Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of: )
)
Communications Assistance for ) CC Docket No. 97-213
Law Enforcement Act )
)
THIRD REPORT AND ORDER
Adopted: August 26, 1999 Released: August 31, 1999
By the Commission:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraph No.
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. BACKGROUND 2
III. DISCUSSION 12
A. General Comments 12
1. Scope of Proceeding 12
2. Definition of "Reasonably Available" 14
3. Retrofitting Equipment under Interim Standard 32
4. Compliance Date for Interim Standard 34
B. Particular Capabilities of J-STD-025 Opposed by CDT, EFF,
EPIC, and ACLU 37
1. Location information 37
2. Packet-Mode 47
C. DoJ/FBI Punch List 57
1. Content of subject-initiated conference calls 58
2. Party hold, join, drop on conference calls 68
3. Subject-initiated dialing and signaling information 76
4. In-band and out-of-band signaling 83
5. Timing information 90
6. Surveillance status 97
7. Continuity check tone 102
8. Feature status 107
9. Dialed digit extraction 112
D. Disposition of J-STD-025 Modifications 124
E. Other Technologies and Systems 130
F. Other Matters 134
G. Summary of Findings 138
IV. PROCEDURAL MATTERS 139
A. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 139
B. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis 157
V. ORDERING CLAUSES 158
VI. APPENDIX A: FINAL RULES
VII. APPENDIX B: MANUFACTURERS' REVENUE ESTIMATES
VIII. APPENDIX C: COMMENTING PARTIES
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In this Third Report and Order (Third R&O), the Commission adopts technical
requirements for wireline, cellular, and broadband Personal Communications Services (PCS) carriers
to comply with the assistance capability requirements prescribed by the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA, or the Act). Specifically, we require that all capabilities
of J-STD-025 (interim standard) and six of nine "punch list" capabilities requested by the Department
of Justice (DoJ)/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) be implemented by wireline, cellular, and
broadband PCS carriers. While we are requiring that a packet-mode capability be implemented by
such carriers, we are not at this time adopting technical requirements for packet-mode
communications, but will permit packet-mode data to be delivered to law enforcement under the
interim standard, discussed below, pending further study of packet-mode communications by the
telecommunications industry.
II. BACKGROUND
2. CALEA, enacted on October 25, 1994, was intended to preserve the ability of law
enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance effectively and efficiently in the face of rapid
advances in telecommunications technology. In enacting this statute, however, Congress recognized
the need to protect privacy interests within the context of court- authorized electronic surveillance.
Thus, in defining the terms and requirements of the Act, Congress sought to balance three important
policies: "(1) to preserve a narrowly focused capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out
properly authorized intercepts; (2) to protect privacy in the face of increasingly powerful and
personally revealing technologies; and (3) to avoid impeding the development of new communications
services and technologies."
3. Section 103 of CALEA establishes four general "assistance capability requirements"
that carriers must meet to achieve compliance with CALEA. Section 103(a) requires that a
telecommunications carrier shall ensure that its equipment, facilities, or services that provide a
customer or subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications are capable
of:
(1) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order
or other lawful authorization, to intercept, to the exclusion of any other
communications, all wire and electronic communications carried by the carrier
within a service area to or from equipment, facilities, or services of a subscriber of
such carrier concurrently with their transmission to or from the subscriber's
equipment, facility, or service, or at such later time as may be acceptable to the
government;
(2) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order
or other lawful authorization, to access call-identifying information that is reasonably
available to the carrier--
(A) before, during, or immediately after the transmission of a wire or
electronic communication (or at such later time as may be acceptable
to the government); and
(B) in a manner that allows it to be associated with the communication
to which it pertains,
except that, with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority
for pen registers and trap and trace devices (as defined in section 3127 of title 18,
United States Code), such call-identifying information shall not include any
information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber (except to the
extent that the location may be determined from the telephone number);
(3) delivering intercepted communications and call-identifying information to the
government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, in a format
such that they may be transmitted by means of equipment, facilities, or services
procured by the government to a location other than the premises of the carrier;
and
(4) facilitating authorized communications interceptions and access to call-
identifying information unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with any
subscriber's telecommunications service and in a manner that protects--
(A) the privacy and security of communications and call-identifying
information not authorized to be intercepted; and
(B) information regarding the government's interception of
communications and access to call-identifying information.
4. Section 107(a)(2) of CALEA contains a "safe harbor" provision, stating that "[a]
telecommunications carrier shall be found to be in compliance with the assistance capability
requirements under section 103, and a manufacturer of telecommunications transmission or switching
equipment or a provider of telecommunications support services shall be found to be in compliance
with section 106, if the carrier, manufacturer, or support service provider is in compliance with
publicly available technical requirements or standards adopted by an industry association or standard-
setting organization, or by the Commission under subsection (b), to meet the requirements of section
103." Section 107(b) authorizes the Commission, upon petition, to establish rules, technical
requirements or standards necessary for implementing section 103 "[i]f industry associations or
standard-setting organizations fail to issue technical requirements or standards or if a Government
agency or any other person believes that such requirements or standards are deficient."
5. Subcommittee TR45.2 of the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA)
developed the interim standard to serve as a "safe harbor" for wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS
carriers and manufacturers under section 107(a) of CALEA. That standard defines services and
features required by wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers to support lawfully authorized
electronic surveillance, and specifies interfaces necessary to deliver intercepted communications and
call-identifying information to a law enforcement agency (LEA). Several parties filed petitions for
rulemaking with the Commission, pursuant to section 107(b) of CALEA, contending that the interim
standard was either overinclusive or underinclusive. Specifically, DoJ/FBI argue that the interim
standard is underinclusive and does not satisfy CALEA requirements because it fails to include the
following nine essential capabilities:
1) Content of subject-initiated conference calls -- Capability would enable law
enforcement to access the content of conference calls supported by the subject's
service (including the call content of parties on hold).
2) Party hold, join, drop -- Messages would be sent to law enforcement that identify
the active parties of a call. Specifically, on a conference call, these messages would
indicate whether a party is on hold, has joined or has been dropped from the
conference call.
3) Subject-initiated dialing and signaling information -- Capability would provide a
LEA access to all dialing and signaling information available from the subject would
inform law enforcement of a subject's use of features (such as the use of flash-hook
and other feature keys).
4) In-band and out-of-band signaling (notification message) -- A message would be
sent to a LEA whenever a subject's service sends a tone or other network message to
the subject or associate (e.g., notification that a line is ringing or busy).
5) Timing information -- Information necessary to correlate call-identifying
information with the call content of a communications interception would be sent to
a LEA.
6) Surveillance status -- A message that would verify that an interception is still
functioning on the appropriate subject would be sent to a LEA.
7) Continuity check tone (c-tone) -- An electronic signal would alert a LEA if the
facility used for delivery of call content interception has failed or lost continuity.
8) Feature status -- A message would affirmatively notify a LEA of any changes in
features to which a subject subscribes.
9) Dialed digit extraction -- Information sent to a LEA would include those digits
dialed by a subject after the initial call setup is completed.
6. The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF), Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), and American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
argue that the interim standard is overinclusive because it includes location information and packet-
mode communications capabilities. Specifically, the interim standard includes a location parameter
that would identify the location of a subject's "mobile terminal" whenever this information is
reasonably available at the intercept access point and its delivery to law enforcement is legally
authorized. Location information would be available to the LEA irrespective of whether a call
content channel (CCC) or a call data channel (CDC) was employed. The interim standard also
provides for LEA access to call-identifying information and the interception of wire and electronic
telecommunications, regardless of whether the telecommunications are carried in circuit-mode or in
packet-mode. The interim standard further states that the "call-identifying information associated
with the circuit-mode content surveillance is provided on the [call data channel]," but does not
specifically address whether call-identifying information, if any, associated with packet-mode
surveillance must be provided over a call data channel.
7. The Commission released a Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making (Further NPRM)
in this proceeding to address alleged deficiencies in the interim standard. In the Further NPRM, we
stated that we did not intend to reexamine any of the uncontested technical requirements of the
interim standard, but would make determinations only regarding whether the 11 disputed capabilities
met the assistance capability requirements specified in section 103 of CALEA.
8. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that the provision by carriers to LEAs of
location information and five punch list capabilities is necessary to meet the assistance capability
requirements under section 103(a). Those five punch list capabilities are subject-initiated conference
calls; party hold, join, drop on conference calls; subject-initiated dialing and signaling information;
and timing information. The Further NPRM also sought comment on whether the dialed digit
extraction (post-cut-through digits) capability is necessary to meet the assistance capability
requirements under Section 103(a). The Further NPRM also tentatively concluded that three punch
list capabilities--surveillance status, continuity check tone and feature status--were not assistance
capability requirements under Section 103(a).
.
9. We emphasized in the Further NPRM that we were directed, pursuant to section
107(b) of CALEA, to take into account five factors in our analysis of deficiency petitions brought to
our attention. Those factors are: (1) meeting the assistance capability requirements of section 103
by cost-effective methods; (2) protecting the privacy and security of communications not authorized
to be intercepted; (3) minimizing the cost of CALEA compliance on residential ratepayers; (4) serving
the policy of the United States to encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the
public; and, (5) providing a reasonable time and conditions for CALEA compliance.
10. We also tentatively concluded in the Further NPRM that, if the additional technical
requirements we proposed were adopted, they could be most efficiently implemented by permitting
TIA to modify J-STD-025 in accord with our determinations. We stated that although TIA may have
to undertake additional work to implement the additional technical requirements identified in the
Further Notice, it has the experience and resources to develop technical specifications and implement
CALEA's requirements most rapidly.
11. Finally, we sought comment in the Further NPRM on what role, if any, we can or
should play in assisting telecommunications carriers other than wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS
to set standards for, or to achieve compliance with, CALEA's requirements.
III. DISCUSSION
A. General Comments
1. Scope of Proceeding
12. We stated in the Further NPRM that the uncontested technical requirements of the
interim standard are beyond the scope of this proceeding. EPIC, EFF, and ACLU, challenge this
tentative conclusion. They argue that our decision to foreclose comment on "uncontested" issues
improperly insulates the interim industry standard from public scrutiny, is inconsistent with the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, and undermines the value of our authority over
the process that led to the standard.
13. Discussion. We find no need to reexamine the entire interim standard. CALEA
provides that the Commission establish technical requirements or standards upon being petitioned by
a government agency or other person, where industry fails to issue technical requirements or
standards or such government agency or person believes the technical requirements or standards are
deficient. As discussed in the Further NPRM, a draft industry standard was submitted for balloting
in spring 1997 to all interested participants under procedures of the American National Standards
Institute. Subsequently, petitions for rulemaking were filed with the Commission, pursuant to
section 107(b), contending that the interim standard was deficient; however, none of these petitions
raised any issue pertaining to the interim standard other than those relating to location information,
packet-mode communications, and the DoJ/FBI punch list. Further, on April 20, 1998, our Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology issued a Public Notice in this
proceeding that solicited specific comment on the scope of the assistance capability requirements
necessary to satisfy the obligations imposed by CALEA. Again, no deficiencies in the interim
standard were identified other than with respect to location information, packet-mode
communications, and the punch list. We find that no other issues were raised before the Commission
regarding the interim standard. Since section 107(b) requires the Commission to resolve specific
disputes raised by petition regarding alleged deficiencies in the industry standard, we decline to
consider other aspects of that standard not challenged in this proceeding. Moreover, by focusing only
on those specific technical issues properly raised before us, we will achieve greater efficiency and will
permit telecommunications manufacturers and carriers to deploy CALEA solutions on a more
expedited basis. Accordingly, we find that wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers must
comply with all uncontested requirements of the interim industry standard by June 30, 2000.
2. Definition of "Reasonably Available"
14. While the Act defines call-identifying information as "dialing or signaling information
that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each communication generated or
received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or service of a telecommunications
carrier," it does not define "reasonably available." The Further NPRM asked for comment on the
factors we should use in determining whether call-identifying information to be provided by a carrier
to a LEA is "reasonably available" to the carrier. The interim standard includes a definition of this
term which states that call-identifying information is "reasonably available" to a carrier if such
information is present at an intercept access point (IAP) for call processing purposes. The IAP is "a
point within a telecommunication system where some of the communications or call-identifying
information of an intercept subject's equipment, facilities, and services are accessed." There may be
one or more IAPs.
15. Comments. AT&T and Nextel Communications, Inc. (Nextel) state that they support
the definition of reasonably available call-identifying information given in the interim standard.
AT&T further states that in the Further NPRM we departed from that definition, and that if we affirm
the proposals set forth therein, we should acknowledge that processing that takes place entirely within
terminal equipment or other subscriber-owned or maintained equipment is not reasonably available.
16. DoJ/FBI contend that the concept of "reasonable availability" is a technical one that
focuses on network design, not a financial one involving carrier balance sheets. Further, DoJ/FBI
disagree that call-identifying information should be deemed reasonably available to a carrier only if
the information is present at an IAP for call processing purposes. DoJ/FBI contend that the interim
standard imposes no requirements regarding where or how IAPs are to be situated within a network.
Instead, according to DoJ/FBI, the interim standard leaves the choice of IAPs entirely to the
discretion of individual carriers and manufacturers and permits a carrier to situate IAPs without
regard to the impact on the carrier's ability to expeditiously isolate and enable a LEA to access call-
identifying information. DoJ/FBI maintain that it is untenable to take the position, as reflected in the
J-STD-025 definition, that there is never any need to modify network protocols, even when the
modification would be technically straightforward and would provide access to call-identifying
information without imposing significant burdens on the network. Accordingly, DoJ/FBI propose
a modified definition of reasonably available call-identifying information, as follows:
Call-identifying information is reasonably available if (1) it is present in an element in the
carrier's network that is used to provide the subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate,
or direct communications and (2) it can be accessed there, or can be delivered to an IAP
located elsewhere, without unreasonably affecting the call processing capabilities of the
network.
17. Nextel contends that we should "validate" the J-STD-025 definition of reasonably
available call-identifying information because the objections of DoJ/FBI to that definition are not well-
grounded. Nextel states that the interim standard requires IAPs to be placed to access call content
and call-identifying information, and that the reason the standard requires that call-identifying
information be present at the IAP for call processing purposes is that Congress narrowly defined such
information as dialing and signaling information used for the purposes of routing calls through a
carrier's network.
18. The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) maintains that
DoJ's/FBI's contention that a carrier may select IAPs that limit LEA collection of call-identifying
information is erroneous. CTIA asserts that a carrier that attempted to implement J-STD-025 in such
a manner would not be in compliance with publicly available technical requirements. CTIA argues,
however, that there is no need for a carrier to redesign its network to create information for use by
a LEA.
19. Numerous parties take issue with the contention of DoJ/FBI that "reasonable
availability" is only a technical concept, and others argue that costs should be taken into consideration
even for punch list items that are not considered to be call-identifying information. Ameritech
Corporation (Ameritech) maintains that Congress used the term "reasonable availability" to include
not only technical but also cost and timeliness considerations. PrimeCo Personal Communications,
L.P. (PrimeCo) argues that DoJ's/FBI's interpretation of this term would effectively nullify Congress's
imposition of a reasonableness requirement and would require the redesign of networks and
equipment upgrades without regard to cost considerations. According to PrimeCo, such an
interpretation would eviscerate the safe harbor of section 107 by requiring carriers to provide a
particular punch list capability notwithstanding the cost criteria set forth in section 107(b). The
United States Telephone Association (USTA) agrees, stating that we cannot adopt a punch list item
unless it is shown to meet those cost criteria. AirTouch states that the cost of any technical solution
is necessarily part of a determination as to whether that solution is reasonably available. AT&T
states that section 107(b)(1) provides that if a capability cannot be provided in a cost-effective
manner, that capability need not be provided.
20. Several parties who argue that the costs of a particular punch list capability are
relevant to a determination of whether that capability is reasonably available to carriers also argue that
we must take into account the costs of the core interim standard in our determination of whether a
punch list item should be required. CTIA contends that these costs will be in excess of $4 billion for
all carriers. On a per switch basis, AT&T states that these costs, even excluding some that are
difficult to quantify, approach almost $500,000. The Personal Communications Industry
Association (PCIA) maintains that, based on the lowest switch modification costs in the record, the
nationwide cost to local exchange carriers (LECs) of implementing the interim standard will be $1.73
billion; and, based on AT&T's per switch estimates, nationwide costs to wireless carriers will be $639
million.
21. Ameritech proposes that if the cost of developing a punch list capability exceeds 5%
of the interim standard we should deem that capability to be not reasonably available. Additionally,
Ameritech asserts that we must consider the cost of modifying switches placed into service on or
before January 1, 1995 in determining capability requirements under section 103 because any such
switches that have undergone major modifications or significant upgrades must be retrofitted at
carriers' expense. Ameritech expresses concern that, given the FBI's proposed definition of "major
modification or significant upgrade," a substantial portion of the costs of CALEA compliance are
designed to become carriers' responsibilities.
22. DoJ/FBI argue that the telecommunications industry has agreed to bear the costs of
implementing the interim standard; therefore, the only relevant costs are the additional costs that will
be added by the punch list. Additionally, DoJ/FBI assert that the features required for a carrier to
meet its CALEA assistance capability obligations will be among many features contained in one or
more periodic "releases" deployed on the carrier's switches, and that the costs attributable to CALEA
are only those that will be added to the costs of this regular release process. Further, according to
DoJ/FBI, it is general industry practice for carriers to be given discounts of as much as 65% from the
manufacturers' quoted prices. Moreover, DoJ/FBI assert that even if CTIA's worst-case scenario
in industry-wide compliance costs to implement the J-Standard is accepted and all costs are passed
on to consumers, the resulting increase in the average ratepayer's monthly bill would be minimal if
costs are spread over five years.
23. In response to our request in the Further NPRM, we received comments from five
manufacturers regarding their anticipated revenues from selling software, and in some cases certain
hardware, to wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers to allow those carriers to meet the
technical requirements of CALEA. Subsequently, the Commission's Office of Engineering and
Technology (OET) issued a Public Notice that solicited comment on these aggregated revenue
estimates. These estimates, which would represent costs to the carriers, totalled $916 million for
the core J-STD-025 and $414 million for the nine punch list items.
24. In response to the Public Notice, we received a number of comments concerning the
aggregated revenue estimates. CTIA contends that its survey of 21 wireless carriers and six wireless
switch manufacturers generally confirms these estimates. AirTouch states that the estimates provide
a floor that the actual total is sure to exceed, and asserts that the Commission must conclude that the
punch list is not cost-effective. AirTouch argues that carriers will incur extensive expenses that will
not be paid to telecommunications equipment manufacturers, including in-house engineering and
implementation costs and purchases from third-party suppliers.
25. GTE and SBC agree with AirTouch that the manufacturers' revenue estimates
significantly understate total costs, and each provides its own CALEA compliance cost estimates.
GTE states that many of its switches are not manufactured by the five vendors encompassed by the
Public Notice, and further states that it has one of the most central office-intensive networks in the
country, thereby increasing its CALEA compliance costs. According to GTE, its wireline costs of
implementing J-STD-025 are more than $400 million, which compares with the manufacturers'
wireline revenue estimate of only $569 million. SBC states its CALEA compliance cost estimates
include not only software, but activation fees, engineering and installation fees, gating hardware costs,
and the required advancement of generic upgrades. Based on these total costs, SBC estimates its
wireline J-STD-025 compliance costs to be $326 million, and its wireless J-STD-025 compliance
costs to be $37.2 million. SBC also estimates its wireline CALEA compliance costs, including the
costs associated with the punch list, to be $340 million, with punch list costs unavailable for its
wireless carriers.
26. DoJ/FBI contend that the manufacturers' revenue estimates have no relevance to the
Commission's task under section 107(b) of CALEA. DoJ/FBI further contend that these estimates
are overstated because they reflect list prices, and additionally do not take into account the fact that
a substantial portion of costs to carriers will be reimbursed because equipment was installed or
deployed by January 1, 1995. DoJ/FBI also maintain that the estimates may include revenues that
enable carriers to meet CALEA's capacity, rather than capability, requirements; and further, may
reflect CALEA solutions being incorporated into all remote switches. DoJ/FBI note that under
section 104(e) of CALEA, eligible capacity costs incurred by a carrier are to be reimbursed by the
Government; and argue that for many switching platforms, compliance solutions need to be
incorporated only into host and stand-alone switches, and not into remote switches.
27. USTA asserts that there is no evidence that any discounts from list prices are available
to reduce costs to carriers, and contends that the DoJ/FBI interpretations of the meaning of the terms
"equipment, facilities, or services installed or deployed" by January 1, 1995 and "major modifications"
to such equipment, facilities, or services would limit reimbursement to carriers. Additionally, USTA
maintains that there has been no indication from DoJ/FBI as to what capacity costs will be eligible
for reimbursement.
28. Discussion. We reiterate that we find no need to re-examine the entire interim
standard; however, in addition to examining the eleven alleged deficiencies, we also will examine
any specific issue regarding that standard raised by the proposals in the Further NPRM, including the
definition of "reasonably available." The interim standard states that call-identifying information is
"reasonably available" to a carrier if such information is present at an IAP for call processing
purposes. We agree with DoJ/FBI that J-STD-025's definition of "reasonably available" is too
narrow because the definition would limit "reasonably available call-identifying information" to call-
identifying information used by the IAP switch for call processing. On the other hand, we find
DoJ/FBI's proffered definition unnecessarily broad because it would apply to call identifying
information located anywhere within a carrier's network, rather than at the IAP location where the
information is being captured for the LEA. Consequently, we do not disturb the interim standard's
conclusion that call identifying information is reasonably available if it is located at the IAP. We thus
find that if call-identifying information is present at a carrier's IAP and can be made available
without the carrier being unduly burdened with network modifications, that information is reasonably
available to that carrier, even if it is not used by the IAP switch for call processing. Under this
definition, call-identifying information that is used by the IAP switch for call processing is reasonably
available, as well as other call-identifying information carried on the carrier's network that passes the
IAP.
29. We believe that modifying the definition of "reasonably available" to include call
identifying information that is present at an IAP, as opposed to restricting such information to that
used only for call processing, serves the important objective of not impeding the development of new
communications services. In addition to network design considerations, our modification will permit
cost and privacy considerations to be considered in determining whether call-identifying information
is "reasonably available" to an originating carrier. This modification is consistent with most
commenting parties' contention that the term "reasonably available," as set forth in section 103(a)(2)
of CALEA, is best interpreted to include cost factors in addition to technical considerations. We
believe that this interpretation is consistent with the Act's directive that in taking any action under
section 107(b), the Commission must meet the assistance capability requirements of section 103 by
cost-effective methods and minimize the cost of CALEA compliance on residential ratepayers, as well
protecting the privacy and security of communications not authorized to be intercepted.
Accordingly, we will define call-identifying information to be "reasonably available" to an originating
carrier if such information "is present at an IAP and can be made available without the carrier being
unduly burdened with network modifications."
30. We have reviewed the cost/revenue data submitted in this proceeding. While there are
a wide variety of cost estimates, we find the five manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimates of $916
million for the core J-STD-025 and $414 million for the nine punch list items to be a reasonable guide
of the costs to wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers for CALEA compliance. Commenters
have noted reasons for believing that the manufacturers' revenue estimates may either understate or
overstate costs to carriers. On balance, we find that while these estimates indicate that costs to
carriers will be significant, and do not represent all carrier costs of implementing CALEA, the
additional punch list costs are not so exorbitant as to require us to reject the punch list automatically
without considering each item on an individual basis in relation to CALEA's other statutory factors.
We find particularly instructive the cost of the punch list relative to the cost of the core J-STD-025
because the latter represents the bulk of costs to carriers, and carriers -- through their participation
in TIA Subcommittee TR45.2 -- have agreed to provide the core capabilities of J-STD-025.
Accordingly, we will evaluate each punch list item individually, including the anticipated cost of each
item, as discussed below.
31. We decline to adopt Ameritech's proposals relating to costs. Its proposal for the
Commission to automatically reject any punch list capability whose costs exceed 5% of the interim
standard would necessarily be arbitrary and contrary to our directives under CALEA. Additionally,
while we recognize that some switches placed into service on or before January 1, 1995 may have
to be retrofitted at carriers' expense, the commenting parties have not submitted information sufficient
for us to quantify the impact of this factor.
3. Retrofitting Equipment under Interim Standard
32. Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc. (BAM) raises another concern about the interim standard.
BAM argues that, in cases in which a carrier deployed equipment after January 1, 1995, we should
commence a proceeding under section 109(b) of CALEA to decide whether the carrier should be
required to bear the costs of retrofitting that equipment to comply with the interim standard. BAM
contends that we are empowered with broad authority to alleviate the adverse public policy
implications for competition and consumers of requiring carriers to pay for retrofitting equipment.
33. Discussion. We observe that BAM's request that the Commission undertake a
rulemaking proceeding under section 109(b) to decide generally whether telecommunications carriers
should be required to bear the costs of retrofitting equipment installed after January 1, 1995 is
contrary to the plain language of the Act. Section 109(b) requires us to determine upon receipt of
a petition whether compliance by an individual carrier with the assistance capability requirements of
section 103 is reasonably achievable with respect to any equipment, facility, or service installed or
deployed after January 1, 1995. If we receive a petition and determine that compliance by an
individual carrier is not reasonably achievable, the Act provides that the Attorney General may agree
to pay for any such equipment, facility or service. If the Attorney General does not agree to pay,
that carrier shall be deemed to be in compliance with the assistance capability requirements of section
103. Accordingly, we decline to adopt BAM's proposal since it is contrary to the plain language
of the Act.
4. Compliance Date for Interim Standard
34. AirTouch Communications, Inc. (AirTouch); BellSouth Corporation, Inc., BellSouth
Telecommunications, Inc., BellSouth Cellular Corp., BellSouth Personal Communications, Inc., and
BellSouth Wireless Data, L,P. (BellSouth); and SBC Communications, Inc. (SBC) question whether
the current June 30, 2000 deadline for implementation of the core requirements of the interim
standard is achievable. AirTouch states that we should acknowledge in this Third R&O that
additional extensions may be necessary; BellSouth states that only one of its vendors has promised
to meet the current deadline; and SBC states that the delivery schedule contemplated by its vendors
will not allow for the extensive testing required to ensure that its deployment is in compliance with
the interim standard, nor does this schedule allow a sufficient period for deployment across SBC's
entire network.
35. Discussion. We see no reason at this time to extend, on an industry wide basis, the
June 30, 2000 deadline for compliance with CALEA's section 103 capability requirements that are
covered by the interim standard. We observe that the deadline specified in the Act was October 25,
1998; thus, we have already extended the original deadline by more than 20 months. In our
Extension Order, we stated:
[W]e will require carriers to have installed CALEA-compliant equipment and facilities based
on the core J-STD-025 standard by June 30, 2000. This is a firm deadline. If this standard
is ultimately modified and new capabilities or features are added to the core standard in the
section 107(b) rulemaking, we will consider establishing a separate deadline for upgrading
carrier equipment and facilities to comply with those capabilities or features in that proceeding
pursuant to our authority under section 107(b)(5). This approach provides certainty to the
telecommunications industry in developing and installing CALEA-compliant solutions, and
recognizes the interests of law enforcement in providing effective public safety. It also seeks
to allow carriers to implement a CALEA-compliant solution sooner, rather than later, while
providing the flexibility to design modifications to the core J-STD-025 standard that can be
installed in carrier equipment and facilities in subsequent upgrades, if any such modifications
are adopted in the section 107(b) rulemaking proceeding.
36. Therefore, carriers and manufacturers have been on notice since the September 1998
Extension Order that we considered June 30, 2000 a "firm" deadline for the section 103 capability
requirements covered by the J-STD-025. Additionally, as discussed in paragraph 129, infra, we find
the record justifies the establishment of a separate later deadline for the additional capabilities that
we are herein mandating for wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers. We also note that
DoJ/FBI is currently negotiating with carriers regarding areas where wiretaps are infrequent, and
these carriers may be permitted to postpone CALEA compliance in those areas. Accordingly, we
understand that DoJ/FBI and/or the affected carriers may seek an extension under section 107(c) of
CALEA of the June 30, 2000 deadline in conformance with such agreements. We therefore will
await receipt of such requests before deciding on a new deadline for the affected carriers. We expect
that along with such requests, DoJ/FBI will submit a list of the affected carriers and the terms of such
extensions so that we may place such information on Public Notice for comment.
B. Particular Capabilities of J-STD-025 Opposed by CDT, EFF, EPIC, and ACLU
1. Location Information
37. Background. J-STD-025 includes a "location" parameter that would identify the
location of a subject's "mobile terminal" whenever this information is reasonably available at the
intercept access point and its delivery to law enforcement is legally authorized. Location information
would be available to the LEA irrespective of whether a call content channel or a call data channel
was employed.
38. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that location information falls under the
definition of call-identifying information set forth in section 102(2) of CALEA because location
information identifies the origin or destination of a communication. Therefore, the Further NPRM
proposed that where location information is reasonably available to a carrier, provision of that
information to LEAs is necessary to meet the mandates of section 103. The Further NPRM also
proposed that location information necessary to meet section 103 would include only the subject's
cell site location at the beginning and termination of a call. Finally, the Further NPRM tentatively
concluded that for a LEA to obtain location information that cannot be determined from the
telephone number, the LEA must have an authorization different from the minimal authorization
necessary for use of pen registers and trap and trace devices.
39. Comments. CDT states that our tentative decision to require carriers to design a
location capability into wireless phones cannot be supported by the plain words of CALEA and,
further, directly contradicts the Act's legislative history, which states that location information is not
a CALEA mandate. CDT contends that the words "origin" and "destination" have obvious
meanings apart from location, and that interpreting those terms to also mean cell site location violates
a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation -- that each word in a statute should be given a single
and unique meaning. Also, CDT contends that the location of wireless phones is more personally
revealing than the location of wireline phones because when a call is made on a wireless phone it
almost always is made by the individual subscriber.
40. EPIC, EFF, and ACLU generally agree with CDT, arguing that CALEA contains no
provisions expressly including location tracking data within the definition of call-identifying
information. EPIC, EFF, and ACLU also contend that the interim standard is internally inconsistent
because it proposes to require carriers to provide location tracking data at the beginning and end of
calls as part of their duty to provide information regarding the "origin" and "destination" of particular
communications, but the definition of those terms in the interim standard does not pertain to physical
location.
41. US West states that the location information capability in the interim standard is not
call-identifying information under section 103(a). US West argues that CALEA's definition of call-
identifying information requires carriers to provide LEAs with telephone numbers, not other
characteristics of calls. US West maintains that while a LEA generally is able to derive a target's
physical location from a telephone number for most wireline calls, that ability is incidental and should
not be read as an underlying mandate of CALEA.
42. DoJ/FBI argue that location information is call-identifying and state that, irrespective
of whether we modify the definition of "reasonable availability" as they propose, there is no need for
us to interpret or construe this term differently in connection with location information than in
connection with the other kinds of call-identifying information at issue in this proceeding. DoJ/FBI
state that they agree that the interim standard requires only that cell site location at the beginning and
end of a call be provided, and maintain that CALEA embodies a compromise regarding location
information: When a LEA is proceeding "solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap
and trace devices," carriers are not to treat location information as call-identifying information, but
when a LEA has been duly authorized to acquire location information under other electronic
surveillance statutes, location information remains part of call-identifying information. DoJ/FBI
contend that the interim standard is consistent with this intent, while CDT's position is not. DoJ/FBI
state that it is not the case, as CDT suggests, that the Commission's reading of "origin" and
"destination" gives those terms different meanings for wireless and wireline communications.
DoJ/FBI contend that those terms encompass location both in the wireless and wireline settings, but
that in the case of wireline communications the fixed location of the subscriber's terminal means that
the telephone number of the terminal identifies the location of the call, and so no separate location
information is required.
43. The New York City Police Department (NYPD) argues that any location information
that is used and/or is available within a carrier's network for the purpose of providing overall service
and/or processing of individual calls should be considered by us to be reasonably available to the
carrier in the case of location of wireless devices. However, NYPD expresses concern about our
proposal to adopt cell site location rather than a more precise location for the subject's mobile
terminal. NYPD contends that such a broad definition could limit the scope of existing electronic
surveillance authority. For example, NYPD states that in criminal cases where triangulation
techniques that allow location to be determined with exactitude have been authorized by a court,
carriers might be reluctant to assist a LEA to determine a more precise location than a cell site.
44. Discussion. We find that a subject's cell site location at the beginning and end of a call
is call-identifying information under CALEA. The Act states that call-identifying information is
"dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of
each communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or
service of a telecommunications carrier." We find, contrary to the position of CDT and
EPIC/EFF/ACLU, that a subject's cell site location at the beginning and end of a call identifies the
"origin" or "destination" of a communication and thus is covered by CALEA. With respect to
CALEA's express statement that "with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority
for pen registers and trap and trace devices (as defined in section 3127 of title 18, United States
Code), . . . call-identifying information shall not include any information that may disclose the physical
location of the subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be determined from the
telephone number)," we agree with DoJ/FBI that this provision does not exclude location
information from the category of "call-identifying information," but simply imposes upon law
enforcement an authorization requirement different from that minimally necessary for use of pen
registers and trap and trace devices.
45. Additionally, we find that location information is reasonably available to cellular and
broadband PCS carriers. We observe that this capability was developed by industry and is included
in the interim standard. Further, as we observed in the Further NPRM, in the wireline environment
LEAs have generally been able to obtain location information routinely from the telephone number
because the telephone number usually corresponds with location. With the telephone number,
location information is available from a LEA's own 911/Enhanced 911 (E911) database or from the
telephone company's electronic records, such as the Loop Maintenance Operating System (LMOS).
We also note that the equivalent location information in the wireless (cellular or broadband PCS)
environment appears to be the location of the cell sites to which the mobile terminal or handset is
connected at the beginning and at the termination of the call. Provision of this particular location
information does not appear to expand or diminish law enforcement's surveillance authority under
prior law applicable to the wireline environment.
46. We will not, however, mandate a location tracking capability in this proceeding. While
NYPD believes that a capability that identifies location more precisely would be useful to LEAs, we
are concerned that such a capability poses difficulties that could undermine individual privacy. We
believe that a more generalized capability that will identify only the location of a cell site, and only
at the beginning and termination of the call, will give LEAs adequate information. We note, however,
that our decision herein does not preclude LEAs from requesting legal authority to acquire more
specific location information in particular circumstances. Accordingly, as has been agreed to by both
DoJ/FBI and the telecommunications industry, we mandate a location capability that will identify cell
site location at the beginning and termination of a call. As proposed in the Further NPRM, we
require that this capability be deployed by carriers by the June 30, 2000 CALEA compliance deadline,
unless carriers have obtained an extension.
2. Packet-Mode
47. Background. J-STD-025 provides for LEA access to call-identifying information and
the interception of wire and electronic telecommunications, regardless of whether the
telecommunications are carried in circuit-mode or in packet-mode. It further states that the "call-
identifying information associated with the circuit-mode content surveillance is provided on the [call
data channel]," but does not specifically address whether call-identifying information, if any,
associated with packet-mode surveillance must be provided over a call data channel.
48. The Further NPRM noted that packet data and packet-switching technology are
potentially usable for both information services and telecommunications services, but that such
technology is subject to CALEA requirements only to the extent it is used to provide
telecommunications services, and not for information services. The Further NPRM also noted that
privacy concerns could be implicated if carriers were to give to LEAs packets containing both call-
identifying and call content information when only the former was authorized. The Further NPRM
tentatively concluded that the record is not sufficiently developed to support any particular technical
requirements for packet-mode communications, and therefore did not propose technical requirements
for such communications. However, the Further NPRM sought comment on a wide range of issues
to develop a sufficient record.
49. Comments. EFF, EPIC, and ACLU state that our cautious approach regarding packet-
mode communications is correct, and that it is critical that we adequately protect the privacy of
communications carried on packet-mode systems. They state that the interim standard's requirement
to deliver the entire packet data stream associated with a given communication violates the privacy
provisions of section 103. Therefore, according to EFF, EPIC, and ACLU, until carriers are able to
protect the privacy of communications carried over packet-mode systems, we should refrain from
adopting capability requirements for such systems.
50. CDT states that carriers using packet technologies have an obligation under CALEA
to protect privacy by distinguishing between call content and call-identifying information, so that a
LEA does not intercept the former when it has only the narrower authority for the latter. CDT
contends that DoJ/FBI acknowledge that protecting privacy by distinguishing between call content
and call-identifying information is technically trivial, but states that DoJ/FBI believe there is no
obligation on carriers to protect privacy. CDT states that we should not wait until packet
technologies are more fully deployed to clarify that carriers have an obligation to protect individual
privacy.
51. AT&T supports our tentative conclusion that packet-mode technologies may require
differing CALEA solutions. AT&T states that it believes that if we defer setting packet-mode
communications standards in this proceeding, industry associations will take up the issue on their
own.
52. TIA states that the telecommunications network is rapidly evolving toward a packet-
based architecture. TIA cautions that the Commission not stifle the continued development of
packet-mode technologies by imposing a solution that could require the redesign (or even
abandonment) of certain technologies. TIA recommends that we consider establishing a separate
packet-mode standard-setting effort within it.
53. US West argues that risks to advanced services and the Internet support the deferral
of any CALEA requirements on packet networks, at least until CALEA can be implemented without
inhibiting the development of advanced telecommunications services. It further states that because
many packet-mode communications will avoid the circuit-switched network altogether, carriers and
manufacturers will have to develop and install CALEA solutions for different network elements from
those used in circuit-switched networks. Additionally, US West asserts that separating the header
from content in packet-mode communications is not feasible because packet data is delivered in a
layered stack structure, and carriers have neither the ability nor any business reason to monitor packet
data streams and then decipher the various protocols.
54. DoJ/FBI argue that the interim standard's treatment of packet-mode communications
in pen register cases does not conflict with anything in CALEA, and hence that standard is not
deficient in this regard. DoJ/FBI state that, as a technical matter, it is perfectly feasible for a LEA
to employ equipment that distinguishes between a packet's header and its communications payload
and makes only the relevant header information available for recording or decoding. DoJ/FBI further
state that the statutory distinction between telecommunications carriers and providers of information
services does not correspond to any distinction between packet-mode and circuit-mode
communications; therefore, the use of packet-mode protocols does not turn the transmission of a wire
or electronic communication by a telecommunications carrier into the provision of information
services.
55. Discussion. We find that the approach taken with regard to packet-mode
communications in J-STD-025 raises significant technical and privacy concerns. Under this standard,
LEAs would be provided with both call-identifying information and call content even in cases where
a LEA is authorized only to receive call-identifying information (i.e., under a pen register). We are
aware that packet-mode technology is rapidly changing, and that different technologies may require
differing CALEA solutions for separating call-identifying information from call content. We also
recognize that we must avoid implementing CALEA requirements that could impede the development
of new technologies. We do not believe that the record sufficiently addresses packet technologies
and the problems that they may present for CALEA purposes. For example, some packet
technologies (e.g., frame relay, ATM, X.25) are connection oriented--i.e., there are call set-up and
take-down processes, similar to those used in circuit switched voice networks, whereby addressing
information is made available to the carrier separate from and before call content is transmitted.
Other packet technologies (e.g., internet protocol based solutions) would not be processed this way.
We believe that further efforts can be made to find ways to better protect privacy by providing law
enforcement only with the information to which it is lawfully entitled. We note that TIA recommends
further study of this matter. Accordingly, we invite TIA to study CALEA solutions for packet-mode
technology and report to the Commission in one year on steps that can be taken, including particular
amendments to J-STD-025, that will better address privacy concerns. In the interim, we find that
packet-mode communications, including call-identifying information and call content, may be
delivered to law enforcement under the interim standard. Further, we are herein requiring that
packet-mode communications be delivered to LEAs under that standard no later than September 30,
2001. That date is 15 months after the June 30, 2000 CALEA compliance deadline, and will afford
manufacturers that have not yet developed a packet-mode capability the time needed to do so.
56. We recognize that the solution we have crafted above is not perfect because a LEA
may receive both call identifying information and call content under a pen register. We note, however,
that independent legal barriers exist which will protect, to a certain extent, the privacy rights of
individuals until a permanent solution is developed. In particular, under this interim arrangement the
LEA will be legally prohibited from using any content information in a court proceeding if it has only
a pen register or trap and trace authorization. We find, therefore, that in weighing the factors
identified under section 107(b) of CALEA--that is, in particular, (1) to meet the assistance capability
requirements of section 103 by cost effective methods, (2) to protect the privacy and security of
communications not authorized to be intercepted, and (3) to encourage the provision of new
technologies and services to the public --we believe that the above solution provides the most suitable
temporary remedy available at this time. We emphasize, however, that we intend this solution to be
only an interim one. We recognize that, in view of the growing importance of packet-mode
communications, a timely permanent solution is essential. Accordingly, we expect that TIA will
deliver a report to us no later than September 30, 2000 that will detail a permanent solution, keeping
in mind the objectives underlying CALEA which are described in paragraph 2, supra.
C. DoJ/FBI Punch List
57. Section 103(a)(1) of CALEA authorizes telecommunications carriers to provide to
LEAs call content information, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization; and section
103(a)(2) of CALEA authorizes telecommunications carriers to provide to LEAs call- identifying
information, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization. Call-identifying information,
however, must be provided only if it is reasonably available to the carrier. The Further NPRM
tentatively concluded that the provision by carriers to LEAs of the content of subject-initiated
conference calls is authorized by section 103(a)(1); and that party hold, join, drop on conference calls,
subject-initiated dialing and signaling information, timing information, and dialed digit extraction
constitute call-identifying information under section 102(2) of CALEA and therefore must be
provided, where reasonably available, under section 103(a)(2).
1. Content of subject-initiated conference calls
58. Background. This capability would permit the LEA to monitor the content of
conversations connected via a conference call set up by the facilities under surveillance. Surveillance
of all portions of a conference call would continue, even if any party to the call utilized services such
as hold, call waiting, or three-way calling. For example, if anyone involved in a conference call were
placed on hold, all remaining conversations would continue to be available to the LEA for monitoring.
The ability to monitor would continue even after the subject drops off the conference call.
59. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that the provision to LEAs of the content
of subject-initiated conference calls is a technical requirement that meets the assistance capability
requirements of section 103(a) of CALEA.
The Further NPRM also sought comment as to how the Commission should define or
interpret section 103's use of the phrase "equipment, facilities, or services" in the context of
subscriber-initiated conference calls. The five manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimate for this
capability is $37 million.
60. Comments. TIA states that the interim standard already provides LEAs access to the
content of most conference calls. TIA contends that access is not provided in only a few situations
in which the subject's terminal equipment is not connected to the call. TIA further contends that
while providing this capability to LEAs is technically feasible, it would require a large redeployment
effort by most manufacturers -- particularly with respect to provisioning a separate call content
channel to monitor the conversations of any parties on hold.
61. Bell Atlantic argues that providing the conference calling feature as proposed would
give LEAs an expanded capability. Bell Atlantic states that while multi-party calling services and
conference calling have been available for many years, LEAs have not had the ability to monitor all
parties to a multiparty conference call after the subject of the surveillance has left the call or has put
the call on hold. EPIC, EFF, and ACLU agree that our proposal would permit expanded access to
conversations of participants in subject-initiated conference calls, and they contend that this expansion
would be inconsistent with statutory and constitutional limitations because it would expand the
facilities doctrine of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as
modified by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. EPIC, EFF, and ACLU state
that a LEA with authority to monitor only the subject's facilities should not be permitted to trace
conversations on network resources once the subscriber disconnects.
62. AT&T states that not all conference calls are subscriber-based. It maintains that on-
demand services such as "Meet Me" conference calling, in which the carrier or a third party provider
makes a conference bridge available to anyone, are not covered by CALEA because there is no
subscriber. Ameritech agrees, stating that conference bridging services must be excluded because
they are not "equipment, facilities, or services of a subscriber." Ameritech contends that such services
do not permit carriers to know when conference calls will occur and which telecommunications
providers will be used to establish the calls.
63. DoJ/FBI contend that the proposed conference calling capability is consistent with
CALEA. They maintain that when a subscriber's service supports the ability of other participants in
a conference call to continue to speak to one another when the subscriber places them on hold or
hangs up, the conversations of these other participants constitute "communications" to or from the
subscriber's "equipment, facilities, or services," and therefore come within the scope of section
103(a)(1). DoJ/FBI also assert that call hold is similar to call forwarding, which the legislative history
of the Act makes clear was one of the principal features that Congress intended to reach when it
enacted CALEA. DoJ/FBI state that the facilities of callers who have been placed on hold are
supported by the subscriber's conference calling service even if the communication is no longer routed
through the subscriber's switch to his terminal equipment. DoJ/FBI further argue that commenters'
arguments that meet-me conference services are outside the scope of a carrier's obligations under
section 103 is repudiated by the interim standard. DoJ/FBI state that a party that contracts for meet-
me conference service is no less a subscriber than a party that arranges for conventional conference
calling service. Finally, DoJ/FBI contend that in no case would a LEA need to use more than two
call content channels to monitor a conference call because DoJ/FBI are not seeking separated delivery
of each leg of a held call on a different call content channel.
64. Discussion. We find that, under certain circumstances discussed below, the provision
of the content of subject-initiated conference calls is a technical requirement that meets the assistance
capability requirements of section 103. Under these circumstances, with appropriate lawful
authorization, the LEA is entitled to "intercept, to the exclusion of any other communications, all wire
and electronic communications carried by the carrier within a service area to or from equipment,
facilities, or services of a subscriber."
65. As we stated in the Further NPRM, we recognize that different carriers provide
conference calling features in various ways and that not all carriers' system architectures are the
same. Conference calling features include various types of multi-party calls, such as three-way calling where a bridge is established in the subscriber's serving
switch, as well as "meet me" or conference bridge services where a bridge is established at a remote switch of another carrier. Some of these services are available as
a standard subscriber option from a customer's presubscribed carrier, while others are available on a demand basis from multiple carriers. Some systems are designed,
for example, to allow a conference call that is initiated by the subject to continue among other parties on the call even after the subject drops off the call, either by putting
the call on hold or terminating the connection; other systems do not offer this feature. When a system is designed to allow the conference call to continue, we conclude
that carriers must provide the content of the call under the following circumstances.
66. Clearly, a LEA, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, is entitled to the content of the conference call when the subject's facilities
initiate the call and are being used to participate in the call. In this case, an open circuit is maintained between the subject's equipment, facilities and services and the
other parties on the call. When the subject puts the conference call on hold, the subject's circuit to the conference call is maintained within the carrier's network (usually
at the subscriber's serving switch), thus allowing the subject to rejoin easily the call without having to reinitiate the circuit. In this case, we find that the communication
continues to or from the equipment, facility or service of the subscriber, and thus the carrier also must provide the content of the communication among the other parties
to the conference call. In both cases, however, we conclude that the carrier does not have to provide access to the content of the communication between a participant
of the conference call other than the subject and any person with whom that participant speaks on an alternative line; e.g., when A, the subject, is on a conference call
with B and C, we conclude that C's conversations with D on call waiting do not have to be provided by the carrier. We also conclude that the anticipated costs to carriers
of adding the conference call capability in these cases is not so exorbitant as to require automatic exclusion of the capability. In percentage terms, based on the
manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimates, these costs would be 4% of the core interim standard and 9% of the total punch list.
67. We reach a different conclusion when the subject terminates his circuit connection to the conference call. In this case, the communication between
other participants no longer is to or from the subscriber's equipment, facilities, and services, and may no longer even be "carried by the carrier within a service area" to
or from the subscriber of the carrier, pursuant to section 103(a) and (d). This is especially true with conference bridges located in remote switches of other carriers.
We conclude that it is not reasonable to require the carrier to provide at its IAP the communications of other parties continuing on the conference call after the subject
terminates his circuit connection to the call because to do so would not be a cost-effective method of implementing the conference call intercept and may not protect the
privacy and security of communications not authorized to be intercepted, pursuant to section 107(b). We recognize, as DoJ/FBI acknowledge, that if the subject
arranges for a "meet me" conference bridge, the LEA will need a Title III order to cover the communication of the conference bridge. Under those circumstances,
the carrier that provides the conference bridge should provide an IAP to the LEA.
2. Party hold, join, drop on conference calls
68. Background. This capability also involves features designed to aid a LEA in the interception of conference calls. This capability would permit
the LEA to receive from the telecommunications carrier messages identifying the parties to a conversation at all times. The party hold message would be provided
whenever one or more parties are placed on hold. The party join message would report the addition of a party to an active call or the reactivation of a held call. The
party drop message would report when any party to a call is released or disconnects and the call continues with two or more other parties.
69. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that this capability constitutes call-identifying information and therefore must be provided by the carrier
to the LEA where reasonably available. The Further NPRM noted, however, that LEA access to party hold, join, and drop information would be required only in cases
where a carrier's facilities, equipment, or services are involved in providing the service; i.e., where a network signal is generated. To the extent that customer premises
equipment (CPE) is used to provide this service, the Further NPRM tentatively concluded that party hold, join, and drop information could not be made reasonably
available to the LEA because no network signal would be generated. The five manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $64 million.
70. Comments. AT&T states that currently carriers do not generate party join and drop messages, and argues that party hold messages are more
appropriately classified as subject-initiated signaling. AT&T contends that whether a party joins or drops from a call has no bearing on the continuity of a call or the
communications that may be made during the call, and that a call leg does not constitute either a call or a communication. Finally, AT&T argues that if we sustain our
tentative conclusion with respect to this capability, we should simply require that industry provide for dynamic reporting of participant changes in a subscriber-initiated
conference call because industry may have more efficient or effective ways than party messages to report joins and drops from the call.
71. Bell Atlantic argues that if a carrier were to provide information that a party has been added to or disconnected from a call or has been put on
hold, that would be a significant enhancement to existing or previous wiretapping capabilities, and would be beyond the scope of section 103(a)(5). Bell Atlantic also
argues that the words "the origin, direction, destination, or termination" in section 102(2) have physical rather than temporal meanings, that is, they refer to places or
locations in the network. Thus, information identifying the "termination" of a call would be the telephone number called, and would not include special information about
when one leg of a multi-party calls ends. Finally, Bell Atlantic asserts that party hold, join, or drop information may not be reasonably available to the carrier because
conference call capabilities are often provided through equipment that is external to the switch and may even belong to a service provider unrelated to the carrier.
72. TIA states that, while this item is technically feasible, the provision of party hold, join, and drop information in the manner sought by the FBI
would require considerable software coding to add additional call processing traps and new messages necessary to report the information. TIA further states that the
interim standard already permits LEAs access to party join and drop information, and therefore, the only additional capability LEAs would receive under this punch list
item is hold information. TIA contends, however, that such information is not always detected by the switch and even when it is detected, the switch may not have the
specific identification information requested by the FBI.
73. DoJ/FBI argue that without party hold, join, and drop information, a LEA often would not know who joins or leaves a conference call, whether
the subject alternated between legs of the call, or which parties may have heard or said particular communications during the course of the call. They also contend that
we should not use the instant proceeding to determine whether such information is reasonably available to particular carriers or platforms, but should frame an appropriate
definition of reasonably available and leave the application of that definition to be worked out by individual carriers and LEAs on a case-by-case basis. DoJ/FBI further
argue that the interim standard's Change message is not a substitute for party join information because: (1) the Change message is triggered by changes in call
identities, rather than by changes in party identities, and therefore will not identify party joins if a manufacturer uses a single call identity to cover multiple legs
of a call; (2) the interim standard's Release message is not a proxy for a party drop message because it does not require a carrier to send the Release message when
a single call leg or call appearance is released; and (3) the industry has not suggested that the interim standard provides any message that notifies the LEA of party
holds. Additionally, DoJ/FBI contend that commenters who oppose this capability err by treating a multi-party, multi-leg call as a single communication because doing
so would mean that the LEA in many cases would lack proof of which party participated in a particular conversation and which parties did not. Finally, DoJ/FBI assert
that the industry argument that this capability does not exist today confuses the information available to the network and the messages used to encapsulate the information
and convey it to the LEA. DoJ/FBI maintain that whether particular information exists in a network is relevant to a carrier's obligations under section 103(a)(2), but that
whether a particular message exists is irrelevant to the carrier's obligations.
74. Discussion. We find that party hold/join/drop information falls within CALEA's definition of "call-identifying information" because it is "signaling
information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each communication generated or received" by the subject. Party join information
appears to identify the origin of a communication; party drop, the termination of a communication; and party hold, the temporary origin, temporary termination, or re-
direction of a communication. This capability also appears to be necessary to enable the LEA to isolate call-identifying and content information because, without it, the
LEA would be unable to determine who is talking to whom, and, more accurately, to focus on the subject's role in the conversation. Further, by isolating the call-
identifying information in this manner, the LEA can screen out third parties who are not privy to the communications involving the subject, thereby furthering privacy
considerations.
75. We further find that party hold/join/drop information is reasonably available to the carrier in those cases where the carrier's facilities, equipment
or services are involved in providing the service, and that the anticipated costs to carriers of adding this capability are not so exorbitant as to require automatic exclusion
of the capability. In percentage terms, based on the manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimates, these costs would be 7% of the core interim standard and 15% of the
total punch list. To the extent that CPE is used to provide such features, we conclude that party hold/join/drop information is not reasonably available to the LEA
since no network signal would be generated. Thus, we conclude that the provision of party hold, join, and drop information on conference calls, to the extent a network
signal is generated, is a technical requirement that meets the assistance capability requirements of section 103.
3. Subject-initiated dialing and signaling information
76. Background. This capability would permit the LEA to be informed when a subject using the facilities under surveillance uses services such as
call forwarding, call waiting, call hold, and three-way calling. DoJ/FBI requests this information for each communication initiated by the subject. This capability would
require the telecommunications carrier to deliver a message to the LEA, informing the LEA that the subject has invoked a feature that would place a party on hold, transfer
a call, forward a call, or add/remove a party to a call.
77. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that this capability fits within the definition of call-identifying information and therefore must be provided
by the carrier to the LEA where reasonably available. The Further NPRM requested comment on whether remote subject-initiated dialing and signaling should affect
this tentative conclusion, and noted that to the extent CPE is used to initiate dialing and signaling no information need be provided to the LEA. The five manufacturers'
aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $35 million.
78. Comments. SBC and USTA state that subject-initiated dialing and signaling information is not call-identifying and may not be reasonably
available. SBC argues that only if the subscriber action can be detected within a CALEA-equipped switch does this feature meet the standard, and it is unknown
whether a signal of this nature can be incorporated into the switch by manufacturers at a reasonable cost.
79. TIA states that subject-initiated dialing and signaling information has nothing to do with call processing, and that the interim standard generally
provides all of the relevant call-identifying information. TIA contends that the only additional information the LEA would receive under this punch list item is the identity
of the keys pressed by the subject to enable the feature, and most manufacturers would have to make fairly substantial modifications to their equipment to capture and
report such information.
80. BellSouth contends that subject-initiated dialing and signaling information would be redundant with the information provided by party join, hold,
and drop messages. BellSouth also states that privacy concerns would be raised by this capability.
81. DoJ/FBI contend that industry's arguments that information about a subject's use of flash hook, feature keys, and similar activity is not call-
identifying are incorrect. DoJ/FBI argue that a subject's use of these feature keys changes the connections between the parties to a call, and in so doing changes the
"direction" and "destination" (and in some cases "origin" or "termination") of one or more "communication[s] generated or received" by the subject. Moreover, DoJ/FBI
argue that any use of feature keys or flash hooks by a subject to control a call constitutes "direction" of the communication by the subject. DoJ/FBI further argue that
BellSouth's suggestion that the information a LEA would derive from a subject's dialing and signaling activity is redundant with the information it would learn from party
join, hold, drop messages is incorrect because dialing and signaling may be either pre- or post-cut-through, and may be transmitted either in- or out-of-band. DoJ/FBI
states that some of this activity may result in party joins, holds, or drops, but much of it will not; and that, conversely, there will be many instances in which a change
in party connections does not reflect any subject-initiated dialing and signaling activity.
82. Discussion. We conclude that subject-initiated dialing and signaling information fits within the definition of call-identifying information contained
in section 102(2) of CALEA, and that the anticipated costs to carriers of adding this capability are not so exorbitant as to require automatic exclusion of the capability.
In percentage terms, based on the manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimates, these costs would be 4% of the core interim standard and 8% of the total punch list.
Call-forwarding signaling information identifies the direction and destination of a call, and call-waiting signaling information identifies the origin and termination of each
communication. We also conclude that access to subject-initiated dialing and signaling information may be necessary in order for the LEA to isolate and correlate call-
identifying and call content information. Knowing what features a subject is using will ensure that the LEA receives information "in a manner that allows it to be
associated with the communication to which it pertains." For example, without knowing that a subject has switched over to a call on call-waiting, the LEA may not
be able to associate the call-identifying information with the call content to which it pertains and thus could be more likely to mistake one call for another. Further, we
conclude that all in-band signals generated by a subject that must be processed at the IAP (e.g., rotary dial pulse digits, on-hook, off-hook, and flashes) are reasonably
available to the carrier. Dual tone multi-frequency (DTMF) signals generated by a subject that must be processed at the IAP also are reasonably available to the carrier;
however, some DTMF signals generated by the subject are post-cut-through digits and are addressed separately in this order. To the extent CPE is used to perform any
of the functions described here, and no network signal is generated, that information is not reasonably available to a carrier, and thus, is not required to be provided.
Thus, we conclude that the provision of subject-initiated dialing and signaling information is a technical requirement that meets the assistance capability requirements
of section 103.
4. In-band and out-of-band signaling
83. Background. This technical requirement would enable a telecommunications carrier to send a notification message to the LEA when any network
message (ringing, busy, call waiting signal, message light, etc.) is sent to a subject using facilities under surveillance. For example, if someone leaves a voice mail message
on the subject's phone, the notification to the LEA would indicate the type of message notification sent to the subject (such as the phone's message light, audio signal,
text message, etc.). For calls the subject originates, a notification message would also indicate whether the subject ended a call when the line was ringing, busy (a busy
line or busy trunk), or before the network could complete the call.
84. The Further NPRM stated that certain types of in-band and out-of-band signaling, such as notification that a voice mail message has been received,
appear to constitute call-identifying information; whereas other types of in-band and out-of-band signaling may constitute call content information and thus would raise
questions as to under what authority they should be provided to the LEA. The Further NPRM therefore sought comment on what types constitute a technical requirement
necessary to meet the CALEA assistance capability requirements. The five manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $57 million.
85. Comments. Nextel and PCIA each state that in-band and out-of band signaling information is not call-identifying because in-band and out-of-band
messages are not used to route calls, but merely inform the subject as to the status of calls made or received. Nextel states that what identifies the origin, direction,
destination, or termination of a call are the numbers dialed, not any subsequent network signal that provided information about the call.
86. TIA states that certain types of network signaling may constitute call-identifying information or call content, but most of the broad range of signals
sought by the FBI are neither. TIA maintains that there are hundreds of features supported by modern switches that provide some sort of signaling within the scope of
the FBI's request, and that in order to report this signaling each of these features would require software modifications, affecting the entire system architecture. TIA asserts
that if we require carriers to report any such signals, we should specify which signals are covered and should clarify that carriers can provide notification only of those
signals that are sent to the subject's unit and that are generated by the serving switch. SBC generally agrees with TIA, and also states that to the extent that network
signaling can be audibly detected over the subject's subscriber line, they constitute call content and can be obtained only under a Title III authorization.
87. Ameritech states that a notification that a voice mail message has been received is not call-identifying information because that type of message
is associated with the provision of an information service, which we acknowledge is not part of CALEA. Nextel and US West, Inc. (US West) agree.
88. DoJ/FBI state that, contrary to industry commenters, network signaling constitutes call-identifying information because without such signaling,
a subject will be unaware that an incoming call is taking place and the calling party will never reach the subject. DoJ/FBI further state that there are many circumstances
in which the interim standard's existing messages, such as the Termination Attempt message, will not provide the LEA with knowledge of the network signaling
presented to the subject. Additionally, DoJ/FBI state that SBC's argument that audible network signals constitute call content is not legally supported because Title III
is designed to protect communications between the parties using a telecommunications network, not signaling by the network. Finally, DoJ/FBI argue that network
notification of waiting voice mail messages is covered by section 103 because when a carrier sends a network notification message to alert a subscriber that he has received
a voice mail message, the carrier is not acting as an information service provider.
89. Discussion. We conclude that some in-band and out-of-band signaling constitutes call-identifying information under section 102(2) of CALEA
and that the anticipated costs to carriers of adding this capability are not so exorbitant as to require automatic exclusion of the capability. In percentage terms, based on
the manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimates, these costs would be 6% of the interim core standard and 14% of the total punch list. Certain types of signals, such as
ringing and busy signals, clearly fall within the scope of call-identifying information because they indicate information about the termination of a call. Other types of
signals, however, may simply be used by carriers for supervision or control of certain functions and features of the network and do not trigger any audible or visual
message to the subscriber and, thus, would not be call-identifying information. We thus conclude that in-band and out-of-band signals that are generated at the IAP toward
the subscriber (e.g., call waiting or stutter dial tone) and that are being used for call processing purposes are call identifying information that is reasonably available to
the carrier. Other signals that provide call identifying information (e.g., busy, fast busy, audible ringing tone), although generated elsewhere in the carrier's network, pass
through the IAP on their way to the subject even if they are not used for call processing and can be made available without excessive modifications to the network and
thus are reasonably available to the carrier. To the extent CPE is used to perform any of the functions described here, and no network signal is generated, that information
is not reasonably available to a carrier and thus is not required to be provided.
5. Timing information
90. Background. In those cases where the LEA has obtained authorization to intercept both content and call-identifying information, this capability
would require that a telecommunications carrier send call timing information to the LEA so that the LEA could associate the call-identifying information with the actual
content of the call. There would be two elements to this capability:
1) Each call-identifying message (answer message, party join message, party drop message, etc.) would be time stamped within a specific amount
of time from when the event triggering the message occurred. This time-stamp would allow the LEA to associate the message with the call
content information (i.e., the conversation). DoJ/FBI propose that the time stamp be accurate to within 100 milliseconds.
2) A carrier would be required to send the call-identifying message to the LEA within a defined amount of time after the event to permit the
LEA to associate the number dialed to the conversation. DoJ/FBI propose that the event be defined as the time the message is received at the
switch's IAP, and that delivery from the IAP to the LEA's Collection Function take place within 3 seconds 99% of the time.
91. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that this capability is call-identifying information and therefore must be provided by the carrier to the
LEA where reasonably available. The five manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $20 million.
92. Comments. Industry commenters argue that timing information is not call-identifying and is not required by CALEA. AirTouch states that a
time stamp is not part of the call, does not identify the origin, direction, destination, or termination of the call, and would not have been picked up from the call on a
traditional pen register or trap and trace interception. Ameritech and AT&T similarly assert that timing information is not call-identifying, and AT&T proposes that
any timing requirements be message specific, taking into account the nature of the event that prompts the message and its relative importance to a LEA to know it.
AT&T argues that any timing requirement should have to be met only 95% of the time. Finally, Sprint PCS states that it already provides LEAs with various types
of call identifying information within 4-6 seconds of the event's occurring.
93. TIA states that it disagrees that timing information is call-identifying, but says that it does not oppose a timing provision within the final standard.
TIA asserts that while manufacturers would prefer to maintain the standard's "expeditious access" requirement, they are willing to replace that provision with a specific
amount of time, as long as that time is reasonable and consistent with current system architectures. TIA proposes that such a timing requirement apply to the time between
detection of the event by the interim standard's Delivery Function and the sending of the call-identifying message from the Delivery Function toward the LEA's
Collection Function, and that the message be sent within eight seconds 95% of the time, and with an accuracy near 200 milliseconds.
94. DoJ/FBI argue that the interim standard must be modified to incorporate a specific timing requirement in order to give effect to the general timing
provisions of section 103(a)(2). They further argue that the timing requirements they suggest are feasible and constitute a performance standard, not a design standard;
and that we are not being asked to prescribe any specific design by which the timing requirements are to be met. NYPD agrees with DoJ/FBI that the requested 3
second delivery timeframe with 99% probability and 100 millisecond accuracy for the time stamp is needed to ensure timely delivery of call-identifying information.
95. Discussion. We will adopt a timing information requirement as an assistance capability requirement of section 103 of CALEA. First, we
find that time stamping is call-identifying information as defined in section 102(2) of CALEA. This information is needed to distinguish and properly associate the
call identifying information with the content of several calls occurring at approximately the same time. In other words, time stamp information is needed to identify "the
origin, direction, destination, or termination" of any given call and, thus, fits within the statutory definition of section 102(2). Second, we find that delivery of call-
identifying information, including time stamp information, to the LEA must, pursuant to section 103(a)(2), be provided in such a timely manner to allow that information
"to be associated with the communication to which it pertains." Third, we find that the anticipated costs to carriers of adding this capability are not so exorbitant as
to require automatic exclusion of the capability. In percentage terms, based on the manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimates, these costs would be 2% of the core interim
standard and 5% of the total punch list. Therefore, we will include timing parameters for delivery of call-identifying information as a technical requirement necessary
to meet the assistance capability requirements of section 103(a).
96. Specifically, because we find it to be a reasonable compromise between the DoJ/FBI and TIA proposals, we will adopt the DoJ/FBI proposal
that the event be defined as the time the call-identifying information is received at the IAP and TIA's proposal that this information, including a time stamp, be transmitted
to the LEA's Collection Function within eight seconds 95% of the time, and that the time stamp be accurate within 200 milliseconds. We find that TIA's proposal to define
the event as the time the call-identifying message is detected by the Delivery Function to be insufficient because in some circumstances this message might not be detected
by the Delivery Function until well after it was received at the IAP. However, we find the DoJ/FBI proposal for delivery of the message from the IAP to the LEA's
Collection function within 3 seconds 99% of the time with 100 millisecond accuracy to be overly stringent and possibly excessively costly to carriers given the various
network designs used by carriers in different services applying this requirement. Accordingly, we will require that delivery of a call-identifying message be transmitted
to the LEA's Collection Function within eight seconds of its receipt by the IAP 95% of the time, and with an accuracy within 200 milliseconds.
6. Surveillance status
97. Background. This capability would require the telecommunications carrier to send information to the LEA to verify that a wiretap has been
established and is still functioning correctly. This information could include the date, time, and location of the wiretap; identification of the subscriber whose facilities
are under surveillance; and identification of all voice channels that are connected to the subscriber. This information would be transmitted to the LEA when the wiretap
is activated, updated or deactivated, as well as periodically.
98. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that surveillance status messages do not fall within any provisions of section 103 and therefore should
not be required for CALEA compliance. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that such messages could be useful to LEAs, but are not required by the plain language
of CALEA. The five manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $37 million.
99. Comments. Industry commenters agree that this capability is not required by CALEA. TIA states that there is no statutory basis for this
requirement, and that it would be extremely difficult and costly to implement, particularly for wireless services. TIA contends that a wireless surveillance status
requirement would require significant modifications to system architecture to verify electronically that every relevant mobile switch and every other piece of network
equipment containing intercept-related data is operational and properly configured.
100. DoJ/FBI state that section 103 obligates carriers to take affirmative steps to ensure surveillance integrity, and that the interim standard excuses
carriers from taking any such steps. DoJ/FBI contend that a carrier that does not take any affirmative steps to monitor the integrity of authorized electronic surveillance
is not "ensuring" that its equipment, facilities, and services are capable of delivering "all communications" and all reasonably available call-identifying information that
law enforcement is authorized to intercept while protecting the privacy and security of other communications and call-identifying information. DoJ/FBI further argue
that TIA's argument that implementing these messages would require fundamental design of wireless networks assumes that the reporting of surveillance status messages
would require a central implementation. According to DoJ/FBI, however, a wireless carrier would be free to transmit surveillance status messages directly from each
network element involved in the surveillance, just as each switch will separately transmit call-identifying information and call content to law enforcement. The New
Jersey State Police (NJSP) and NYPD agree with DoJ/FBI that a surveillance status message is necessary.
101. Discussion. CALEA requires carriers to ensure that authorized wiretaps can be performed in an expeditious manner, and we believe that
a surveillance status message could assist carriers and LEAs in determining the status of such wiretaps. We conclude, however, that a surveillance status message does
not fall within any of the provisions of section 103. We do not believe that it is call-identifying information as defined by CALEA, since the information such a feature
would provide would not identify "the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each communication." Nor does a surveillance status message appear to be
required under section 103(a)(1), since it is not a wire or electronic communications carried on a carrier's system. Nor are we persuaded by the FBI's interpretation that
a surveillance status message is required by CALEA's direction that a carrier "shall ensure" that its system is capable of meeting the section 103(a) requirements. Rather,
we note that the Act expressly states: "a telecommunications carrier shall ensure that its equipment, facilities, or services . . . are capable of" intercepting communications
and allowing LEA access to call-identifying information. We interpret the plain language of the statute to mandate compliance with the capability requirements of
section 103(a), but not to require that such capability be proven or verified on a continual basis. Ensuring that a wiretap is operational can be done in either a technical
or non-technical manner, and section 103(a) does not include "ensurance" itself as a capability. Thus, we conclude that the surveillance status punch list item is not an
assistance capability requirement under section 103. However, we are confident that carriers and LEAs will work together to ensure that a wiretap is functioning
correctly. We also note that there is nothing that would prevent carriers from providing this capability either on a voluntary basis, or with compensation from LEAs.
7. Continuity check tone
102. Background. This technical requirement would require that, in cases where a LEA has obtained authority to intercept wire or electronic
communications, a C-tone or dial tone be placed on the call content channel received by the LEA from the telecommunications carrier until a user of the facilities under
surveillance initiates or receives a call. At that point, the tone would be turned off, indicating to the LEA that the target facilities were in use. This capability would
permit correlation between the time a call is initiated and the time the connection is established. The C-tone would also verify that the connection between the carrier's
switch and the LEA is in working order.
103. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that continuity check tones do not fall within any provisions of section 103 and therefore should not
be required for CALEA compliance. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that such tones could be useful to LEAs, but are not required by the plain language of
CALEA. The five manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $3 million.
104. Comments. Industry commenters agree that this capability is not required by CALEA. AirTouch states that a carrier's diligent compliance
with the industry standard, coupled with its observation of routine maintenance and operational standards, will adequately ensure the integrity of wiretap surveillance
facilities. Bell Atlantic contends that this capability, as well as the surveillance status and feature status capabilities, would give LEAs information they have not
previously had and, accordingly, these capabilities should be rejected. PCIA argues that the delivery of an automated continuity check would require carriers to install
C-tone generators at the switch.
105. DoJ/FBI reiterate the arguments they make with respect to surveillance status messages, contending that section 103 obligates carriers to take
affirmative steps to ensure surveillance integrity, and that the interim standard excuses carriers from taking any such steps. DoJ/FBI also contend that PCIA's assertion
that delivery of an automated continuity check tone would require carriers to install C-tone generators at the switch level is incorrect, because a C-tone is not the only
form of continuity check that would be acceptable to LEAs.
106. Discussion. As with the case of surveillance status messages, we believe that continuity tone could assist the LEA in determining the status of
a wiretap, but that this technical requirement is not necessary to meet the mandates of section 103(a). Similar to our reasoning regarding surveillance status messages,
we do not believe that a continuity tone falls within CALEA's definition of call-identifying information, since the information such a feature would provide would not
identify "the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each communication." Nor does it appear to be required under section 103(a)(1), since it is not a wire
or electronic communications carried on a carrier's system. Furthermore, as explained above, the plain language of the statute mandates compliance with the capability
requirements of section 103(a), but does not require that such capability be proven or verified on a continual basis. Again, ensuring that a wiretap is operational can
be done in either a technical or non- technical manner, and section 103(a) does not include "ensurance" itself as a capability. Thus, we conclude that the continuity tone
punch list item is not an assistance capability requirement under section 103. As noted in paragraph 101, supra, we are confident that carriers and LEAs will work
together to ensure that a wiretap is functioning correctly, and also note that there is nothing that would prevent carriers from providing this capability either on a voluntary
basis, or with compensation from LEAs.
8. Feature status
107. Background. This technical requirement would require a carrier to notify the LEA when specific subscription-based calling services are added
to or deleted from the facilities under surveillance, including when the subject modifies capabilities remotely through another phone or through an operator. Examples
of such services are call waiting, call hold, three-way calling, conference calling, and call return. Also, the carrier would be required to notify the LEA if the telephone
number of the facilities under surveillance was changed or service was disconnected.
108. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that feature status messages do not fall within any provisions of section 103 and therefore should not
be required for CALEA compliance. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that such messages could be useful to LEAs, but are not required by the plain language
of CALEA. The five manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $40 million.
109. Comments. Industry commenters agree that this capability is not required by CALEA. SBC contends that it is unreasonable to mandate
measures that would require the wholesale redesign of a carrier's network simply to comply with a LEA's preferences regarding surveillance. SBC also contends that
while it is necessary for changes in the telephone number of the facilities to be conveyed to a LEA, that need is already being met through existing administrative
procedures. US West states that it has provided LEAs with expeditious access to feature status information in the past and will do so in the future. US West also
contends that LEAs never before had the access that DoJ/FBI now is demanding to carriers' databases, and that DoJ/FBI's reasons for seeking this access are
unconvincing. PCIA maintains that provision of a feature status message by a carrier is not feasible because a carrier may not know which features a subscriber has
implemented at any particular time.
110. DoJ/FBI reiterate the arguments they make with respect to surveillance status messages and continuity check tones, contending that section 103
obligates carriers to take affirmative steps to ensure surveillance integrity, and that the interim standard excuses carriers from taking any such steps. DoJ/FBI also
contend that PCIA's assertion that carriers may not be able to provide a feature status message because they may not know which features a subscriber has implemented
at any particular time is inconsistent with the way carriers' networks operate. NYPD agrees with DoJ/FBI that a feature status capability is needed by LEAs, and
states that this capability is particularly necessary with respect to call forwarding and when a subject disconnects his service or changes his telephone number.
111. Discussion. Similar to surveillance status messages and continuity tones, we believe that feature status messages could be useful to a LEA, but
that provision of these messages from a carrier to a LEA is not required to meet the mandates of section 103(a). First, we believe it is clear that feature status messages
do not constitute call-identifying information since the information such a feature would provide would not identify "the origin, direction, destination, or termination of
each communication." Further, feature status messages do not appear to be required under section 103(a)(1) because they are not wire or electronic communications
carried on a carrier's system. Rather, they would simply aid a LEA in determining how much capacity is required to implement and maintain effective electronic
surveillance of a target facility, information that could be useful in assuring that an interception is fully effectuated and the intercepted material delivered as authorized.
However, as noted by AT&T, the information that would be provided by feature status messages can be provided by other means, such as in response to a subpoena
to the carrier. We reiterate that the plain language of the Act mandates compliance with the assistance capability requirements of section 103(a), but does not require
carriers to implement any specific quality control capabilities to assist law enforcement. The information sought by DoJ/FBI in a feature status message can be provided
in either a technical or non-technical manner, and section 103(a) does not include "ensurance" itself as a capability. Thus, we conclude that the feature status punch list
item is not an assistance capability requirement under section 103. Similar to surveillance status messages and continuity check tones, we are confident that carriers
and LEAs will work together to ensure that some form of feature status capability is provided, and also note that there is nothing that would prevent carriers from providing
this capability either on a voluntary basis, or with compensation from LEAs.
9. Dialed digit extraction
112. Background. This capability would require the telecommunications carrier to provide to the LEA on the call data channel the identity of any
digits dialed by the subject after connecting to another carrier's service (also known as "post-cut-through digits"). One example of such dialing and signaling would occur
when the subject dials an 800 number to access a long distance carrier. After connecting to the long distance carrier through the 800 number, the subject then dials the
telephone number that represents the ultimate destination of the call.
113. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that the identity of post-cut-through digits representing all telephone numbers needed to route a call,
for example, from the subscriber's telephone through its LEC, then through IXC and other networks, and ultimately to the intended party is call-identifying information.
The Further NPRM sought comment on whether such call-identifying information is reasonably available to the carrier originating the call. The five manufacturers'
aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $121 million.
114. Comments. EFF, EPIC, and ACLU argue that CALEA does not permit a LEA to obtain post-cut-through digits via a pen register order directed
at the initial telecommunications carrier because those digits are carried on the initial carrier's call content channel, and therefore must be treated the same as other call
content and not revealed to a LEA through a pen register order served on that carrier. EFF, EPIC, and ACLU maintain that information contained in the call content
portion of a transmission does not qualify as call-identifying because it does not identify the "origin, direction, destination or termination" of the initial carrier's
communications.
115. PCIA and TIA each assert that post-cut-through digits are not call-identifying information and are not reasonably available to the originating
carrier. TIA states that a carrier has no reason to detect dialed digits that are not used for call routing, and the manufacturers' switch designs do not contemplate their
detection since they are meaningless to the switch after the call is routed. Further, TIA contends, modifying these fundamental switch designs would be extraordinarily
difficult and expensive.
116. PCIA, Ameritech, and BellSouth propose alternative ways for a LEA to obtain post-cut-through dialed digits. PCIA states that, under the interim
standard, a LEA would be provided with these digits if it either serves the LEC with a Title III warrant and arranges for the provisioning of a CCC from that carrier, or
serves the interexchange carrier (IXC) with a pen register warrant and arranges for the provisioning of a CDC from that carrier. PCIA states that given the availability
of these alternatives, we should not expand the interim standard in a manner that conflicts with section 103. Ameritech and BellSouth propose another alternative
method, which they claim would be less expensive than our proposal that would require carriers to redesign touchtone detector architectures and add detector hardware
to their switches. Ameritech and BellSouth propose that a LEA obtain a pen register warrant, order a CCC from the originating carrier, and install equipment at the LEA's
collection facility to extract dual tone multi frequency (DTMF) digits. According to Ameritech and BellSouth, such a practice would allow carriers to avoid the expense
of both developing a digit extraction feature and keeping touchtone registers tied to a monitored call for the duration of that call.
117. AirTouch argues that a dialed digit extraction capability would be particularly expensive for wireless carriers to implement. It cites a vendor
estimate that each dialed digit extraction would cost about $1000; thus, a carrier whose switching system has the capability of conducting 200 simultaneous wiretaps would
have to pay roughly $200,000 -- an amount that AirTouch maintains is comparable to the per-switch cost of the software upgrade for the entire punch list.
118. DoJ/FBI argue that the statutory definition of call-identifying information encompasses all dialing and signaling information that identifies the
destination of each communication generated or received by a subscriber regardless of whether the particular carrier from whom the information is being sought uses
the information for call routing purposes; accordingly, DoJ/FBI maintain that it is irrelevant whether an originating carrier uses post-cut-through digits to route calls through
the network. DoJ/FBI also contend that the argument of EFF, EPIC, and ACLU regarding a LEA's lack of authority to obtain call content channel information with only
a pen register order is incorrect. DoJ/FBI state that the pen register statute authorizes LEAs to acquire all call-identifying numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted by
the subject using the monitored facilities. Ideally, DoJ/FBI state, carriers would have the capability to automatically distinguish between post-cut-through digits used for
call completion and those used for other purposes, but in the absence of such a capability, the carrier must deliver all post-cut-through digits to the LEA. Additionally,
DoJ/FBI argue that post-cut-through digits cannot be obtained expeditiously from other carriers, and often will not be available at all; and that for a LEA to provision
a CCC to extract post-cut-through tones at the LEA's collection facility would cost LEAs as much as $20 million per year. Moreover, DoJ/FBI argue that delivering the
contents of a subject's post-cut-through communications to a LEA pursuant to a pen register order could pose unnecessary risks to privacy interests because innocent
conversations might be heard by LEAs in the course of such surveillance.
119. Discussion. We find that some digits dialed by a subject after connecting to a carrier other than the originating carrier are call-identifying
information. While a subject may dial digits after the initial call set-up that are not call-identifying -- e.g., a bank account number to access his/her bank statement -- some
digits dialed after connecting to an IXC identify the "origin, direction, destination or termination" of the communications. We also find that this call-identifying information
is "reasonably available" to the originating carrier because the digits dialed by a subject after connecting to another carrier are present at an IAP and can be made available
by the originating carrier without the carrier being unduly burdened with network modifications.
120. Additionally, we note that there appears to be a consensus that LEAs should be permitted to obtain in some fashion digits dialed by the subject
after connecting to another carrier's service. PCIA, Ameritech, and BellSouth have proposed alternative methods of extracting such digits, and these methods would
minimize the expense to originating carriers. However, each alternative method also raises significant concerns. The first method proposed by PCIA -- a LEA serving
the originating carrier with a Title III warrant and arranging for the provisioning of a CCC from that carrier -- is not feasible unless the LEA can obtain the legal
authorization necessary for a Title III warrant. The burden of proof necessary for obtaining a Title III authorization is more stringent than that required for a pen register
warrant, and a pen register is all that is required to obtain call-identifying information. We do not believe that CALEA contemplates changing the standard of proof in
obtaining a warrant in order to avoid implementing a particular CALEA feature.
121. The second method proposed by PCIA -- a LEA serving an IXC with a pen register warrant and arranging for the provisioning of a CDC from
that carrier -- would shift the cost burden from the originating carrier to the LEA, which would not necessarily be less expensive to the public. Further, this method could
be time-consuming, particularly if a caller used multiple IXCs to complete a single call, and thus would seem to defeat one of the purposes of CALEA to preserve the
ability of law enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance effectively and efficiently in the face of rapid advances in telecommunications technology.
Finally, this method would shift to the LEA responsibility for ensuring that the interception is conducted in a way that protects the privacy and security of communications
not authorized for interception, and thus would effectively relieve carriers of their obligations under section 103(a)(4) of CALEA.
122. The method proposed by Ameritech and BellSouth -- a LEA obtaining a pen register warrant, ordering a CCC from the originating carrier, and
installing equipment at the LEA's collection facility to extract DTMF digits -- would again shift the cost burden from the originating carrier to the LEA and thus not
necessarily effect a cost savings for the public. Additionally, this method would jeopardize privacy because the LEA would be using a CCC, and therefore would obtain
call content, as well as call-identifying, information under a pen register warrant. Thus, to an even greater extent than the second method proposed by PCIA, this method
would shift to the LEA responsibility for ensuring that the interception is conducted in a way that protects the privacy and security of communications not authorized
for interception, and thus would relieve carriers of their obligations under section 103(a)(4).
123. Accordingly, while we are concerned about the costs of a dialed digit extraction capability to originating carriers, as well as the privacy implications
of permitting LEAs to access non-call-identifying digits (such as bank account numbers) with only a pen register warrant, we find that requiring this capability is
appropriate. We find that adopting our proposal rather than one of the three alternatives suggested in the comments will best balance the directives of section 107(b)
of CALEA that the capability requirements of section 103 be met by cost-effective methods and that the privacy and security of communications not authorized to be
intercepted be protected. As with packet switching, the LEA will be required to minimize its search of the CDC for call-identifying information. With respect to costs,
we note that the manufacturers' revenue data indicate that the cost of a dialed digit extraction capability would exceed the cost of any other punch list capability. In
percentage terms, based on the manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimates, this cost would be 13% of the core interim standard and 29% of the total punch list.
Based on the manufacturers' wireless revenue estimates, this cost would be 17% of the core interim standard and 26% of the total punch list. However, in balancing
these costs against other statutory requirements, we do not find them to be so exorbitant as to require automatic exclusion of the capability. Further, it is unclear whether
any of the alternative methods proposed would be significantly less expensive; rather, they would simply shift the cost burden from carriers to LEAs. Thus, we conclude
that the provision of dialed digit extraction information by the originating carrier is a technical requirement that meets the assistance capability requirements of section
103.
D. Disposition of J-STD-025 Modifications
124. Background. In the Further NPRM, we stated that we expected that TIA Subcommittee TR45.2 would modify the interim standard to be
consistent with any additional technical requirements we adopt, and that we anticipated that the Subcommittee would complete those modifications within 180 days of
release of this Third R&O. We noted that this was an ambitious schedule, but we stated that we believed it to be achievable because the Subcommittee has been examining
CALEA technical standards issues for several years and the modifications to J-STD-025 are likely to be relatively limited. Finally, we stated that we would set a separate
compliance deadline for those additional technical requirements.
125. Comments. TIA endorses our conclusion that its Subcommittee TR45.2 should revise the interim standard, consistent with the requirements that
we adopt. TIA states that the Subcommittee has the expertise and resources to issue a revised technical standard in the most efficient and expeditious manner, and that
it will make every effort to expedite the completion of a stable, ballot-ready revision of the final standard within 180 days. TIA contends, however, that 180 days
for a balloted and approved standard is not possible. TIA also requests clarification as to whether the revisions to the interim standard should be balloted as a
TIA/American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard, or as another interim standard. TIA states that the former procedure would extend the balloting and approval
process. Finally, TIA states that representatives from our Office of Engineering and Technology should participate in the standard's formulating group, and that members
of the privacy and law enforcement communities are strongly encouraged to participate.
126. Several parties submitted comments consistent with those submitted by TIA. US West states that it supports the proposed remand to the TIA
Subcommittee, but that the expectation that the Subcommittee will be able to complete its work within 180 days probably is overly optimistic. US West contends that
developing a consensus on the necessary technical standards and having them subsequently approved by ballot, as required under ANSI procedures, could take more
than one year. SBC states that it agrees with us about remanding the interim standard to the Subcommittee, but contends that whether the activity of the Subcommittee
can be completed within 180 days will depend upon the extent of our modifications. AT&T states that it may be feasible to complete technical amendments to the
interim standard within 180 days, but that procedures for promulgation as a final industry standard will require additional time. However, DoJ/FBI contend that if
the Commission is specific about the changes required to the interim standard, there is no reason why the Subcommittee cannot produce a ballot-ready draft within 90
days and a vote on the final standard within an additional 90 days.
127. TIA argues that implementation of the additional punch list capabilities by manufacturers and carriers should be at least 36 months after the June
30, 2000 deadline for implementing the capability requirements covered by the interim standard. This deadline would provide manufacturers approximately 24 months
to design and test new products and provide carriers approximately 12 months to acquire and test new products in their networks, according to TIA. DoJ/FBI suggest
that manufacturers and carriers be required to implement the punch list capabilities within 18 months of adoption of a revised industry standard. DoJ/FBI argue that
the industry already has begun work on revisions to the standard to include the punch list capabilities, and points to the long delays that already have occurred in
implementing CALEA, urging the Commission not to delay further industry compliance.
128. Discussion. As proposed, we are remanding the interim standard to Subcommittee TR45.2 of the TIA to make the necessary technical
modifications in accord with our findings herein. We believe that those technical requirements can be most efficiently implemented by permitting the Subcommittee to
make the modifications. LEAs, carriers, and manufacturers are voting members of the Subcommittee, and the Subcommittee has the experience and resources in place
to resolve these issues quickly. Regarding the specific timing requirements, we conclude that seven months is a reasonable period of time for TIA to complete the
necessary changes to J-STD-025. We note that only certain punch list items will need to be included in the revised standard, which will reduce the amount of work to
be completed, and that the industry already has begun work in this regard. Accordingly, we will require TIA to complete the necessary revisions to the interim standard
by March 30, 2000. We find it sufficient for TIA to adopt a revised TIA interim standard and see no need or benefit to consider the revised standard as an ANSI standard.
Commission staff will closely monitor the development of the revised standard, but will not participate directly so that we can maintain our impartiality in the event of
disputes relative to the revised standard.
129. We will require wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers to make the six punch list capabilities available to LEAs by September 30, 2001.
We believe that manufacturers, if they have not done so already, will begin working to include the additional capabilities in their products as soon as practicable after
adoption of this Third R&O, rather than delay such work until after the June 30, 2000 deadline, as TIA suggests. Relative to implementation of the core interim standard,
the September 30, 2001 deadline will provide carriers an additional 15 months to implement these capabilities. We find that this deadline provides sufficient time for
the development process to be completed and for carriers to implement these capabilities.
E. Other Technologies and Systems
130. Background. In the Further NPRM, we noted that the interim standard applies only to wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers. CALEA
assistance capability requirements for other telecommunications service providers, including paging, specialized mobile radio (SMR), and satellite service providers, are
not covered by that standard. Industry associations or standard-setting organizations that represent such service providers that fit within the definition of
telecommunications carrier under CALEA may establish voluntary standards to achieve compliance with section 103 by the June 30, 2000 deadline, and take advantage
of the safe harbor provision of section 107(a). The absence of an industry standard, however, does not relieve such carriers from the obligations imposed by section
103. In the absence of a publicly available standard, a carrier will have to work with its vendors to develop an individual CALEA solution, and a carrier is free to
choose a solution that is specifically tailored to its particular system and technology.
131. Comments. Motorola states that it has been active with respect to technical work involving paging, satellite, SMR, and Enhanced Specialized
Mobile Radio (ESMR) systems. It contends that we should defer to and encourage these ongoing efforts by other sectors of the telecommunications industry to comply
with CALEA's obligations. Motorola also recommends that we clarify that this Third R&O is not a checklist against which other standards will be judged in the future
because requirements that may be reasonable in the wireline, cellular, or PCS context simply may not apply to other technologies. Finally, Motorola states that we should
recognize that despite industry's best efforts, compliance for these other technologies may not be possible by June 30, 2000. Motorola states that we may want to grant
a blanket extension for these technologies and postpone their capability compliance until their eventual capacity deadline under the FBI's final notice of capacity.
132. American Mobile Satellite Corporation (AMSC) states that, in the absence of petitions to us, we should allow operators of systems that use other
technologies to establish, in consultation with LEAs, the capability requirements that will apply to their services. AMSC states that only if we are requested to consider
the adequacy of technical rules or standards that are adopted for carriers not covered by the interim standard should we become involved. Similarly, ICO Services
Limited (ICO) states that we should not take any action at this time with respect to mobile satellite providers, and should allow those providers to work directly with LEAs
to establish standards. AT&T states that, unless a party asks us to intercede in the standards process, we should have no direct role. Rather, we should announce
general capability principles under section 103, leaving industry associations or standard setting bodies to implement the requirements based on the particular
technology. Southern Communications Services, Inc. (Southern) states that we should establish a CALEA safe harbor standard for SMR carriers, but that our role
in the standards setting process should be limited absent a deficiency petition or failure of industry to establish standards. Southern further states that our decisions herein
should serve only as a general guide for SMR carriers, and that the definition of reasonably available will differ based on the particular technology employed. Finally,
PCIA states that it has developed a safe harbor standard for traditional paging providers, whereby such providers will meet the assistance capability requirements through
the provision of cloned pagers. However, PCIA contends that NYPD has requested that paging carriers provide specific call-identifying information that is neither required
by section 103 nor by the paging safe harbor standard, and that this request should be rejected.
133. Discussion. Under Section 107 of CALEA, we can establish technical requirements or standards only after a Government agency or person
petitions us to do so because an industry standard has not been developed or because the petitioner finds that such a standard is deficient. In the absence of a petition,
we do not have authority to establish standards and thus do not do so herein for telecommunications carriers deploying other technologies. We note that each of the
requirements we adopt herein with respect to wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers is not necessarily appropriate for other technologies. As to the deadline for
compliance for other technologies, we decline to extend the date. We made clear in the Extension Order that the June 30, 2000 deadline would apply to all
telecommunications carriers and should provide sufficient time for the development of CALEA-compliant technology. Accordingly, while we will consider any
petitions that may be filed to extend that deadline for specific services, we decline to issue a blanket extension herein. Finally, with respect to PCIA's concerns regarding
the safe harbor standard it says that it has developed with respect to paging systems, no party has petitioned us contending that PCIA's paging standard is deficient.
Therefore, there is at present no issue for us to resolve regarding that standard.
F. Other Matters
134. Standardized Delivery Interface. DoJ/FBI contend that there is another capability that should be included in the final industry standard; namely,
a standardized delivery interface that would limit the number of potential delivery interfaces LEAs would need to accommodate from the telecommunications industry.
DoJ/FBI state that the interim standard does not contain any limitation on the number of protocols that may be used by carriers to deliver call content and call-identifying
information. Therefore, according to DoJ/FBI, unless a relatively small number of standardized protocols are employed, each carrier will be free to employ a different
interface protocol, and LEAs could be faced with prohibitive practical and financial burdens in equipping themselves to deal with scores of different protocols. DoJ/FBI
state that this capability was part of their original punch list and they have not dropped it from consideration, even though we stated in the Further NPRM that it had
been dropped. DoJ/FBI argue that limiting the number of delivery interfaces will ensure that industry meets the assistance capability requirements of section 103
by cost-effective methods.
135. PrimeCo disagrees with DoJ/FBI, stating that we should not limit the number of delivery interfaces. PrimeCo states that many new digital
standards are currently under consideration, and contends that the DoJ/FBI proposal contravenes legislatively-imposed parameters by discouraging the development of
new services and technologies.
136. Discussion. As Assistant Attorney General Colgate stated in February 1998, "a single delivery interface is not mandated by CALEA," and
we see nothing in the Act that would require that the number of interfaces be limited. We believe, however, that as digital technology evolves, industry will reach
agreement on a relatively limited number of delivery interfaces, which should serve to reduce costs to LEAs. Accordingly, we reject the DoJ/FBI proposal to include
a standardized delivery interface capability in the final industry standard.
137. Employee conduct and recordkeeping requirements. The Further NPRM inadvertently included proposals related to employee conduct and
recordkeeping requirements for telecommunications carriers. These proposals were carried over from the original Notice of Proposed Rule Making in this
proceeding, and are not relevant to the issues we address herein. No comments were filed to the Further NPRM that addressed these proposals. Accordingly, we
make no findings regarding them in this decision. We note, however, that these proposals were addressed in our recent Report and Order in this proceeding.
G. Summary of Findings
138. In this Order, we have finalized technical requirements for wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers. Specifically, we are requiring these
carriers to implement the capabilities of the interim standard and six DoJ/FBI punch list items: content of subject-initiated conference calls; party hold, join, drop on
conference calls; subject-initiated dialing and signaling information; in-band and out-of-band signaling; timing information; and dialed digit extraction. The core capabilities
of the interim standard must be implemented by June 30, 2000, and packet-mode communications and the punch list items must be implemented by September 30, 2001.
IV.
PROCEDURAL INFORMATION
A. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
139. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was incorporated in the Further NPRM.
The Commission sought written public comments on the proposals in the Further NPRM, including the IRFA. This Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA)
conforms to the RFA.
(A) Need for and Purpose of this Action
140. This Third Report and Order responds to the legislative mandate contained in the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub.
L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.). The Commission, in compliance with 47 U.S.C. 229,
promulgates rules in this Third Report and Order to ensure the prompt implementation of section 103 of CALEA. In enacting CALEA, Congress sought to balance
three key policies with CALEA: "(1) to preserve a narrowly focused capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out properly authorized intercepts; (2) to protect
privacy in the face of increasingly powerful and personally revealing technologies; and (3) to avoid impeding the development of new communications services and
technologies."
141. The rules adopted in this Third Report and Order implement Congress's goal to balance the three key policies enumerated above. The objective
of the rules is to implement as quickly and effectively as possible the national telecommunications policy for wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS telecommunications
carriers to support the lawful electronic surveillance needs of law enforcement agencies.
(B) Summary of the Issues Raised by Public Comments Made in Response to the IRFA
142. Summary of Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA). In the Further NPRM, the Commission performed an IRFA and asked for comments
that specifically addressed issues raised in the IRFA. No parties filed comments directly in response to the IRFA. In response to non-IFRA comments to the Further
NPRM, we have modified several of the Commission's proposals, particularly regarding packet switching, conference call content, in-band and out-of-band signaling,
and timing information, as discussed above.
(C) Description and Estimates of the Number of Entities Affected by This Third Report and
Order
143. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be affected by the
action taken. The RFA generally defines the term "small entity" as having the same meaning as the terms "small business," "small organization," and "small
governmental jurisdiction." In addition, the term "small business" has the same meaning as the term "small business concern" under the Small Business Act.
A small business concern is one that: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria
established by the Small Business Administration (SBA). A small organization is generally "any not-for-profit enterprise which is independently owned and operated
and is not dominant in its field." Nationwide, as of 1992, there were approximately 275,801 small organizations. And finally, "small governmental jurisdiction"
generally means "governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special districts, with a population of less than 50,000." As of 1992,
there were approximately 85,006 such jurisdictions in the United States. This number includes 38,978 counties, cities, and towns; of these, 37,566, or 96 percent,
have populations of fewer than 50,000. The United States Bureau of the Census (Census Bureau) estimates that this ratio is approximately accurate for all
governmental entities. Thus, of the 85,006 governmental entities, we estimate that 81,600 (91 percent) are small entities. Below, we further describe and estimate the
number of small business concerns that may be affected by the actions taken in this Third Report and Order.
144. As noted, under the Small Business Act, a "small business concern" is one that: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant
in its field of operation; and (3) meets any additional criteria established by the SBA. The SBA has defined a small business for Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) categories 4812 (Radiotelephone Communications) and 4813 (Telephone Communications, Except Radiotelephone) to be small entities when they have no more
than 1,500 employees. We first discuss the number of small telecommunications entities falling within these SIC categories, then attempt to refine further those
estimates to correspond with the categories of telecommunications companies that are commonly used under our rules.
145. Total Number of Telecommunications Entities Affected. The Census Bureau reports that, at the end of 1992, there were 3,497 firms engaged
in providing telephone services, as defined therein, for at least one year. This number contains a variety of different categories of entities, including local exchange
carriers, interexchange carriers, competitive access providers, cellular carriers, mobile service carriers, operator service providers, pay telephone operators, PCS providers,
covered SMR providers, and resellers. It seems certain that some of those 3,497 telephone service firms may not qualify as small entities or small incumbent LECs
because they are not "independently owned and operated." For example, a PCS provider that is affiliated with an interexchange carrier having more than 1,500
employees would not meet the definition of a small business. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that fewer than 3,497 telephone service firms are small entity
telephone service firms or small incumbent LECs that may be affected by the actions taken in this Third Report and Order.
146. The most reliable source of current information regarding the total numbers of common carrier and related providers nationwide, including the
numbers of commercial wireless entities, appears to be data the Commission publishes annually in its Carrier Locator report, derived from filings made in connection
with the Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS). According to data in the most recent report, there are 3,604 interstate carriers. These include, inter alia,
local exchange carriers, wireline carriers and service providers, interexchange carriers, competitive access providers, operator service providers, pay telephone operators,
providers of telephone toll service, providers of telephone exchange service, and resellers.
147. We have included small incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs) in this RFA analysis. As noted above, a "small business" under the RFA is
one that, inter alia, meets the pertinent small business size standard (e.g., a telephone communications business having 1,500 or fewer employees), and "is not dominant
in its field of operation." The SBA's Office of Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small incumbent LECs are not dominant in their field of operation because
any such dominance is not "national" in scope. We have therefore included small incumbent LECs in this RFA analysis, although we emphasize that this RFA action
has no effect on FCC analyses and determinations in other, non-RFA contexts.
148. Wireline Carriers and Service Providers (SIC 4813). The Census Bureau reports that there were 2,321 telephone communications companies
other than radiotelephone companies in operation for at least one year at the end of 1992. All but 26 of the 2,321 non-radiotelephone companies listed by the Census
Bureau were reported to have fewer than 1,000 employees. Thus, even if all 26 of those companies had more than 1,500 employees, there would still be 2,295 non-
radiotelephone companies that might qualify as small entities or small incumbent LECs. Although it seems certain that some of these carriers are not independently owned
and operated, we are unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of wireline carriers and service providers that would qualify as small business
concerns under SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate that there are fewer than 2,295 small entity telephone communications companies other than radiotelephone
companies that may be affected by the actions taken in this Third Report and Order.
149. Local Exchange Carriers, Interexchange Carriers, Competitive Access Providers, and Resellers. Neither the Commission nor SBA has developed
a definition of small LECs, interexchange carriers (IXCs), competitive access providers (CAPs), or resellers. The closest applicable definition for these carrier-types under
SBA rules is for telephone communications companies other than radiotelephone (wireless) companies. The most reliable source of information regarding the number
of these carriers nationwide of which we are aware appears to be the data that we collect annually in connection with the TRS. According to our most recent data,
there are 1,410 LECs, 151 IXCs, 129 CAPs, and 351 resellers. Although it seems certain that some of these carriers are not independently owned and operated,
or have more than 1,500 employees, we are unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of these carriers that would qualify as small business concerns
under SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate that there are fewer than 1,410 small entity LECs or small incumbent LECs, 151 IXCs, 129 CAPs, and 351 resellers
that may be affected by the actions taken in this Third Report and Order.
150. Wireless Carriers (SIC 4812). The Census Bureau reports that there were 1,176 radiotelephone (wireless) companies in operation for at least
one year at the end of 1992, of which 1,164 had fewer than 1,000 employees. Even if all of the remaining 12 companies had more than 1,500 employees, there would
still be 1,164 radiotelephone companies that might qualify as small entities if they are independently owned are operated. Although it seems certain that some of these
carriers are not independently owned and operated, we are unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of radiotelephone carriers and service providers
that would qualify as small business concerns under SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate that there are fewer than 1,164 small entity radiotelephone companies
that may be affected by the actions taken in this Third Report and Order.
151. Cellular, PCS, SMR and Other Mobile Service Providers. In an effort to further refine our calculation of the number of radiotelephone companies
that may be affected by the actions taken in this Second Report and Order, we consider the data that we collect annually in connection with the TRS for the subcategories
Wireless Telephony (which includes PCS, Cellular, and SMR) and Other Mobile Service Providers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a definition
of small entities specifically applicable to these broad subcategories, so we will utilize the closest applicable definition under SBA rules, which is for radiotelephone
communications companies. According to our most recent TRS data, 732 companies reported that they are engaged in the provision of Wireless Telephony services
and 23 companies reported that they are engaged in the provision of Other Mobile Services. Although it seems certain that some of these carriers are not
independently owned and operated, or have more than 1,500 employees, we are unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of Wireless Telephony
Providers and Other Mobile Service Providers, except as described below, that would qualify as small business concerns under SBA's definition. Consequently, we
estimate that there are fewer than 732 small entity Wireless Telephony Providers and fewer than 23 small entity Other Mobile Service Providers that might be affected
by the actions taken in this Second Report and Order.
152. Broadband PCS Licensees. The broadband PCS spectrum is divided into six frequency blocks designated A through F, and the Commission has
held auctions for each block. The Commission defined "small business" for Blocks C and F as an entity that has average gross revenues of not more than $40 million
in the three previous calendar years. These regulations defining "small business" in the context of broadband PCS auctions have been approved by SBA. No
small businesses within the SBA-approved definition bid successfully for licenses in Blocks A and B. There have been 237 winning bidders that qualified as small entities
in the four auctions that have been held for licenses in Blocks C, D, E and F, all of which may be affected by the actions taken in this Second Report and Order.
153. Cellular Licensees. According to the Bureau of the Census, only twelve radiotelephone firms from a total of 1,178 such firms which operated during
1992 had 1,000 or more employees. Therefore, even if all twelve of these firms were cellular telephone companies, nearly all cellular carriers were small businesses under
the SBA's definition. In addition, we note that there are 1,758 cellular licenses; however, a cellular licensee may own several licenses. In addition, according to the most
recent Carrier Locator data, 732 carriers reported that they were engaged in the provision of either cellular service or PCS services, which are placed together in the data.
We do not have data specifying the number of these carriers that are not independently owned and operated or have more than 1,500 employees, and thus are unable
at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of cellular service carriers that would qualify as small business concerns under the SBA's definition.
Consequently, we estimate that there are fewer than 732 small cellular service carriers that may be affected by the actions taken in this Second Report and Order.
(D) Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other
Compliance Requirements.
154. No reporting and recordkeeping requirements are imposed on telecommunications carriers, thus burdens on carriers, including small carriers, are not
increased as a result of actions taken herein. Telecommunications carriers, including small carriers, will have to upgrade their network facilities to provide to law
enforcement the assistance capability requirements adopted herein. Although compliance with the technical requirements will impose costs on carriers, the record was
not sufficient to analyze thoroughly the costs to carriers, including small carriers (see paragraph 30, supra).
(E) Steps Taken to Minimize Significant Economic
Impact on Small Entities and Significant
Alternatives Considered.
155. The need for the regulations adopted herein is mandated by Federal legislation. In the final regulations, we affirm our proposals in the Further NPRM
to establish regulations for wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS telecommunications carriers. Costs to telecommunications carriers will be mitigated in several ways.
For example, the final regulations will require telecommunications carrier's to make available to law enforcement call identifying information when it can be done without
unduly burdening the carrier with network modifications, thus allowing cost to be a consideration in determining whether the information is reasonably available to the
carrier and can be provided to law enforcement (see paragraphs 28-29, supra). Thus, compliance with the assistance capability requirements of CALEA will be reasonable
for all carriers, including small carriers. Also, under CALEA some carriers will be able to request reimbursement from the Department of Justice for network upgrades
to comply with the technical requirements adopted herein, and others may be able to defer network upgrades to their normal business cycle under a plan being developed
by the Department of Justice.
Report to Congress
156. The Commission will send a copy of this FRFA, along with this Third Report and Order, in a report to Congress pursuant to the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A). In addition, the Commission will send a copy of this Third Report and Order, including the
FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration. A copy of this Third Report and Order, including FRFA, will also be published in the
Federal Register. See 5 U.S.C. 604(b).
B. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis
157. This Third Report and Order does not contain a modified information collection.
V. ORDERING CLAUSES
158. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to sections 1, 4, 229, 301, 303, and 332 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and
107(b) of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154, 229, 301, 303, 332, and 1006(b), this Third Report and Order and the
rules specified in Appendix A ARE ADOPTED.
159. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the rules set forth in Appendix A WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE 90 days after publication in the Federal
Register.
160. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, as required by Section 604 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and as set
forth above, IS ADOPTED.
161. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission's Office of Public Affairs, Reference Operations Division, SHALL SEND a copy of this Third
Report and Order, including the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Magalie Roman Salas
Secretary
VI. APPENDIX A: FINAL RULES
AMENDMENTS TO THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
PART 22- PUBLIC MOBILE SERVICES
A. Part 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:
1. The authority citation in Part 22 continues to read:
AUTHORITY: 47 U.S.C. 154, 222, 303, 309 and 332.
2. The table of contents for Part 22 is amended to add Subpart J to read as follows:
Subpart J - Required New Capabilities Pursuant to the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)
22.1100 Purpose.
Pursuant to the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in sections of 18
U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.), this subpart contains rules that require a cellular telecommunications carrier to implement certain capabilities to ensure law enforcement access
to authorized communications or call-identifying
information.
22.1101 Scope.
The definitions included in this subpart shall be used solely for the purpose of implementing CALEA requirements.
22.1102 Definitions.
Call Identifying Information. Call identifying information means dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each
communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or service of a telecommunications carrier. Call identifying information is
"reasonably available" to a carrier if it is present at an intercept access point and can be made available without the carrier being unduly burdened with network
modifications.
Collection Function. The location where lawfully authorized intercepted communications and call-identifying information is collected by a law enforcement agency (LEA).
Content of subject-initiated conference calls. Capability that permits a LEA to monitor the content of conversations by all parties connected via a conference call when
the facilities under surveillance maintain a circuit connection to the call.
Dialed digit extraction. Capability that permits a LEA to receive on the call data channel digits dialed by a subject when a call is connected to another carrier's service
for processing and routing.
In-band and out-of-band signaling
. Capability that permits a LEA to be informed when a network message that provides call identifying information (e.g., ringing, busy, call waiting signal,
message light) is generated or sent by the IAP switch to a subject using the facilities under surveillance. Excludes signals generated by customer premises equipment when
no network signal is generated.
Intercept Access Point (IAP). Intercept access point is a point within a carrier's system where some of the communications or call-identifying information of an intercept
subject's equipment, facilities, and services are accessed.
J-STD-025. The interim standard developed by the Telecommunications Industry Association and the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions for wireline,
cellular, and broadband PCS carriers. This standard defines services and features to support lawfully authorized electronic surveillance, and specifies interfaces necessary
to deliver intercepted communications and call-identifying information to a LEA
LEA. Law enforcement agency; e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a local police department.
Party hold, join, drop on conference calls
. Capability that permits a LEA to identify the parties to a conference call conversation at all times.
Subject-initiated dialing and signaling information
. Capability that permits a LEA to be informed when a subject using the facilities under surveillance uses services that provide call identifying information,
such as call forwarding, call waiting, call hold, and three-way calling. Excludes signals generated by customer premises equipment when no network signal is generated.
Timing information. Capability that permits a LEA to associate call-identifying information with the content of a call. A call-identifying message must be sent from the
carrier's IAP to the LEA's Collection Function within eight seconds of receipt of that message by the IAP at least 95% of the time, and with the call event time-stamped
to an accuracy of at least 200 milliseconds.
22.1103 Capabilities that must be provided by a cellular telecommunications carrier.
(a) Except as provided under paragraph (b), as of June 30, 2000 a cellular telecommunications carrier shall provide to a LEA the assistance capability requirements of
CALEA, see 47 U.S.C. 1002. A carrier may satisfy these requirements by complying with publicly available technical requirements or standards adopted by an industry
association or standard-setting organization, such as J-STD-025.
(b) As of September 30, 2001 a cellular telecommunications carrier shall provide to a LEA communications and call-identifying information transported by packet-mode
communications and the following capabilities:
(1) Content of subject-initiated conference calls;
(2) Party hold, join, drop on conference calls;
(3) Subject-initiated dialing and signaling information
;
(4) In-band and out-of-band signaling;
(5) Timing information;
(6) Dialed digit extraction.
PART 24- PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
B. Part 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:
1. The authority citation in Part 24 continues to read:
AUTHORITY: 47 U.S.C. 154, 301, 302, 303, 309 and 332.
2. The table of contents for Part 24 is amended to add Subpart J to read as follows:
Subpart J - Required New Capabilities Pursuant to the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)
24.900 Purpose.
Pursuant to the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in sections of 18
U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.), this subpart contains rules that require a broadband PCS telecommunications carrier to implement certain capabilities to ensure law enforcement
access to authorized communications or call-identifying information.
24.901 Scope.
The definitions included in this subpart shall be used solely for the purpose of implementing CALEA requirements.
24.902 Definitions.
Call Identifying Information. Call identifying information means dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each
communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or service of a telecommunications carrier. Call identifying information is
"reasonably available" to a carrier if it is present at an intercept access point and can be made available without the carrier being unduly burdened with network
modifications.
Collection Function. The location where lawfully authorized intercepted communications and call-identifying information is collected by a law enforcement agency (LEA).
Content of subject-initiated conference calls. Capability that permits a LEA to monitor the content of conversations by all parties connected via a conference call when
the facilities under surveillance maintain a circuit connection to the call.
Dialed digit extraction. Capability that permits a LEA to receive on the call data channel a digits dialed by a subject after a call is connected to another carrier's service
for processing and routing.
IAP. Intercept access point is a point within a carrier's system where some of the communications or call-identifying information of an intercept subject's equipment,
facilities, and services are accessed.
In-band and out-of-band signaling
. Capability that permits a LEA to be informed when a network message that provides call identifying information (e.g., ringing, busy, call waiting signal,
message light) is generated or sent by the IAP switch to a subject using the facilities under surveillance. Excludes signals generated by customer premises equipment when
no network signal is generated.
J-STD-025. The interim standard developed by the Telecommunications Industry Association and the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions for wireline,
cellular, and broadband PCS carriers. This standard defines services and features to support lawfully authorized electronic surveillance, and specifies interfaces necessary
to deliver intercepted communications and call-identifying information to a LEA
LEA. Law enforcement agency; e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a local police department.
Party hold, join, drop on conference calls
. Capability that permits a LEA to identify the parties to a conference call conversation at all times.
Subject-initiated dialing and signaling information
. Capability that permits a LEA to be informed when a subject using the facilities under surveillance uses services that provide call identifying information,
such as call forwarding, call waiting, call hold, and three-way calling. Excludes signals generated by customer premises equipment when no network signal is generated.
Timing information. Capability that permits a LEA to associate call-identifying information with the content of a call. A call-identifying message must be sent from the
carrier's IAP to the LEA's Collection Function within eight seconds of receipt of that message by the IAP at least 95% of the time, and with the call event time-stamped
to an accuracy of at least 200 milliseconds.
24.903 Capabilities that must be provided by a broadband PCS telecommunications carrier.
(a) Except as provided under paragraph (b), as of June 30, 2000 a cellular telecommunications carrier shall provide to a LEA the assistance capability requirements of
CALEA, see 47 U.S.C. 1002. A carrier may satisfy these requirements by complying with publicly available technical requirements or standards adopted by an industry
association or standard-setting organization, such as J-STD-025.
(b) As of September 30, 2001 a cellular telecommunications carrier shall provide to a LEA communications and call-identifying information transported by packet-mode
communications and the following capabilities:
(1) Content of subject-initiated conference calls;
(2) Party hold, join, drop on conference calls;
(3) Subject-initiated dialing and signaling information
;
(4) In-band and out-of-band signaling;
(5) Timing information;
(6) Dialed digit extraction.
PART 64 - MISCELLANEOUS RULES RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS
C. Part 64 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:
1. The authority citation for Part 64 is amended to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: 47 U.S.C. 151, 154, 201, 202, 205, 218-220, and 332 unless otherwise noted. Interpret or apply 201, 218, 225, 226, 227, 229, 332, 48 Stat.
1070, as amended. 47 U.S.C. 201-204, 208, 225, 226, 227, 229, 332, 501 and 503 unless otherwise noted.
2. The table of contents for Part 64 is amended to add Subpart W to read as follows:
Subpart W - Required New Capabilities Pursuant to the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)
64.2200 Purpose.
Pursuant to the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in sections of 18
U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.), this subpart contains rules that require a wireline telecommunications carrier to implement certain capabilities to ensure law enforcement access
to authorized communications or call-identifying information.
64.2201 Scope.
The definitions included in this subpart shall be used solely for the purpose of implementing CALEA requirements.
64.2202 Definitions.
Call Identifying Information. Call identifying information means dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each
communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or service of a telecommunications carrier. Call identifying information is
"reasonably available" to a carrier if it is present at an intercept access point and can be made available without the carrier being unduly burdened with network
modifications.
Collection Function. The location where lawfully authorized intercepted communications and call-identifying information is collected by a law enforcement agency (LEA).
Content of subject-initiated conference calls. Capability that permits a LEA to monitor the content of conversations by all parties connected via a conference call when
the facilities under surveillance maintain a circuit connection to the call.
Dialed digit extraction. Capability that permits a LEA to receive on the call data channel a digits dialed by a subject after a call is connected to another carrier's service
for processing and routing.
IAP. Intercept access point is a point within a carrier's system where some of the communications or call-identifying information of an intercept subject's equipment,
facilities, and services are accessed.
In-band and out-of-band signaling
. Capability that permits a LEA to be informed when a network message that provides call identifying information (e.g., ringing, busy, call waiting signal,
message light) is generated or sent by the IAP switch to a subject using the facilities under surveillance. Excludes signals generated by customer premises equipment when
no network signal is generated.
J-STD-025. The interim standard developed by the Telecommunications Industry Association and the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions for wireline,
cellular, and broadband PCS carriers. This standard defines services and features to support lawfully authorized electronic surveillance, and specifies interfaces necessary
to deliver intercepted communications and call-identifying information to a LEA
LEA. Law enforcement agency; e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a local police department.
Party hold, join, drop on conference calls
. Capability that permits a LEA to identify the parties to a conference call conversation at all times.
Subject-initiated dialing and signaling information
. Capability that permits a LEA to be informed when a subject using the facilities under surveillance uses services that provide call identifying information,
such as call forwarding, call waiting, call hold, and three-way calling. Excludes signals generated by customer premises equipment when no network signal is generated.
Timing information. Capability that permits a LEA to associate call-identifying information with the content of a call. A call-identifying message must be sent from the
carrier's IAP to the LEA's Collection Function within eight seconds of receipt of that message by the IAP at least 95% of the time, and with the call event time-stamped
to an accuracy of at least 200 milliseconds.
64.2203 Capabilities that must be provided by a wireline telecommunications carrier.
(a) Except as provided under paragraph (b), as of June 30, 2000 a cellular telecommunications carrier shall provide to a LEA the assistance capability requirements of
CALEA, see 47 U.S.C. 1002. A carrier may satisfy these requirements by complying with publicly available technical requirements or standards adopted by an industry
association or standard-setting organization, such as J-STD-025.
(b) As of September 30, 2001 a cellular telecommunications carrier shall provide to a LEA communications and call-identifying information transported by packet-mode
communications and the following capabilities:
(1) Content of subject-initiated conference calls;
(2) Party hold, join, drop on conference calls;
(3) Subject-initiated dialing and signaling information
;
(4) In-band and out-of-band signaling;
(5) Timing information;
(6) Dialed digit extraction.
VII. APPENDIX B: MANUFACTURERS' REVENUE ESTIMATES
Capability
Estimated Total
Revenues ($millions)
Estimated Wireless
Revenues ($millions)
Estimated Wireline
Revenues ($millions)
J-STD-025
$916
$348
$569
Subject-initiated conference calls
$ 37 (4%, 9%)
$ 15 (4%, 6%)
$ 22 (4%, 12%)
Party hold, join, drop messages
$ 64 (7%, 15%)
$ 42 (12%, 18%)
$ 22 (4%, 12%)
Subject-initiated dialing and signaling
$ 35 (4%, 8%)
$ 27 (8%, 12%)
$ 8 (1%, 4%)
In-band and out-of-band signaling
$ 57 (6%, 14%)
$ 30 (9%, 13%)
$ 27 (5%, 15%)
Timing information
$ 20 (2%, 5%)
$ 13 (4%, 6%)
$ 8 (1%, 4%)
Surveillance status messages
$ 37 (4%, 9%)
$ 24 (7%, 10%)
$ 13 (2%, 7%)
Continuity check tones
$ 3 (0.3%,
0.7%)
$ 3 (0.9%, 1.3%)
$ 0 (0%,
0%)
Feature status messages
$ 40 (4%, 10%)
$ 19 (5%, 8%)
$ 21 (4%, 12%)
Dialed digit extraction
$121 (13%,
29%)
$ 60 (17%,
26%)
$ 60 (11%, 33%)
Total punch list
$414
$234
$180
VIII. APPENDIX C: COMMENTING PARTIES
Comments to Further NPRM
AirTouch Communications, Inc.
American Mobile Satellite Corporation
AT&T Corp.
Ameritech Corporation
Bell Atlantic
Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc.
BellSouth Corporation, Inc., BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., BellSouth Cellular Corp., BellSouth Personal Communications, Inc., and BellSouth Wireless
Data, L,P.
Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association
Center for Democracy and Technology
Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation
Drug Enforcement Administration
Electronic Privacy Information Center, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and American Civil Liberties Union
GTE Service Corporation
ICO Services Limited
International Association of Police Chiefs
Metricom, Inc.
New York City Police Department
New Jersey State Police
Nextel Communications, Inc.
Personal Communications Industry Association
Pomona (CA) Police Department
Rural Cellular Association
SBC Communications, Inc.
Southern Communications Services, Inc.
Telecommunications Industry Association
Texas Department of Public Safety
United States Cellular Corporation
United States Marshals Service
United States Telephone Association
US West, Inc.
Reply Comments to Further NPRM
AirTouch Communications, Inc.
American Mobile Telecommunications Association, Inc.
AT&T Corp.
Ameritech Corporation
Bell Atlantic
Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc.
BellSouth Corporation, Inc., BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., BellSouth Cellular Corp., BellSouth Personal Communications, Inc., and BellSouth Wireless
Data, L,P.
Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association
Center for Democracy and Technology
Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation
Electronic Privacy Information Center, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and American Civil Liberties Union
MCI WorldCom Inc
Motorola, Inc.
Moultrie Independent Telephone Company
New Jersey State Police
New York City Police Department
Nextel Communications, Inc.
Pennsylvania State Police
Personal Communications Industry Association
Pomona (CA) Police Department
PrimeCo Personal Communications, L.P.
SBC Communications, Inc.
Southern Communications Services, Inc.
Sprint PCS
Telecommunications Industry Association
Texas Department of Public Safety
United States Telephone Association
US West, Inc.
Comments to May 1999 Public Notice
AirTouch Communications, Inc.
Bell Atlantic
BellSouth Corporation
Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association
Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation
Omnipoint Communications Services LLC
Personal Communications Industry Association
PrimeCo Personal Communications, L.P.
SBC Communications, Inc.
Sprint PCS
Texas Advisory Commission on State Emergency Communications and Texas Emergency Communication Districts
United States Telephone Association
US West, Inc.
Reply Comments to May 1999 Public Notice
AirTouch Communications, Inc.
BellSouth Corporation
Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association
Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation
GTE Service Corporation
MCI WorldCom, Inc.
SBC Communications, Inc.
United States Telephone Association