Spotlight on Surveillance
“National Network” of Fusion Centers Raises Specter of COINTELPRO
EPIC’s “Spotlight on Surveillance” project scrutinizes federal government programs that affect individual privacy. For more information, see previous Spotlights on Surveillance. This month, Spotlight shines on fusion centers, which have received $380 million in federal grants and millions more from state governments. There are 43 current and planned fusion centers in the U.S., and some states have more than one.
A “fusion center,” according to the Department of Justice, is a “mechanism to exchange information and intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by analyzing data from a variety of sources,” which includes private sector firms and anonymous tipsters. When local and state fusion centers were first created, they were purely oriented toward counterterrorism, but, over time and with the escalating involvement of federal officials, fusion centers “have increasingly gravitated toward an all-crimes and even broader all-hazards approach.”
The expansion of fusion center goals and increasing interaction with federal and private sector entities leads to a massive accumulation of data, raising questions of possible misuse or abuse. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seeks to create a “national network” of local and state fusion centers, tied into DHS’s “day-to-day activities.” This national network combined with the Department of Homeland Security’s plan to condition grant funding based on fusion center “compliance” with the federal agency’s priorities inculcates DHS with enormous domestic surveillance powers and evokes comparisons the publicly condemned domestic surveillance program COINTELPRO.
History of Fusion Centers
Source: Congressional Research Service
There are 43 current or planned fusion centers nationwide.
“Fusion centers” collect an enormous amount of data from law enforcement agencies, “public safety components, including fire, health, transportation, agriculture, and environmental protection,” and private sector organizations. A few state fusion centers had begun operations before September 11, 2001, but afterward, the number of centers grew rapidly.
A few months after the International Association of Chiefs of Police held a March 2002 summit on criminal intelligence, the group recommended the creation of a “Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council,” to create “a nationally coordinated, but locally driven, criminal intelligence generation and sharing process.” The Council would include local, state, federal and international agencies. The group also recommended against limiting intelligence sharing to terrorism-related data, suggesting instead that all “criminal intelligence” data be shared. Criminal intelligence was defined as “the combination of credible information with quality analysis – information that has been evaluated and from which conclusions have been drawn.”
A year later, the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (part of the Justice Department) also recommended the creation of a “Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council,” which would include private sector organizations as well as local, state, tribal, federal and international agencies. Global’s October 2003 report, “The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan,” sought to find “solutions and approaches for a cohesive plan to improve our nation’s ability to develop and share criminal intelligence.” Global highlighted several issues including: “the need to increase availability of information, from classified systems to local and state law enforcement agencies, for the prevention and investigation of crime in their jurisdictions”; “the need to identify an intelligence information sharing capability that can be widely accessed by local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement and public safety agencies”; and “the need to ensure that individuals’ constitutional rights, civil liberties, civil rights, and privacy interests are protected throughout the intelligence process.”
In May 2004, the Department of Justice announced it had followed up on Global’s recommendation and created the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council and said it “will serve to set national-level policies to implement the [National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan] and monitor its progress on the state and local level.” In December 2004, the President’s Homeland Security Advisory Council recommended “each State should establish an information center that serves as a 24/7 ‘all-source,’ multi-disciplinary, information fusion center,” yet noted this issue was “to be further investigated by the Working Group.”
Also in December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which directed the president to “create an information sharing environment for the sharing of terrorism information in a manner consistent with national security and with applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties.” Notably, the Act defined “information sharing environment” as “an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism information, which approach may include any methods determined necessary and appropriate for carrying out this section.” The Information Sharing Environment Program (managed by former Ambassador Thomas E. McNamara) was placed under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (J. Mike McConnell).
In July 2005, when fusion centers already were up and running in a number of states, the Global released its first set of guidelines for fusion centers, called “Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era -- Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at the Local, State, and Federal Levels -- the Law Enforcement Intelligence Component.” The set of guidelines currently followed, “Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era -- Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at the Local, State, and Federal Levels -- Law Enforcement Intelligence, Public Safety and the Private Sector,” was published in August 2006.
The Department of Homeland Security began funding state fusion centers in Fiscal Year 2004; as of December 2006, the agency has distributed $380 million in grants to state fusion centers and deployed federal personnel to these centers, as well. Today, there are 43 completed and planned state fusions centers nationwide; some states have more than one.
Voluntary Guidelines Do Not Ensure Protection of Privacy and Civil Liberties
Source: Federal Fusion Center GuidelinesThe Federal Guidelines envision a plethora of information entering and exiting the local and state fusion centers.
The federal Fusion Center Guidelines recommend that state fusion centers collect information on myriad issues: “Agriculture, Food, Water and the Environment, Banking and Finance, Chemical Industry and Hazardous Materials, Criminal Justice, Retail, Real Estate, Education, Emergency Services (Non-Law Enforcement), Energy, Government, Health and Public Health Services, Hospitality and Lodging, Information & Telecommunications, Military Facilities and Defense Industrial Base, Postal and Shipping, Private Security, Public Works, Social Services, [and] Transportation” State fusion centers can find this data by accessing a variety of systems, such as:
1. “Driver’s license,
2. Motor vehicle registration,
3. Location information (411, addresses, and phone numbers),
4. Law enforcement databases,
5. National Crime Information Center (NCIC),
6. Nlets -- The International Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing Network, and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC),
7. Criminal justice agencies,
8. Public and private sources (Security Industry databases, Identity Theft databases, Gaming Industry databases),
9. Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS)/Law Enforcement Online (LEO), U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), including the United States Private-Public Partnership (USP3) – formerly HSIN-CI. (Note: RISS, LEO, and DHS’s HSIN are currently collaborating on a network capability.),
10. Organizational and association resources (InfraGard, The Infrastructure Security Partnership),
12. Sex offender registries,
13. Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (VICAP),
14. Health- and Public Health-Related Databases (Public Health Information Network, Health Alert Network).”
When state fusion centers create and enforce their privacy policies, the federal Fusion Center Guidelines recommend that fusion centers “consider” Fair Information Practices, which are based on five principles:
- “There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret,
- There must be a way for a person to find out what information about the person is in a record and how it is used,
- There must be a way for a person to prevent information about the person that was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without the person’s consent,
- There must be a way for a person to correct or amend a record of identifiable information about the person,
- Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuses of the data.”
However, there is no mandate for the state fusion centers to follow these Guidelines or Fair Information Practices, and the Guidelines themselves are vague as to what privacy and security safeguards are strong. There no requirement that state fusion centers ensure the protection of individuals’ privacy and civil liberty rights. Therefore, state fusion centers could create and use records full of inaccurate data and refuse to allow judicially enforceable redress, access and correction.
In testimony to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (better known as the 9/11 Commission), EPIC Executive Director Marc Rotenberg explained the central findings from the Privacy Act of 1974, which remain relevant. In 1974, Congress said that:
- The privacy of an individual is directly affected by the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal information by federal agencies.
- The opportunities for an individual to secure employment, insurance, and credit, and his right to due process, and other legal protection are endangered by the misuse of certain information systems.
- In order to protect the privacy of individuals identified in information systems maintained by federal agencies, it is necessary and proper for the Congress to regulate the collection, maintenance, use and dissemination of information by such agencies.
The Privacy Act continues to play an important role in safeguarding the rights of Americans today. Such judicially enforceable rights are necessary, because it is difficult for agencies to ensure such a vast amount of data is being used according to privacy and civil liberty requirements. This is especially important in the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Civil Liberties (tasked with providing privacy and civil liberties training fusion centers) is one-twentieth the size of the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division. The discrepancy remains though DHS has 208,000 employees, almost twice the number of Department of Justice’s 104,000 employees.
Databases Used By Fusion Centers Are Error-Filled
It is well known that the databases that the fusion centers will be searching and linking together are full of mistakes. For example, the Social Security Administration’s Inspector General estimated in December 2006 that about 17.8 million records in Numerical Identification File have discrepancies with name, date of birth or death, or citizenship status. In the same report, the Inspector General also found numerous problems in the databases of Citizenship and Immigration Services.
At the Kentucky Office of Homeland Security, the Operations and Prevention Division "is focused on risk assessments and intelligence gathering. The chief objective of this division is to [establish] an Information and Intelligence Fusion Center."
Another relevant example concerns the Terrorist Screening Center. In 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 6 consolidated administration of the no-fly, selectee and other security watch lists under the jurisdiction of the Terrorist Screening Center. When the Department of Justice Inspector General reported on the Center in June 2005, “determined that the TSC could not ensure that the information in that database was complete and accurate.” He said, “Our review of the consolidated watch list identified a variety of issues that contribute to weaknesses in the completeness and accuracy of the data, including variances in the record counts between [two versions of the Terrorist Screening Database], duplicate records, missing or inappropriate handling instructions or categories, missing records, and inconsistencies in identifying information between TSDB and source records.”
Earlier this year, the head of the Transportation Security Administration said that the watch lists were being reviewed, and he expected to cut the list of 325,000 names in half. Last year, the director of TSA’s redress office revealed that more than 30,000 people who are not terrorists have asked the agency to remove their names from the lists since September 11, 2001.
Also, there have been numerous examples demonstrating the consequences of inaccurate and incomplete information in the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) system. In one case, a Los Angeles man was arrested five times, three at gunpoint, due to an error in the NCIC. An escaped prisoner had assumed the identity of an innocent person and then committed a robbery and murder. In another instance, a Phoenix resident who was pulled over for driving the wrong way down a one-way street was arrested after an NCIC inquiry erroneously revealed an outstanding misdemeanor arrest warrant that had been quashed weeks earlier.
Even though these incidents demonstrate that the FBI should work to improve the accuracy of this system of records, in 2003, the FBI chose to establish a new rule exempting the NCIC system, the Central Records System and National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime systems from the accuracy requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974. For the previous 30 years, the FBI operated the NCIC database with the Privacy Act accuracy requirement in place. The relevant provision requires that any agency that maintains a system of records, “maintain all records which are used by the agency in making any determination about any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individuals in the determination.” The NCIC database provides more than 80,000 law enforcement agencies with access to a computerized network of more than 39 million records regarding criminal activity. Even more agencies and records will be involved through state fusion centers, yet the FBI exempted the database from the Privacy Act requirement of accuracy.
The private sector databases that the federal Guidelines recommend state fusion centers use are also full of mistakes. For example, when a news reporter looked up his file on databroker Intellius.com, he found the record said he was charged with child molestation (he wasn’t) and that he had a close male relative who was convicted of manslaughter (the reporter had never even heard of the man). There are numerous errors in the records of databroker ChoicePoint, used by the FBI and IRS. A man bought his ChoicePoint record and found that the file showed he had died in 1976. Another man’s report included numerous crimes that he never committed. “In Florida I’m a female prostitute (named Ronnie); in Texas I’m currently incarcerated for manslaughter,” according to the man. Also, “In New Mexico I’m a dealer of stolen goods. Oregon has me as a witness tamperer. And in Nevada -- this is my favorite -- I’m a registered sex offender.” The record of one woman listed “possible Texas criminal history” even though she has been to Texas only twice and has not been charged with or committed crimes there. Her record also included “three automobiles she never owned and three companies listed that she never owned or worked for.”
Not only does erroneous data affect citizens, but it also harms security investigations by creating confusion and mistakes. Therefore, it is paramount that the state fusion centers follow the Fair Information Practices and apply all the Privacy Act requirements of accuracy, purpose limitation, notice, access, correction, and judicially enforceable redress.
Extensive Domestic Surveillance Powers Given to Department of Homeland Security
In a recent report, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) interviewed “the majority of state fusion center leaders and operational directors . . . [and] stakeholders within the federal government” to learn more about fusion centers. CRS found that, though local and state fusion centers were originally designed to be local- or state-wide in jurisdiction and purely oriented toward counterterrorism, “they have increasingly gravitated toward an all-crimes and even broader all-hazards approach.” A part of this broadening of fusion center missions is the Department of Homeland Security’s goal of creation a “national network” of fusion centers.
State fusion centers began as “the outgrowth or expansion of an existing intelligence and/or analytical unit or division within the state’s law enforcement agency.” However, the presence of DHS officials has grown. The agency has “embedded” federal officials at many local and state fusion centers, and has said it seeks to deploy federal staff to all of them. DHS seeks to tie fusion centers into the agency’s “day-to-day operations,” linking all of the centers together. The federal Fusion Center Guidelines recommend that fusion centers “allow for future connectivity to other local, state, tribal, and federal systems.”
Also, the federal Guidelines recommend that, “nontraditional collectors of intelligence, such as public safety entities and private sector organizations” could be “‘fused’ with law enforcement data.” The use of private sector data in a national network of fusion centers raises the possibility that such data could be misused, allowing the government to circumvent warrant requirements and state or federal privacy laws or regulations.
Current legislation seeks to expand the power of the Department of Homeland Security over local and state fusion centers. In the House, H.R. 1, “Improving America’s Security Act of 2007,” conditions federal grant funding for the fusion centers upon the centers’ fulfillment of standards set by the Department of Homeland Security. If the fusion centers “fail to substantially comply” with DHS regulations or guidelines, DHS can “terminate payment,” “reduce amount of payment,” or “limit the use of grant funds.” This can continue “until such time as the Secretary determines that the grant recipient is in full compliance.” The Department of Homeland Security already is contemplating such conditioning of grant funding. Such a development moves the power of setting priorities for fusion centers away from state and local law enforcement and to the Department of Homeland Security. As envisioned, the Department of Homeland Security would be the de facto directors of this national network of local and state fusion centers.
The Specter of COINTELPRO
A national network of state fusion centers, working with the federal government, comes perilously close to a domestic surveillance agency, which has been rejected by the public and law enforcement officials. In testimony to the 9/11 Commission, CIA Director Louis Freeh and FBI Director Robert Mueller III both rejected the idea of a domestic surveillance agency. Mueller told the Commission, “I do believe that creating a separate agency to collect intelligence in the United States would be a grave mistake.”
Such a domestic surveillance system invites comparison to the FBI’s Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), in which the agency abused its investigatory powers to harass and disrupt political opponents. The FBI’s own documents show that the agency engaged in extensive surveillance and infiltration of political groups in the 1950s and 60s in order to disrupt a broad range of legitimate First Amendment activity. FBI agents probed groups that were suspected of having a Communist ideology. Individuals who had engaged in no criminal wrongdoing were investigated and arrested. The FBI built dossiers on the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., the National Organization for Women (NOW), environmental advocates, the American Indian Movement.
In 1975, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (more commonly known as the Church committee because it was headed by Idaho Sen. Frank Church) and House Select Intelligence Committee (called the Pike committee after its chairman, N.Y. Rep. Otis Pike) began investigating reports of possible illegal, improper, or unethical activities conducted by the FBI, the CIA, and the NSA. The committees released volumes of findings and recommendations. Among them were the plan of the FBI to summarily arrest thousands of Americans in case of a national emergency; that the FBI had investigated the NAACP for 25 years to determine whether it was a Communist front; that the FBI had burglarized political groups to gain information on their activities; and that the FBI kept files on one million Americans.
These abuses led to the creation of the Attorney General’s Guidelines limiting the ability of the FBI to intimidate activists. Despite these, however, the agency continued to investigate groups that engaged in legitimate political activities. The FBI investigated the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) in the 1980s. The FBI also established in the 1980s the “Library Awareness Program,” a system to obtain library records to monitor reading habits. The FBI later revealed that it had investigated hundreds of Americans -- librarians and others – because they protested the program. After the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, the FBI again began searching library records to monitor reading habits. The FBI has detailed more than 230 agents to fusion centers nationwide. 
Questions also have been raised about Homeland Security officials. In December 2003, just nine months after the Department of Homeland Security had been created, an officer from the DeKalb County, Georgia, Division of Homeland Security observed and photographed vegans who were peacefully protesting outside a Honey Baked Ham store. When two protesters noticed they were being photographed, they wrote down the license plate of the man’s unmarked government. After they refused to turn over the paper with the license plate number, the Homeland Security officer arrested them. In 2004, two plainclothes Contra Costa County sheriff’s deputies identified themselves as Homeland Security agents while monitoring a protest by striking Safeway workers.
In February 2006, two Montgomery County, Md., Homeland Security agents walked into a suburban Bethesda library, demanded the attention of all the patrons, and told patrons that viewing Internet pornography was illegal. It is not illegal to view pornography in a public library, and Montgomery County simply “asks customers to be considerate of others when viewing Web sites.” The Washington Post said, “After the two men made their announcement, one of them challenged an Internet user’s choice of viewing material and asked him to step outside, according to a witness. A librarian intervened . . . [and later a] police officer arrived. In the end, no one had to step outside except the uniformed men.” The men were later reassigned, but the incident raised questions about why exactly Maryland Homeland Security agents thought it part of their Homeland Security duties to enter a public library, survey the patrons, and then incorrectly tell patrons that their legal viewing habits were illegal acts.
In describing COINTELPRO, the Church Committee said the FBI’s actions “can only be described as ‘abhorrent in a free Society.’” The Committee went on to try to answer the questions, “What happened to turn a law enforcement agency into a law violator? Why do those involved still believe their actions were not only defensible, but right?” The answers were found in a combination of factors, the Committee said, including, “the availability of information showing the targets’ vulnerability gathered through the unrestrained collection of domestic intelligence.” Such unrestrained domestic surveillance could easily happen again under the national network of state fusion centers envisioned by the Department of Homeland Security.
The Dangers of Haphazard Data Collection
A “fusion center,” is a “mechanism to exchange information and intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by analyzing data from a variety of sources,” which includes private sector firms and anonymous tipsters. This creates a massive amount of data and the problem with intelligence gathering, according to the Deputy Director of the FBI, is “not a lack of information, but rather a flood of it. It's like trying to sip water from a firehose.” The Deputy Director said that he thought fusion centers would help “turn all that raw information into valuable knowledge,” but such haphazard data collection does not help with counterterrorism. A “flood of data,” in fact, has been shown to harm counterterrorism efforts by distracting agents from targeted investigations.
One FBI supervisory special agent working for the “Joint Regional Intelligence Center” recently discussed the “tips” that are called into the agency. She said that “it’s hard to keep the leads straight,” and that it is “common” for people to anonymously file complaints about their neighbors. This also raises questions about the reliability and accuracy of the data collected and used by fusion centers.
Another case about the drawbacks of vast, unfiltered data collection concerns President Bush’s secret 2002 order allowing the NSA to conduct warrantless surveillance of international telephone and Internet communications on American soil, which was disclosed in December 2005. The secret program created a large list of phone numbers and e-mail addresses linked to possible terrorists. This list regularly was sent to the FBI, but virtually all of that data led to dead ends or innocent Americans, according to officials interviewed by the New York Times. “F.B.I. officials repeatedly complained to the spy agency that the unfiltered information was swamping investigators,” reported the New York Times.
 See, generally, EPIC, Information Fusion Centers and Privacy, http://www.epic.org/privacy/fusion/ and Dep’t of Justice, Information Technology Initiatives, http://www.it.ojp.gov/topic.jsp?topic_id=209.
 Todd Masse, Siobhan O’Neil & John Rollins, Congressional Research Serv., Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, RL34070 20, 93 (July 6, 2007) [“CRS Fusion Center Report”], available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/fusion/crs_fusionrpt.pdf.
 Global Justice Info. Sharing Initiative, Dep’t of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era -- Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at the Local, State, and Federal Levels -- Law Enforcement Intelligence, Public Safety and the Private Sector 2 (Aug. 2006) [“DOJ Fusion Center Guidelines”], available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/fusion/report.pdf.
 CRS Fusion Center Report at i, supra note 2.
 DOJ Fusion Center Guidelines at 16, supra note 3.
 Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for Intelligence-Led Policing At the Local, State and Federal Levels 20 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/fusion/intelsharerpt.pdf.
 Id. at 7-10.
 Id. at 12-13.
 Id. at v.
 Id. at iv.
 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (May 14, 2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel04/factsheet051404.htm.
 Homeland Sec. Advisory Council, Summary of Meeting: December 14, 2004 (Mar. 7, 2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSAC_MtgSummary_121404.pdf; For more information on the Council, see Exec. Order 13260 of March 19, 2002, Establishing the President’s Homeland Security Advisory Council and Senior Advisory Committees for Homeland Security, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020321-9.html; Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Homeland Security Advisory Council Home Page, http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/committees/editorial_0331.shtm.
 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c108:4:./temp/~c108vJAoSj::.
 DOJ Fusion Center Guidelines at 2, supra note 3.
 Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Select Homeland Security Accomplishments For 2006 (Dec. 29, 2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1167404984182.shtm; Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fusion Centers: DHS Funded Activities -- Fiscal Years 2004 -- 2006 (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/NPB_Fusion_Centers.pdf.
 CRS Fusion Center Report at vi, supra note 2.
 DOJ Fusion Center Guidelines at 5-7, supra note 3.
 Id. at C-1.
 Id. at 33-34.
 U.S. Dep’t. of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Secretary’s Advisory Comm. on Automated Personal Data Systems, Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens viii (1973), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/.
 Marc Rotenberg, Exec. Dir., EPIC, Testimony and Statement for the Record at a Hearing on Security and Liberty: Protecting Privacy, Preventing Terrorism” Before the Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Dec. 8, 2003), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/911commtest.pdf.
 Daniel W. Sutherland, Officer, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement at a Hearing on “The Department of Homeland Security State and Local Fusion Center Program: Advancing Information Sharing While Safeguarding Civil Liberties” Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence, Info. Sharing, & Terrorism, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. (Mar. 14, 2007), available at http://hsc.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070314172323-14515.pdf.
 Office of Inspector Gen., Soc. Sec. Admin, Congressional Response Report: Accuracy of the Social Security Administration’s Numident File, A-08-06-26100 6 (Dec. 18, 2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-08-06-26100.pdf.
 Id. at 15.
 Homeland Sec. Presidential Directive/HSPD-6, Subject: Integration and Use of Screening Information (Sept. 16, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030916-5.html.
 Inspector Gen., Audit Div., Dep’t of Justice, Audit Report No. 05-27: Review of the Terrorist Screening Center xi (June 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0527/final.pdf.
 Id. at 66.
 Walter Pincus & Dan Eggen, 325,000 Names on Terrorism List, Wash. Post. Feb. 15, 2006;
Edmund S. “Kip” Hawley, Assistant Sec’y, Transp. Sec. Admin., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Testimony at Hearing on Aviation Security: Reviewing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 110th Cong. (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/_files/TestimonyofMrHawley.pdf.
 Anne Broache, Tens of thousands mistakenly matched to terrorist watch lists, CNet News.com, Dec. 6, 2005.
 Rogan v. Los Angeles, 668 F. Supp. 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
 Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation, 68 Fed. Reg. 14140 (Mar. 24, 2003).
 5 U.S.C. §552a(e)(5) (1974).
 Bob Sullivan, Red Tape Chronicles: Bob the Writer, Bob the Molester, MSNBC, May 3, 2006.
 Jane Black, Data Collectors Need Surveillance, Too, Business Week, Jan. 24, 2002.
 Kim Zetter, Bad Data Fouls Background Checks, Wired News (Mar. 11, 2005).
 Bob Sullivan, ChoicePoint files found riddled with errors, MSNBC (Mar. 8, 2005).
 CRS Fusion Center Report at 93, supra note 2.
 Id. at i.
 Michael Chertoff, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Remarks at the International Association of Chiefs of Police Annual Conference (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1161184338115.shtm.
 CRS Fusion Center Report at 19, supra note 2.
 Charles E. Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Hearing on the Assessment of Information Sharing Centers Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence, Info. Sharing, & Terrorism, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 109th Cong. (Sept. 7, 2006) [“DHS Testimony on Fusion Centers”].
 DOJ Fusion Center Guidelines at 6, 37, supra note 3.
 Id. at 3.
 H.R.1, Improving America’s Security Act of 2007, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h.r.00001:.
 Charles E. Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement at a Hearing on the Department of Homeland Security State and Local Fusion Center Program: Advancing Information Sharing While Safeguarding Civil Liberties Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence, Info. Sharing, & Terrorism, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. (Mar. 14, 2007), available at http://hsc.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070314172258-47553.pdf.
 Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Tenth Public Hearing, Apr. 14, 2004, available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing10/index.htm.
 Testimony of Robert Mueller III, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigations, id.
 See Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI’s Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States (2nd ed. 2002).
 James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency 434 (2001); see also, Paul Wolf, COINTELPRO: A collection of documents on federal law enforcement investigation of political activities, http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/cointel.htm.
 CISPES v. Sessions, 929 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
 See Herbert N. Foerstel, Surveillance in the Stacks: The FBI's Library Awareness Program (1991).
 Bob Egelko, FBI checking out Americans’ reading habits, San Francisco Chronicle, June 23, 2002; Martin Kasindorf, FB’'s reading list worries librarians, USA Today, Dec. 16, 2002.
 John S. Pistole, Deputy Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the National Fusion Center Conference (Mar. 7, 2007) [“Pistole Speech”].
 David E. Kaplan, Spies Among Us: Despite a troubled history, police across the nation are keeping tabs on ordinary Americans, US News & World Report, Apr. 30, 2006.
 Cameron W. Barr, Policing Porn Is Not Part of Job Description, Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 2006.
 Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report: Book III, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans 94th Cong. (Apr. 14, 1976), available at http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportIIIa.htm.
 DOJ Fusion Center Guidelines at 2, supra note 3.
 Pistole Speech, supra note 65.
 Shane Harris, Shadow Hunters, Nat’l Journal, Apr. 27, 2007.
 See EPIC, Spotlight on Surveillance, Legality of NSA’s Secret Eavesdropping Program Is Suspect and Cost is Unknown (Jan. 2006), http://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0106/.
 Lowell Bergman, Eric Lichtblau, et. al, Spy Agency Data After Sept. 11 Led F.B.I. to Dead Ends, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 2006.
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