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2 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA  
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5 LARRY D. HIBEL,

6 Petitioner,

No. 38876

7 vs

8 THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT  
9 COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,  
10 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF,  
11 HUMBOLDT, AND THE HONORABLE  
12 RICHARD A. WAGNER

13 Respondent,

14 and  
15 THE STATE OF NEVADA,  
16 Real Party in Interest

**FILED**

**MAR 15 2002**

JANETTE M. BLOOM  
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT  
BY *J. Reback*  
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

17 SUPPLEMENT TO ANSWER TO WRIT OF CERTIORARI

18 On February 6, 2002 and February 21, 2002 petitioner filed a motion and an errata  
19 requesting that he be allowed to supplement his writ of certiorari with a recent decision by  
20 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The state did not oppose the motion to supplement  
21 because it wanted to file a supplemental answer if the court granted the motion. On February  
22 25, 2002 this court entered an order granting petitioner's motion to supplement the writ of  
23 certiorari. Therefore the state submits this supplement for the court's consideration as a  
24 result of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control  
25 Board filed February 4, 2002.  
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27  
28 **RECEIVED**

FEB 28 2002

JANETTE M. BLOOM  
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT  
DEPUTY CLERK

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**LEGAL ARGUMENT**

**A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IN CAREY FAILS TO PROPERLY BALANCE THE INTEREST OF GOVERNMENT AND THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE.**

The Nevada Supreme Court is not obligated to follow the legal reasoning of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Blanton v. North Las Vegas Municipal Court, 103 Nev. 623, 748 P.2d 494 (1987) this court noted that decisions of federal circuit courts and panels are not binding on the court. The Nevada State Constitution binds the courts of this state to the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. The state urges this court not to adopt the rationale in Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Board, \_\_\_ F.3d \_\_\_ (Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Filed February 4, 2002) and to recognize that the opinion creates an unwarranted expansion of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights that the United States Supreme Court has declined to acknowledge and that other federal circuit courts have rejected. Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995).

The state argues in its answer to petitioner's writ of certiorari that this court should apply a balancing test when deciding if NRS 171.123(3) is unconstitutional. The state cited opinions from the United State Supreme Court in support of this position. In Carey the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied a balancing test but failed to adequately explain how requiring individuals to identify themselves violates the Fourth and/or Fifth Amendments. The only explanation given by the court is a reference to Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981) where the court stated "as a result of the demand for identification, the statutes bootstrap the authority to arrest on less than probable cause, and because the serious intrusion on personal security outweighs the mere possibility that identification might provide a link leading to arrest."

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2 The state finds it difficult to conceive how asking for identification is a “serious  
3 intrusion on personal security.” The answer to such a request does not give law enforcement  
4 “substantive information” of a crime. The request to provide identification does not require  
5 the person to explain his whereabouts at a particular time or his conduct prior to being  
6 detained by an officer. This information can only be described as neutral and non-  
7 substantive in nature. Therefore, the state believes that the Ninth Circuit Court’s depiction  
8 of the serious nature of asking for identification is skewed and fails to take into  
9 consideration the complexities of law enforcement.  
10

11 It is interesting to note that in the opinion the court describes Carey’s name as “not  
12 relevant to determining whether Carey had cheated.” Id at 1725 The state agrees with this  
13 assertion. The information itself is not relevant to the crime charged. However, it becomes  
14 very relevant for law enforcement purposes. When an officer has reasonable suspicion to  
15 detain a person he should be permitted, at a minimum, to know the name of the person he is  
16 confronting. So often routine stops turn into situations where an officer’s life is threatened.  
17 If the officer can obtain the person’s identity to determine their criminal history or  
18 outstanding warrants, it would cause the officer to act more prudent and alleviate the  
19 potential risk of harm to the officer and/or person being detained. Furthermore, since the  
20 Ninth Circuit deems this information as “not relevant” it can hardly be deemed compelled  
21 testimony under the Fifth Amendment or a threat to personal security under the Fourth  
22 Amendment.  
23  
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25 In light of the Carey opinion it is clear the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals believes  
26 an individual cannot be compelled to identify himself when detained on reasonable  
27 suspicion. With this opinion the court created an unwarranted dilemma for officers in the  
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1 State of Nevada. Applying the court's rationale it would appear that individuals stopped for  
2 committing a traffic violation are no longer required to produce identification when  
3 requested by the officer. A routine traffic stop is similar to a *Terry* stop that is based on  
4 reasonable suspicion. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); *See Dixon v. State*, 103  
5 Nev. 272, 737 P.2d 1162 (1987) If a person is not required to produce identification while  
6 being detained on reasonable suspicion then they certainly cannot be compelled to produce  
7 identification during a routine traffic stop. This essentially will prevent officers from  
8 obtaining the needed information to complete the traffic citation and result in the arrest of  
9 the driver. Perhaps this is the quid pro quo the Ninth Circuit had in mind when it deemed  
10 that requiring a person to produce identification is a "threat to personal security."

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13 The state fails to see any distinctions between this scenario and when a person is  
14 detained on reasonable suspicion. Each encounter involves a police presence. Each  
15 encounter requires the officer to do some investigation and gather information before  
16 making a decision. By creating a broad prophylactic rule in an attempt to protect individual  
17 rights, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has now placed law enforcement officers and  
18 citizens at greater risk. The state submits that this has tipped the scales in a direction that is  
19 unacceptable and should be rejected by this court.  
20


### 21 CONCLUSION

22 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's opinion falls short in properly balancing the  
23 interests of law enforcement with the constitutional rights of individuals. Requiring a  
24 person to provide identification while being detained on reasonable suspicion allows an  
25 officer to adequately perform his lawful duties while the act of providing identification  
26 constitutes a minimal intrusion into a person's life. The information itself is non-testimonial  
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in nature and does not provided substantive information about a particular crime. When weighing these competing interests it seems reasonable that a person can be arrested for failing to provide identification to an officer when that officer is lawfully engaged in performing his duties. The state urges this court to reject the "bootstrap" analysis propounded by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and adopt the position of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals as set forth in the Oliver and Albright opinions. These opinions are more reasonable in light of the complexities that law enforcement officers face each day.

Dated This 27 Day of February 2002.

  
Conrad Hafén  
Chief Deputy District Attorney

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**CERTIFICATE OF MAILING**

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b) I certify that I, am an employee of the Humboldt County District Attorney's Office and that on this 27<sup>th</sup> day of February, 2002 I deposited by a copy of to the following:

Attorney General's Office  
100 North Carson Street  
Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717

Supreme Court Clerk  
201 South Carson Street, #201  
Carson City, Nevada 89701

Public Defender  
511 East Robinson Street  
Carson City, Nevada 89701

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
PAIGE D. BROWN

# HUMBOLDT COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY

DAVID ALLISON  
DISTRICT ATTORNEY



POST OFFICE BOX 909  
WINNEMUCCA, NEVADA 89446

February 27, 2002

Supreme Court Clerk  
201 South Carson Street, Ste. 201  
Carson City, Nevada 89701



**RE: Hibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court - 38876**

Dear Clerk:

Enclosed please find original and three copies of Supplement to Answer to Writ of Certiorari regarding the above-entitled matter. Please file-stamp and return file-stamped copy to this office.

Thank you, if you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact our office.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Paige Brown".

Paige Brown  
Legal Secretary

:pb  
encl.