the collection of social media information. Louis Rodi, deputy assistant director of ICE Homeland Security Investigations' National Security Program, said: "We haven't found anything that would preclude someone from getting a visa through social media alone. But, you never know, the day may come when social media will actually find someone that wasn't in the government systems we check."<sup>16</sup> The vague descriptions of this program make it ripe for mission creep and abuse.

Other federal agencies have a history of using social media for controversial purposes. For example, DHS has monitored social and other media for dissent and criticism of the agency.<sup>17</sup> Will the State Department monitor for similar speech that is critical of U.S. policy? Will mere dissent constitute grounds for denying entry into the U.S.? Additionally, will alien visitors who provide their social media identifiers open up their social network associations to

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<sup>16</sup> George Joseph, *Extreme Digital Vetting of Visitors to the U.S. Moves Forward Under a New Name*, ProPublica (Nov. 22, 2017), <https://www.propublica.org/article/extreme-digital-vetting-of-visitors-to-the-u-s-moves-forward-under-a-new-name>.

<sup>17</sup> Marc Rotenberg, President and Ginger McCall, EPIC Open Government Project Director, *Statement for the Record for Hearing on DHS Monitoring of Social Networking and Media: Enhancing Intelligence Gathering and Ensuring Privacy*, 1-3, Feb. 16, 2012, <https://epic.org/privacy/socialmedia/EPIC-Stmt-DHS-Monitoring-FINAL.pdf>.

scrutiny? How long will social media identifiers be retained and who will they be shared with? How will the DOS prevent Muslim and Arab Americans from being scrutinized more harshly?

Additionally, what information will the social media identifiers be combined with? Will the State Department use the social media identifiers to obtain additional information about the applicant from social media companies? Will applicants be informed if the information obtained from their social media accounts led to the denial of their application? And does the acquisition of social media identifiers place at risk the privacy and security of account holders? Is State Department prepared to accept liability if the practice leads to identity theft or financial fraud?

*Answers to these questions should be provided prior to adoption of the agency's proposal to acquire the social media identifiers of people suspected of no crime.*

This proposal leaves the door open for abuse, mission creep, and the disproportionate targeting of Muslim and Arab Americans among other groups. This proposal is especially alarming in light of past misuses of social media from all levels of government<sup>18</sup> as well as the Trump administration's controversial travel ban.<sup>19</sup> The State Department has provided no details of how the agency will tailor the use of social media identifiers to ensure their use does not expand beyond the stated purpose or prevent the targeting of individuals merely engaged in First Amendment protected activities.

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<sup>18</sup> Elizabeth Dwoskin, *Police Are Spending Millions of Dollars to Monitor the Social Media of Protesters and Suspects*, Washington Post, Nov. 18, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/11/18/police-are-spending-millions-to-monitor-the-social-media-of-protesters-and-suspects/>; *Map: Social Media Monitoring By Police Departments, Cities, and Counties*, Brennan Center for Justice, Nov. 16, 2016, <https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/map-social-media-monitoring-police-departments-cities-and-counties>; Eric Yoder, *Beware What You Post: Federal Employees May Face Government Scrutiny on Social Media*, Washington Post, May 12, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/05/12/beware-what-you-post-federal-employees-may-face-government-snooping-on-social-media/>.

<sup>19</sup> Alex Emmons, *Activists Worry That Social Media Vetting of Visa Applicants Could Quietly Expand Trump's Muslim Ban*, The Intercept, Mar. 23, 2017, <https://theintercept.com/2017/03/23/activists-worry-that-social-media-vetting-of-visa-applicants-could-quietly-expand-trumps-muslim-ban/>.

### III. Indiscriminate Scrutiny of Social Media Accounts Chills First Amendment Protected Activities

The State Department's proposal to collect social media identifiers of visa applicants also implicates the First Amendment and will have a chilling effect on protected speech. Freedom of speech and expression are core civil liberties and have been strongly protected by the Constitution and the U.S. courts.<sup>20</sup> These rights extend to non-U.S. citizens.<sup>21</sup>

Many people around the world use social media, including Facebook and Twitter, to support democratic movements and to campaign for political reform.<sup>22</sup> But these political views reflect the specific circumstances of national political systems and regional political conflict, and there is some risk that comments taken out of context could discourage political reform efforts. For example, social media is credited with empowering the Arab Spring and allowing Egyptians to remove former President Hosni Mubarak from power.<sup>23</sup> Social media also played a pivotal role in the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Turkey and the recent anti-Putin protests in Russia, which were sparked by a blog post and YouTube video.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> See, e.g., *United States v. Stevens*, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (holding that the "First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs"); see also *NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson*, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists was related to the right of freedom of association and fell under the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); *City of Los Angeles v. Patel*, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015) (holding that a city ordinance that required hotels to make their registries available to the police on demand was unconstitutional under the 4<sup>th</sup> Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).

<sup>21</sup> See David Cole, *Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as Citizens?*, 25 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 367-388 (2003) ("foreign nationals are generally entitled to the equal protection of the laws, to political freedoms of speech and association, and to due process requirements of fair procedure where their lives, liberty, or property are at stake.").

<sup>22</sup> Sophie Hutchinson, *Social media Plays Major Role In Turkey Protests*, BBC, Jun. 4, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22772352>; David Auerbach, *The Bernie Bubble*, Slate, Feb. 17, 2016, [http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future\\_tense/2016/02/the\\_bernies\\_sanders\\_campaign\\_owes\\_a\\_lot\\_to\\_social\\_media.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/02/the_bernies_sanders_campaign_owes_a_lot_to_social_media.html).

<sup>23</sup> Amitava Kumar, *'Revolution 2.0': How Social Media Toppled A Dictator*, NPR, Feb. 8, 2012, <http://www.npr.org/2012/02/08/145470844/revolution-2-0-how-social-media-toppled-a-dictator>; Ramesh Srinivasan, *Taking Power Through Technology in the Arab Spring*, Al Jazeera, Oct. 26, 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/2012919115344299848.html>.

<sup>24</sup> Steve Dorsey, *Turkey's Social Media And Smartphones Key To 'Occupy Gezi' Protests*, Huffington Post, Jun. 10, 2013, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/09/turkey-social-media-smartphones-occupy-gezi->

The State Department contends that obtaining social media identifiers, presumably to view user accounts, will provide more information to be used in the vetting process.<sup>25</sup> However, the proposal assumes that social media provides an accurate picture of a person and those they are close with. People connect with others on social media for many reasons. An individual's "friend" on a social media site could range from a close friend to an acquaintance to someone they may never have met. Often individuals connect to people on social media who have completely different perspectives and world views. Furthermore, the proposal fails to state to what extent possible connections will be used in the vetting process and whether the social media accounts of U.S. citizens may be used as part of the vetting process.

The proposal also fails to explain how the State Department will use social media as part of the vetting process. Many individuals have been on social media for years and have created a permanent record of their lives.<sup>26</sup> Teenagers are routinely warned to be careful of what they post on social media,<sup>27</sup> however teenagers and adults have made posts on social media which they later regret and may not be an actual reflection of who they are.<sup>28</sup> This should be taken into account when using social media to vet those entering the country. Social media does not necessarily reflect who a person truly is and taking posts out of context has the potential to wrongly deny people entry because of an inside joke or posturing that the State Department does

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protests\_n\_3411542.html; Julia Ioffe, *What Russia's Latest Protests Mean for Putin*, *The Atlantic*, Mar. 27, 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/03/navalny-protests-russia-putin/520878/>.

<sup>25</sup> Notice.

<sup>26</sup> Alexandra Mateescu et. al., *Social Media Surveillance and Law Enforcement*, DATA & CIVIL RIGHTS, Oct. 27, 2015, [http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2015-1027/Social\\_Media\\_Surveillance\\_and\\_Law\\_Enforcement.pdf](http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2015-1027/Social_Media_Surveillance_and_Law_Enforcement.pdf).

<sup>27</sup> Franki Rosenthal, *Caution ahead: The dangers of social media*, SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 2, 2016, <http://www.sun-sentinel.com/teenlink/college/tl-caution-ahead-the-dangers-of-social-media-20160202-story.html>.

<sup>28</sup> Alyssa Giacobbe, *6 ways social media can ruin your life*, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 2014, <https://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2014/05/21/ways-social-media-can-ruin-your-life/St8vHIIdqCLk7eRsvME3k5K/story.html>.

not understand from viewing certain information in isolation.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, the proposal runs the risk of making what is not on social media seem suspect. Some individuals may not be active on social media or may not have any social media accounts at all and the Department has failed to say what impact, if any, this may have on the vetting process.

Understanding the context of social media activity is difficult for humans to analyze, but relying on algorithms to do so will be even more problematic. According to recent reporting, DHS has made its social media data “searchable by tone” to conduct emotional analysis on visa applicants.<sup>30</sup> It is not clear whether the State Department intends to use similar analysis methods. Use of such artificial intelligence tools raises many problems. It is difficult for algorithms to understand the complexity of language—sarcasm and slang are very difficult to detect.<sup>31</sup> The shortcomings of natural language processing could distort the results of an algorithm meant to classify statements by tone.

EPIC and a coalition of 56 civil rights, civil liberties, government accountability, human rights, immigrant rights, and privacy organizations sent a letter to DHS explaining the dangers of using machine learning and social media in the vetting process.<sup>32</sup> A coalition of 54 computer scientists, engineers, mathematicians also sent a letter to DHS stating that “no computational

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<sup>29</sup> Mateescu et. al., *Social Media Surveillance*; Brandon Giggs, *Teen failed for Facebook ‘joke’ is released*, CNN, Jul. 13, 2013 (discussing a teenager who was arrested after making a “threat” that, when viewed in context, appears to be sarcasm), <http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/12/tech/social-media/facebook-jailed-teen/>; Ellie Kaufman, *Social Media Surveillance Could have a Devastating Impact on Free Speech. Here’s Why.*, MIC, Jan. 19, 2016, <https://mic.com/articles/132756/social-media-surveillance-could-have-a-devastating-impact-on-free-speech-here-s-why>.

<sup>30</sup> Aaron Cantú and George Joseph, *Trump’s Border Security May Search Your Social Media by ‘Tone,’* The Nation (Aug. 23, 2017), available at <https://www.thenation.com/article/trumps-border-security-may-search-your-social-media-by-tone/>.

<sup>31</sup> *Id.*; Ben Conarck, *Sheriff’s Office’s Social Media Tool Regularly Yielded False Alarms*, The Florida Times-Union, May 30, 2017, <http://jacksonville.com/news/public-safety/metro/2017-05-30/sheriff-s-office-s-social-media-tool-regularly-yielded-false>.

<sup>32</sup> Civil Rights Coalition, Letter to The Honorable Elaine C. Duke, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security (Nov. 16, 2017), <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/Coalition%20Letter%20to%20DHS%20Opposing%20the%20Extrame%20Vetting%20Initiative%20-%2011.15.17.pdf>.

methods can provide reliable or objective assessments” to vet whether a person will become a positive or detrimental addition.<sup>33</sup> Algorithms are simply not equipped to understand the nuances of online communication and make positive or negative determinations about individuals.

Furthermore, the lack of algorithmic transparency amplifies these problems. If these algorithms are used to make decisions about someone’s ability to enter the U.S., they should not be secret. Without algorithmic transparency, algorithms used to profile people are prone to errors and abuse.<sup>34</sup> Many of the problems caused by algorithms used in the criminal justice system are present in the immigration context as well. Law enforcement officials often use algorithms to determine the guilt of a criminal defendant, while denying the defendant access to the source code that produced those results.<sup>35</sup> Similarly, an algorithm could determine whether immigrants are denied visas. Without access to the source code, it is impossible to identify errors in the analysis or determine why an individual was denied a visa. If the State Department intends to delegate its lawful decision-making authority to process visa applications to computers, it should disclose the training data used to train the algorithm and the code that produced the decisions.

Government programs that threaten important First Amendment rights are immediately suspect and should only be undertaken where the government can demonstrate a compelling interest that cannot be satisfied in other way.<sup>36</sup> Government programs that scrutinize online comments, dissent, and criticism for the purpose of vetting visitors prior to entry into the U.S. send a chilling message to all users of social media—which increasingly provides important forums to share ideas, engage in debates, and explore new ideas.

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<sup>33</sup> See Computer Scientist Coalition, Letter to The Honorable Elaine C. Duke, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security (Nov. 16, 2017), <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/Technology%20Experts%20Letter%20to%20DHS%20Opposing%20the%20Extreme%20Vetting%20Initiative%20-%2011.15.17.pdf>.

<sup>34</sup> EPIC, *Algorithmic Transparency*, <https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/>.

<sup>35</sup> EPIC, *Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System*, <https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/>.

<sup>36</sup> See, e.g., *NAACP v. Button*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); *Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n*, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

Concern over the how the government uses social media is widespread and several questions remain unanswered. Earlier this year, several members of the House of Representatives sent a letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions raising concerns about how the federal government and federal law enforcement agencies used technologies that monitored social media.<sup>37</sup> Those Representatives noted how social media was effectively being used to monitor people who were suspected of no wrongdoing in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights stating:

There is evidence that social media data has been used to monitor protests and activists...An investigator at the Oregon Department of Justice used a service called DigitalStakeout to search Twitter for tweets using the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter. On the basis of his tweets – which included political cartoons and commentary but no indications of criminal activity or violence – the Department’s own Director of Civil Rights was deemed a “threat to public safety.”<sup>38</sup>

The same concerns are present in DOS’s current proposal and these concerns must be addressed before any further steps are taken.

#### **IV. The Demand for an Individual’s Personal Identifier Raises Particular Privacy Concerns**

The request for “social media identifiers” raises a related concern – this particular type of personal information is the key that ties together discrete bits of personal data.<sup>39</sup> In the past, the United States has sought to regulate the collection and use of the Social Security Number

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<sup>37</sup> Letter to Jeff Sessions from Keith Ellison et al., May 2, 2017, <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3696481-House-Democrats-Letter-to-Sessions-re-Social.html>.

<sup>38</sup> *Id.*

<sup>39</sup> *Social Security Numbers*, EPIC, <https://epic.org/privacy/ssn/>.

precisely because of the concern that this leads to government profiling.<sup>40</sup> The availability of the SSN has been shown to contribute to identity theft and financial fraud.<sup>41</sup>

A social media identifier is not private in the sense that it is a secret. But the collection of a social media identifier by the government does raise privacy concerns because it enables enhanced profiling and tracking of individuals. Furthermore, an individual has no way of knowing who in the government may be tracking them and for how long that surveillance could continue. What is initially presented as a way to vet visa applicants can turn into unwarranted, large scale surveillance of innocent people. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director Tom Homan has indicated that he wants to implement “continuous vetting” after an applicant’s visa has been granted.<sup>42</sup> This underscores the concern that DOS and other agencies will utilize this social media information, not just to make visa and other immigration determinations, to perpetually monitor immigrants. The Notice does not specify whether they intend to do this, and whether they will preserve an individual’s records of this information after the vetting process is complete.

Finally, we wish to remind the agency that a central purpose of the Privacy Act of 1974 was to prevent the federal government from establishing secret profiles on individuals that could result in adverse determinations. Such systems violate not only the right to privacy but often produce outcomes that are inaccurate, unfair, and simply wrong.

For these reasons we urge the agency to withdraw its proposal to collect and use social media identifiers to make visa determinations.

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<sup>40</sup> Testimony of Marc Rotenberg, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, "Use of Social Security Number as a National Identifier," Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (February 27, 1991). republished Marc Rotenberg, "The Use of the Social Security Number as a National Identifier," *Computers & Society*, vol. 22, nos. 2, 3, 4 (October 1991); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §552a (2016).

<sup>41</sup> *Identity Theft*, EPIC, <https://epic.org/privacy/idtheft/>; *Social Security Numbers*, EPIC, <https://epic.org/privacy/ssn>.

<sup>42</sup> Tal Kopan, *Vetting of Social Media, Phones Possible as Part of Travel Ban Review*, CNN (Sept. 12, 2017), available at <http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/12/politics/travel-ban-next-steps/index.html>.

## V. Conclusion

EPIC recommends that DOS withdraw its proposal to collect social media identifiers. The problems with collecting social media identifiers and scrutinizing the social media accounts of persons not suspected of any wrongdoing are significant and far-reaching. DOS has provided little transparency in how the agency plans to use social media identifiers collected from alien visitors. The proposal undermines privacy and is contrary to First Amendment rights of speech, expression, and association.

Respectfully submitted,

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