prioritize candidate workshop invitees. While responsible for the overall project, in particular, the TOL will be responsible for the day-to-day project operations, set project schedules, and ensure appropriate staff are available as needed; review and comment to the technical staff on the literature reviews and outlines and ensure timely performance, submittal of deliverables, and monitor and keep project spending within budget; coordinate the literature review and editing activities with a technical editor; assist the Program Manager in chairing the workshop; and provide management oversight of project staff for the entire project.

The Senior Advisors will attend the kick-off meeting, planning meetings, and the workshop. The Senior Advisors will review and comment on draft versions of the literature reviews, facilitator’s discussion guide and the workshop notes. During breaks at the workshop, the advisors will consult with the facilitator and suggest particular points that need clarification or topics that emerge during the discussion. Senior Advisors will hold advanced degrees in relevant disciplines and more than 10 years experience in administering social research projects.

The Workshop Logistics Manager will attend the kick-off meeting; manage logistical arrangements for attendees including travel for invited participants whose costs will be covered; manage preparation and production of workshop materials; and plan, contract for, and manage all venue logistics for the workshop. The Logistics Manager will also help draft routine communications with workshop attendees and oversee the Project Assistant.

The Project Assistant will assist the Workshop Logistics Manager plus handle travel arrangements for invited participants, clerical activities such as the mailing of workshop invitations, information, and background materials; compile the attendee list; arrange reproduction and delivery of workshop materials; and prepare workshop materials including participants’ nametags and name plates.

IHSS has qualified, experienced, and appropriately trained persons who can serve the role of Workshop Facilitator. The facilitator’s role will be to “police” discussions, keeping participants on topic, highlighting important points, moving the discussion along, ensuring that all participants are engaged in the dialogue, and keeping the workshop on schedule. For purposes of budgeting, we have included a senior-level staff person with experience that includes facilitating meetings with a wide variety of attendees including technical professionals. Once specific workshop dates have been identified, we will be able to identify and follow up with one or more candidate facilitators to schedule their assistance during the workshop.

We have also allocated hours for a Technical Writer to take notes during the conference and compile the final summary and copy edit a final report.
October 15, 2009

DRAFT

Workshop on Public Perceptions of Emerging National Security Technologies and Processes

Understanding Public Perceptions of Civil Liberties and Civil Rights in Relation to Emerging Security Technologies and Processes

Prepared by:

(b) (4), (b) (6)

Project Leads

(b) (4), (b) (6)
Introduction

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 had a dramatic impact on U.S. mass public opinion. The vivid and immediate nature of the events—broadcast live and viewed simultaneously by many Americans—caused visceral reactions that transformed the political environment. In a familiar pattern known as the “rally-round-the-flag” phenomenon, public perceptions of threat and feelings of anger and disbelief translated into strong bipartisan support for President George W. Bush and his administration’s anti- and counterterrorism policies. As had occurred in prior crises, fear and uncertainty led a malleable public to seek answers from political, cultural, and religious elites. Within this permissive context, the USA PATRIOT Act was passed in October, 2001. This act marked the initial stage of the “war on terrorism” which focused on other potential threats within the United States that could be revealed through the use of investigatory tactics that infringed upon the civil rights and liberties of U.S. citizens. The Congress acknowledged the emergency nature of this legislation by including a sunset provision that required that the act be reauthorized in 2006. By then, declining perceptions of the threat from terrorism and temporal distance from the events of 9/11 led to increased opposition to measures that constrained the civil rights and liberties of average Americans. As portions of the act are again set to expire on December 31, 2009, political battles over renewal legislation are currently ensuing between liberal Democrats and civil liberties advocates and representatives of the Department of Justice under the Obama administration. The current political environment reflects a return to the traditional pattern of U.S. public skepticism regarding government intrusiveness. The permissive post-9/11 public has been replaced by a cautious and protective public that must be persuaded of the necessity of exchanging civil rights and liberties protections for security from the threat of domestic and international terrorism.

Past research on U.S. mass public opinion regarding civil rights and liberties focused on tolerance of political dissent by “noxious” groups representing extremes within the American political spectrum. This research examined reactions to civil disobedience by communists, neo-Nazis, the KKK, feminists, religious fundamentalists, and other groups. These early findings revealed strong abstract support for democratic principles of free speech and tolerance, but weak support for the application of these principles in specific circumstances involving an “other” that was disliked. Later research benefitted from theories developed in the fields of economics, psychology, and
neuroscience and attempted to discern the processes through which perceptions of threats to civil rights and liberties are formed. The models based on these observations included cost-benefit tradeoff, group/out-group identification, individual personality traits, understanding of democratic norms, emotional responses, and situational factors. These researchers posited a complex and diverse process that could only be captured by including multiple variables measured through multiple methods. A further layer of sophistication has been added by recent experimental and survey research examining how political elites “frame” the issues to increase the likelihood of public support or opposition. This latest research acknowledges the fact that these perceptions are formed within competitive communication domains. After 9/11 this literature substantively moved to the very real trade-offs within the context of threats from international terrorism, but the underlying processes observed vary more in intensity and content than in form.

This literature review of U.S. public perception of civil rights and liberties in the context of technology and national security proceeds as follows. The first section offers a clarification of the separate concepts of civil rights and civil liberties in the legal tradition of the United States. The second section looks at pre-9/11 research on public perceptions of civil rights and civil liberties. Research within this era focused primarily on tolerance/intolerance towards dissident groups rather than technology and national security, but the patterns observed, contextual factors identified, and models developed to explain these behaviors have been transported into this substantive domain. The third section reviews the post-9/11 literature that examines the willingness of the U.S. public to make the tradeoff between civil rights and liberties and security. This section identifies variables of particular significance in the process of reaching judgments regarding the tradeoff, discusses the role of emotion and impact of media framing, and examines critiques of the extant literature. The fourth section lists some of the key issues affecting public acceptance of technologies that may infringe on civil liberties and the fifth section discusses the concept of the “persuadable public.” A final section concludes with a summary of best practices in measuring the U.S. public’s willingness to trade liberty for security and willingness to accept the deployment of intrusive homeland security technologies.

I. Clarifying Concepts

It may be useful at the outset of this literature review to clarify the distinction (however muddy) between civil rights and civil liberties. Though the terms are often used interchangeably in public and media discourse, legal scholars tend to view civil liberties as a subset of civil rights. For our purposes here, civil rights are those rights granted to U.S. citizens through the constitution and later acts of Congress. These rights may be both positive (“citizens can…”) and negative (“government shall not…”).
An illustration of civil rights can be found in the 13th and 14th amendments to the U.S. constitution. The 13th amendment abolished slavery while the 14th amendment defined citizenship rights and extended to all born or naturalized citizens "due process" and the "equal protection of the laws" (U.S. Constitution).

Civil liberties are usually conceived as freedom from unwanted government intervention or interference in the lives of the citizenry. Liberties are generally negative and impose constraints on government action: An illustration of civil liberties can be found in the "bill of rights," the initial ten amendments to the U.S. constitution ratified in 1791. It is the protections against illegal searches and seizures (4th amendment), right to bear arms (2nd amendment), right to speedy trial and right to face accuser (6th amendment), freedom from self-incrimination (5th amendment), and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment (8th amendment) that are most subject to infringement by homeland security measures. Indeed, thought not specifically stated in the constitution, a "right to privacy" has emerged through Supreme Court decisions like Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) and Roe v. Wade (1973). Civil libertarians argue that this right is a "penumbra" (surrounding shadow) implied by the first four amendments in particular. Given the current composition of the Supreme Court, the scope of this implied right is likely to be limited in the near future.

II. Pre-9/11 Research on U.S. Public Perceptions of Civil Rights and Liberties

As usual in the social sciences, the earliest work on U.S. public perceptions of civil rights and liberties was inspired by puzzling behavior in the real world. Researchers observed that although overwhelming majorities of U.S. citizens expressed widespread support for democratic principles like free speech and tolerance for dissenting opinion, attacks on communists, gays and lesbians, neo-Nazis, and proponents of civil rights for African-Americans were quite common. These troubling events led scholars to question whether the U.S. public actually possessed and understood these democratic values, or whether they were simply responding to surveys in a socially desirable manner. McClosky (1964) and McClosky and Brill (1983) found that the U.S. public did comprehend and express support for these abstract principles in a consistent manner across multiple surveys. Unfortunately, they also found that the U.S. public consistently rejected specific applications of these principles to "noxious groups" (Marcus et al. 1995, p. 8; see also Gibson 1992). Since these findings appeared to undermine democracy in the United States, the factors generating the observed intolerance became the focus of research.

Marcus et al. (1995, p. 8-9) summarize the four explanations that dominated early research on political intolerance in the United States. First, the public might comprehend democratic principles but fail to recognize the need for consistent application of these principles to all groups (McClosky and Brill 1983). Second,
individual Americans may have been socialized into possessing negative feelings for particular subgroups (mainly racial or ethnic) and not recognize them as fully entitled to the rights extended to others (Brady and Sniderman 1985). Third, members of the public may have felt that groups that rejected democratic principles themselves (particularly communists and neo-Nazis) should not be allowed to enjoy these privileges (Sullivan et al. 1982). Fourth, some members of the public may have recognized that accepting principles of tolerance and free speech could compromise other principles such as patriotism or maintaining public order. The fundamental problem with each of these explanations is that they explain intolerance as driven by beliefs and predispositions, ignoring the role of threat, emotion, and contemporaneous information about the subject group and political context. The next wave of scholarship on intolerance explored the process of opinion formation—asking fundamental questions about how people think (cognition) and feel (affect or emotion) about civil rights and liberties.

One of the earliest and most widely cited examples of this new way of thinking about political tolerance was based on 30 in-depth interviews of U.S. citizens (originally part of McClosky’s 1977 study) rather than the analysis of broad-based survey data (Chong 1993). The in-depth interview transcripts provided the researcher with a running log of how subjects reason through political dilemmas. Chong observed that the initial framing of the issue was the key to understanding the survey response (1993, p. 868). Prominent cues in the survey prompt tended to elicit considerations of democratic norms and produce tolerance, or elicit considerations of the costs of individual behavior and produce intolerance. Without much time to process the information (i.e. in a typical survey situation) the initial framing could be hasty and highly variant, driven by gut-level emotion, and “off the tops of their heads” (1993, p. 869; see also Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997 on the role of media in framing the issues). However, with the deliberation encouraged during the in-depth interviews, the process came closer to “bounded rationality” as respondents considered new information, competing values, and the potential costs and benefits associated with the trade-offs between civil rights and liberties and other ideals. The observed rationality was “bounded” because participants continued to be constrained by the initial framing of the issue (i.e. anchoring and adjustment), their own understanding of (and attachment to) democratic norms, their personal knowledge and experience with the issue, and their perceptions of the subject group. One attempt to develop a more deductive and comprehensive theory of the role of cognition and affect in civil rights and liberties deliberations can be found in Marcus et al. (1995).

One of the last studies of intolerance in the Pre-9/11 era expanded the study of boundedly rational trade-offs to include multiple competing values (Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz 2001). The authors offered a “multiple values model” that looked at the degree
to which value clarity versus value conflict affected both initial tolerance decisions and the pliability of these decisions in the face of counterargument. As expected, when values are ranked hierarchically and unambiguously the dominant value generates the corresponding behavior (tolerance or intolerance). However, when value conflict was observed, the authors found an inclination to forbearance and yet a susceptibility to counterargument. Indeed, tolerant individuals experiencing value conflict were more likely to change their initial position than the intolerant. The general inclination to tolerance among those participants experiencing value conflict challenged some of the observations generated by the work of Alvarez and Brehm (2002) on ambivalence and uncertainty. However, the pliability of the initially tolerant supports Alvarez and Brehm's (2002) work on equivocation. Once again, the "bounded" nature of the observed rationality was demonstrated by the inclusion of control variables such as self-esteem, ideology, political knowledge, education, age, gender, and perception of threat from the subject group.

III. Post-9/11 Research on U.S. Public Perceptions of Civil Rights and Liberties

The post-9/11 research on U.S. public perceptions of civil rights and liberties responded to a new set of empirical puzzles. The focus on tolerance and democratic norms was replaced by an emphasis on security, threat perceptions, and a willingness to give up one's own civil rights and liberties in exchange for protection from the threat of terrorism. The underlying model of individual cognition and affect driving a boundedly rational decision making process was unchanged, but the inputs to that process and the importance of the decisions were dramatically altered. Though American Muslims were not rounded up and interned like the Nisei Japanese of World War II, the USA PATRIOT Act and other domestic homeland security measures threatened to infringe on the civil liberties of many American citizens and prominent racial and ethnic subgroups within the larger population. This research agenda was furthered by ideological opposition (among some in academia) to the Bush administration's "War on Terrorism" and efforts to "securitize the domestic sphere" (Baker, 2003).

The identification of a new set of "control variables" engendered by the post-9/11 shift in research is well underway. Davis and Silver (2004) quoted from a New York Times article on 9/29/2001 in which U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor noted, "We're likely to experience more restrictions on our personal freedom than has ever been the case in this country.... It will cause us to re-examine some of our laws pertaining to criminal surveillance, wiretapping, immigration and so on." This observation led the researchers to engage in an NSF-sponsored project to survey Americans about their willingness to trade off civil liberties and personal freedoms for a greater sense of security. They were particularly interested in individuals' threat
perception, trust in government, dogmatism, interpersonal trust, national pride/patriotism, ideology, race/ethnicity, education, age, and locality (urban or rural). Their survey was conducted very soon after the attacks of 9/11 (from 11/14/2001 through 1/15/2002) and provides a snapshot of post-9/11 public sentiment.

Davis and Silver (2004, p.30) distinguished between sociotropic threat (to “society and cherished values and norms”) and personal threat. They found that both types of threat interacted with their trust in government measure to alter perceptions of the liberties vs. security trade-off. As anticipated, high threat perceptions and high trust in government scores are associated with a greater willingness to trade civil liberties for security. Essentially, the perception of threat generates the sense of a situation that requires a response, while trust in government generates support for this particular solution. Dogmatism, possessing a closed and inflexible belief system, was also strongly associated with a willingness to make the liberties vs. security trade-off (2004, p.36). Dogmatic individuals tend to “trust in authority” and are often pessimistic, fearful, and intolerant of other viewpoints. As Marcus et al. demonstrated earlier (1995), some individuals will be personally predisposed to make the tradeoff regardless of the level of threat, due to elements of their individual psychology. Davis and Silver (2004, p. 37) also found that African-Americans were much less willing to make the tradeoff than Whites or Latinos. They suggest that groups that have had to fight for their rights over extended periods of time will be less likely to forfeit or accept limitations on those rights even in perceived emergencies. Finally, liberals were less willing to make the tradeoff than conservatives (ceteris paribus), but were willing to accept the tradeoff when they perceived high threat. Given the temporal proximity of the Davis and Silver survey to the events of 9/11 and the importance they ascribe to threat perception, it is unlikely that future studies will replicate the high levels of willingness to trade civil liberties for security that they observed. However, the variables they identify and the interactions they observed provide a baseline for future work in this area.

Highlighting the importance of the threat perception variable in post-9/11 research on the civil liberties vs. security tradeoff, a number of scholars have examined the emotional and psychological reactions of the U.S. public to the terrorist attacks. Huddy et al. (2005, see also Lerner et al. 2003) attempted to distinguish between increased perceptions of threat and increased anxiety. A number of studies have demonstrated that anxiety “leads to an overestimation of risk and risk aversion whereas external and perceived threat increases support for outwardly focused retaliatory action” (Huddy et al. 2005, p. 593). In effect, the production of feelings of anxiety and helplessness is the goal of the terrorist attack, while the preferred government response is a sense of anger and hatred against the perpetrators. Huddy et al. (2005) found that the minority response to the events of 9/11 was fear and anxiety, the large majority of Americans perceived a significant threat to the United States but were not overly
anxious regarding the government's ability to deal with the threat. As predicted, those respondents feeling anxious and fearful were less supportive of military action and gave President Bush lower approval ratings. Conversely, those Americans perceiving a high threat accompanied by low anxiety were supportive of Bush administration action both domestically and internationally. This research fits with earlier studies (Chong 1993; Marcus et al. 1995) that demonstrated the role of emotion in civil liberties deliberations.

While much of the post-9/11 literature contributed to the overall finding that Americans were willing to trade civil liberties protections for security, Lewis (2005) noted with skepticism the systematic methodological errors that may have led to these conclusions. She identified four common flaws in the survey research conducted immediately after 9/11 and made a plea to use more sophisticated methods developed in psychology and behavioral economics. First, she noted that many questions posed to survey respondents involved proposed expansions of government capacity rather than specific efforts to curb civil liberties (2005, p. 24). For instance, significant majorities opposed efforts to monitor private telephone conversations and email or detain citizens suspected of crimes without due process. Conversely, sizable majorities supported "increased surveillance efforts" or "streamlining criminal procedures." Second, Lewis argued that the tradeoff is often presented as a simple one between a risk to abstract principles (civil liberties) and an immediate and tangible return (improved security). The probabilistic and possibly uncertain prospect of achieving the outcome is ignored and the efficacy of government action is assumed. Third, Lewis suggested that survey questions often leave the benefits of government action up to the imaginations of the respondents. The respondent may prefer immediate and substantial benefits (however unlikely) over discounted future diminishions of liberty (that are more likely to affect others anyway). Fourth, Lewis observed that survey questions usually focus on individual and isolated measures without bundling them together to reveal the scope of the threat to civil protections. If civil liberties concessions were viewed cumulatively, the public may be less willing to accept the individual tradeoffs. To correct these flaws, Lewis advocated the careful formulation of survey instruments and more rigorous analysis of survey results (2005, p. 26). She also called for a better understanding of risk behavior drawn from research in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics (such as Kahneman and Tversky's [1979] prospect theory). Finally, she noted the need for attention to the literature on "contingent valuation" to more appropriately value goods (like civil liberties) that are intangible and not traded on existing markets.

Beyond the more traditional research on the process of evaluating the liberties versus security tradeoff, Scheufle, Nisbet, and Ostman (2005) examined the impact of media exposure on willingness to make civil liberties concessions. Consistent with earlier work on media framing (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997) and the role of threat perception and anxiety (Huddy et al. 2005; Lerner et al. 2003), television viewing
(versus reading newspapers) was positively associated with support for expanded police powers and limits on privacy and freedom. Even liberals that viewed television heavily were more supportive of expanding police powers and were much closer to conservatives on that measure. The authors hypothesized that the mode of presentation was responsible for the results. On an emotional level, the shocking imagery and affect-laden responses of commentators (some openly weeping) was more likely to evoke an immediate perception of threat and anger (2005, p. 214). In the weeks after the attacks, television viewers were bombarded with instances of "civic religion" through telethons, memorial services, the search for survivors, and the statements of political leaders. On a cognitive level, consistent "terminology and framing" across most American television networks combined with presentations of evidence regarding the perpetrators and the details of the plot led to conclusions regarding the need for a response and the domestic vulnerabilities that must be remediated (2005, pp. 214-215). While newspaper readers were subjected to similar ideas and information, exposure was likely less repetitive and less emotionally evocative.

A final vein of post-9/11 research on U.S. public perceptions of civil rights and liberties explores the normative and practical implications of pursuing policies that threaten democratic principles. Gould (2002) asked what might happen when Americans stopped rallying-round-the-flag. In reaction to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, Gould wrote a fairly prescient account of a future of declining threat perception accompanied by media coverage of government error and incompetence. He also predicted an unintended civil libertarian backlash as American support for heightened security restrictions waned over time. From another disciplinary perspective, Annas (2002) offered a public health model for combating bioterrorism that refused to compromise civil liberties and endanger constitutional values. His critique of the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act argued against giving state public health officials "broad, arbitrary powers... without making them accountable" (Annas 2002, p. 1341). These authors (and others) questioned the conventional wisdom that civil rights and liberties and security in the face of terrorism are incompatible. This debate will continue so long as the perceived threat from terrorism declines and the public (and media) is more attentive to other domestic and international concerns.

IV. Special Considerations for Intersection of Technology and National Security

Little rigorous (and publicly available) academic work has been done regarding U.S. public perceptions of advanced national security technologies. To the extent that survey researchers have been interested in this subject, they have included specific questions on the acceptability of a particular technology or method that had become a part of the public discourse (ECHELON, Backscatter). This research has not explored
the dimensions of public acceptance regarding these technologies or the key variables of interest in forming public judgments regarding their application. However, we may look at public opinion research on other emerging technologies (nuclear, nano cites here) and public safety measures (non-lethal weapons cites here). These studies highlight a number of key variables that will affect the responses of U.S. citizens:

**Knowledge**- Is the technology familiar and well understood by the public? Adaptations of previously deployed technologies to a new environment (x-ray, metal detectors, surveillance) will be more acceptable than the introduction of new and poorly understood (or widely misunderstood) technologies. Studies of public acceptance of nano-technology are illustrative here: the public has difficulty grasping the basic science behind the technology and the Michael Crichton book *Prey* has prejudiced many readers against its application (nano cites).

**Perceived Risk/Uncertainty**- Slovic, Flynn, and Layman (1991) examined public perceptions of the risks associated with the Department of Energy's plans regarding storage of high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. They found that the long association of fear and “dread risk” (low likelihood, catastrophic outcomes) with nuclear technology served as an ongoing impediment to public acceptance of nuclear technology. Technologies associated with dread risk by the media and/or popular culture are unlikely to gain widespread acceptance.

**Target of Technology**- So long as the technology is applied against noxious groups the wider public may accept its application. Tear gas, pepper spray, rubber bullets, etc... are all acceptable so long as they are directed toward the appropriate target. However, Gould (2002) found that Americans are sensitive to accusations of discrimination and racial or ethnic profiling and prefer random applications of security measures in these circumstances.

**Intrusiveness of Technology**- Gould (2002) noted that Americans are more willing to pass through metal detectors than to be patted down and more willing to have their bags x-rayed than searched by hand (though the results are equivalent). Technologies generate resistance and public opposition when they are repetitive, intrusive, obvious, and impose a perceived cost. Hidden cameras, data mining, telecommunications monitoring, etc... can be utilized without public knowledge or opposition (unless done poorly and disclosed by the media).

**Potential for Harmful or Unintended Effects**- Non-lethal weapons cause burst eardrums, physical and psychological trauma, blindness, allergic reactions, and occasionally death (non-lethal citation). The severity of potential outcomes associated with the application of the technology will be weighed against perceived benefits from use. The controllability of the application of the technology to the intended target will also produce a public reaction. Tear gas that floats into a restaurant full of unsuspecting patrons or the pepper spray that chokes a toddler and her parents after a riotous victory
celebration at a college football game are examples of this problem. “Surgical” applications will almost always be preferred to broad-brush methods.

Potential for Abuse/Misuse- As Gould (2002) noted, the responsible parties using the technology should be perceived as competent. The response to Backscatter followed anecdotal reports that TSA gate agents were selecting out and fondling attractive female passengers. Reports of Sheriff's deputies using TASERs on themselves or nonthreatening subjects has led to opposition to their access to this technology.

Time Scale for Application- Technologies used during periods of high perceived threat should be withdrawn when the emergency or crisis no longer appears to exist. The U.S. public will chafe under restrictions or violations of personal freedoms that no longer seem necessary.

V. General Considerations Regarding the “Persuadable Public”

As can be gleaned from the previous discussion, segments of the U.S. citizenry hold strongly held attitudes about threats to civil rights and liberties. Unfortunately, other Americans are oblivious to just about any political issue under consideration. When considering the scope of the “persuadable public”—those attentive and responsive to rational and transparent advocacy—one must be sensitive to variables that constrain opinion movement, acceptance of new technologies, or tradeoffs involving civil liberties and security. In a study of wartime public opinion and openness to rational updating and attitude change, Gartner and Segura (2008) found immovable segments of the public (labeled hawks and doves) willing to maintain support or opposition to the Iraq war despite substantial changes to the balance of costs and benefits. However, they also found a smaller “evaluative public” responsive to new information about costs and benefits associated with ongoing military action. In terms of tradeoffs between civil rights/liberties and security and public acceptance of national security technology, we might posit 5 distinct clusters. One, the “inattentive public,” simply doesn’t care and will respond “don’t know” to any question probing their perceptions on the subject. A second, the “you had us at hello” public, possesses dogmatic or authoritarian personalities and will accept any measure that is proposed. A third, the “tin-hat brigade,” sees government conspiracies everywhere and will never accept the tradeoff between liberty and security. A fourth, the “industrious sheep,” read newspapers and watch television, but are more interested in their own lives and will simply follow cues from media and political elites. The fifth, “attentive/procedurally rational public,” will be somewhat fickle and constrained by the variables discussed above, but in the end will approximate a rational cost-benefit analysis (particularly if given time and educated about the issue). Public opinion measures and communication strategies should be geared toward the final two clusters; forming approximately 30-50% of the mass public.
Conclusions

[Best methods for studying state of public willingness to trade liberty for security]

[Best methods for studying public acceptance of national security technologies that may endanger rights/liberties].
Summary

Text goes here.

Contact Information

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References

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VIMS Literature Review

Draft Final

December 2009

Prepared for

Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division
Science and Technology Directorate
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

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1. Introduction

From its birthplace in the social sciences, scholarly interest in terrorism research has seen a significant increase over the past four decades, with a dispersion of interest to many sub-disciplines (Gordon, 2004; Reid & Chen, 2007). Although interest in political violence among academic disciplines has increased, two general observations about the existing research (that it has relied heavily on experts with little collaboration across disciplines and that most of it fails to provide any predictive power) can be broken down into five specific limitations. First, although theoretical work has occurred within academic sub-disciplines, no general theory of terrorism pervades across disciplines. Second, most of the empirical work to date has been disjointed, describing independent relationships between variables rather than offering an inclusive model that predicts political violence. A third, related limitation to previous work is that a number of typologies have been proposed, but again these fail to provide any predictive power and in some cases have not been operationally defined. A reliance on subject matter experts (SMEs) is a fourth problematic feature of previous work because SMEs tend to focus on a small number of groups and often omit information from their analysis that is contradictory to their opinions. Finally, previous research has largely been descriptive, rather than empirical analysis and predictive modeling. Followed by a detailed discussion of these issues provided below, and a discussion of the major theories of political violence, we offer a set of hypotheses to set up our predictive model. It is our hope that this model will address many of the shortcomings of previous research and at the same time contribute to the development of a more inclusive theoretical framework.

Much of the research to date has been descriptive in nature, relying heavily on SME opinion and qualitative analysis of documents (Schmid & Jongman, 2005; see for example volume edited by Crenshaw, 1995). Limiting analysis to descriptive work fails to provide anything that is predictive of future political violence (Silke, 2004a). Related to this is the problem of relying on SMEs. Panels of SMEs have been involved in classifying potentially violent groups and offering advice on the likelihood that they will become politically violent (Post et al., 2002b). At least three problems exist with having SMEs offer advice on potentially violent groups. First, given the relative speed with which organizations can turn violent, it is impractical to gather SMEs on a frequent basis to evaluate constantly updated information. Second, offering real-time assessments of organizations is difficult because experts often must rely so heavily on secondary sources of information (Silke, 2004b). A third problem with using SMEs, perhaps a product of relying on secondary sources of information, is that expert opinion has been found to be no more accurate in forecasting conflict than nonexpert opinion (Green & Armstrong, 2007), and in addition SMEs often discount data that disconfirm their opinions (Tetlock, 1999).

Theories from across the social sciences have been proposed for or applied to components of terrorism but none could be classified as a “grand” theory of terrorism. Some of the theories that have received empirical testing include relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970), resource mobilization theory (Tilly, 1978), ethnic competition theory (Oizak, 1990, 1992), affect control theory (Osgood et al., 1957, 1975; see Heise, 2007), rational choice theories (e.g., Enders & Sandler, 2006; Weede & Muller, 1990), and world systems theory (Bergesen & Lizardo, 2004; Lizardo, 2006, 2008).