

1 Steven P. Lehotsky*
2 Scott A. Keller*
3 Jeremy Evan Maltz*
4 Shannon Grammel*
5 **LEHOTSKY KELLER COHN LLP**
6 200 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 700
7 Washington, DC 20001
8 (512) 693-8350
9 steve@lkcfirm.com
10 scott@lkcfirm.com
11 jeremy@lkcfirm.com
12 shannon@lkcfirm.com

Bradley A. Benbrook (SBN 177786)
Stephen M. Duvernay (SBN 250957)
BENBROOK LAW GROUP, PC
701 University Avenue, Suite 106
Sacramento, CA 95825
Telephone: (916) 447-4900
brad@benbrooklawgroup.com
steve@benbrooklawgroup.com

13 Joshua P. Morrow*
14 **LEHOTSKY KELLER COHN LLP**
15 408 W. 11th Street, 5th Floor
16 Austin, TX 78701
17 (512) 693-8350
18 josh@lkcfirm.com

19 Jared B. Magnuson*
20 **LEHOTSKY KELLER COHN LLP**
21 3280 Peachtree Road NE
22 Atlanta, GA 30305
23 (512) 693-8350
24 jared@lkcfirm.com

25 * Admitted *pro hac vice*.

26 *Attorneys for Plaintiff NetChoice*

27 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
28 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

NETCHOICE,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROB BONTA, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of California,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:24-cv-07885-EJD

**PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL**

Date: TBD

Time: TBD

Judge: Hon. Edward J. Davila

Courtroom: TBD

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

NOTICE OF MOTION

Plaintiff NetChoice will submit an amended notice of motion setting forth the date and time for hearing, if one is set by the Court.

RELIEF SOUGHT

Plaintiff NetChoice has appealed this Court’s order denying in part Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. ECF 39. NetChoice moves this Court for an injunction pending appeal to prohibit Defendant from enforcing the following provisions in California Senate Bill 976 (2024) (“Act” or “SB976”) against NetChoice’s covered members: Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 27001, 27002(b)(2)-(5). This will prevent irreparable harm to NetChoice’s members, including the loss of its members’ First Amendment freedoms recognized by the Supreme Court in *Moody v. NetChoice*, 603 U.S. 707 (2024). And this injunction will maintain the status quo ante while the full appellate process plays out.

This Court’s order conflicts with binding Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court just recognized that websites regulated by the Act disseminate protected expression to their users through their “personalized” and “individualized” feeds. *Id.* at 734. And the Supreme Court has long held that minors have a First Amendment “right to speak or be spoken to” in accessing protected speech. *Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n*, 564 U.S. 786, 795 n.3 (2011). The Court’s order also conflicts with the holdings of at least five other district courts across the country that held similar laws violated the First Amendment. *E.g.*, *NetChoice, LLC v. Reyes*, 2024 WL 4135626 (D. Utah Sept. 10, 2024); *Comput. & Commc’n Indus. Ass’n v. Paxton*, 2024 WL 4051786 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2024) (“CCIA”); *NetChoice, LLC v. Fitch*, 2024 WL 3276409 (S.D. Miss. July 1, 2024); *NetChoice, LLC v. Yost*, 716 F. Supp. 3d 539 (S.D. Ohio 2024); *NetChoice, LLC v. Griffin*, 2023 WL 5660155 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 31, 2023). Therefore, for the reasons explained below and in Plaintiff’s previous briefing in support of its motion for a preliminary injunction,¹ this Court should enjoin Defendant’s enforcement of §§ 27001, 27002(b)(2)-(5) against NetChoice’s covered members pending appeal of this Court’s order.

¹ Given the posture of this case and the fact that the Court rejected Plaintiff’s arguments in its motion for a preliminary injunction, NetChoice restates those arguments in brief here, incorporates the arguments raised in prior briefing by reference, *see* ECF 2, 29, and focuses mainly on the Court’s order.

1
2 Plaintiff intends to move for an injunction pending appeal in the United States Court of
3 Appeals for the Ninth Circuit if this Court does not rule before close of business on January 2,
4 2025. As Plaintiff’s uncontested declarations demonstrate, the Act would require burdensome and
5 large-scale changes to Plaintiff’s members’ services. *See* Cleland Decl. ¶¶ 28-32, 35; Veitch Decl.
6 ¶¶ 41, 48-49, 52; Paolucci Decl. ¶¶ 13, 19, 23-27. And those changes would restrict their users’
7 access to protected speech.

8 Counsel for Plaintiff conferred with Defendant about whether Defendant would agree to
9 stay enforcement of the un-enjoined provisions of SB976 against NetChoice’s members while
10 NetChoice sought injunctive relief pending appeal. Defendant would not agree to any stay of en-
11 forcement of the non-enjoined provisions for any period of time. So without an injunction pending
12 appeal, NetChoice’s covered members are at imminent risk of enforcement and irreparable harm.
13 The Court should therefore grant this motion for an injunction pending appeal to maintain the
14 status quo ante, giving the Ninth Circuit the opportunity to consider these important constitutional
15 questions during a full appellate process.

16 ARGUMENT

17 Plaintiff meets all four factors governing the issuance of an injunction pending ap-
18 peal: (1) likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal; (2) the likelihood of irreparable harm
19 absent an injunction; (3) the harm to opposing parties; and (4) the public interest. *Feldman v. Ariz.*
20 *Sec’y of State’s Office*, 843 F.3d 366, 367 (9th Cir. 2016).

21 I. Plaintiff Is Likely To Succeed On the Merits.

22 NetChoice is likely to succeed on the merits. This Court correctly enjoined some provisions
23 of SB976. *See* §§ 27002(a), 27002(b)(1), § 27005. But it erred and misinterpreted Supreme Court
24 precedent in denying a preliminary injunction as to the other challenged SB976 provisions. In-
25 deed, NetChoice needed only make “a *colorable* claim that its First Amendment rights have been
26 infringed, or are threatened with infringement” to meet the “likelihood-of-success standard in [this]
27 First Amendment case[.]” *Meinecke v. City of Seattle*, 99 F.4th 514, 521 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation
28 omitted) (emphasis added). NetChoice’s arguments against SB976 certainly surpassed that low
bar in light of the binding Supreme Court precedent in *Moody*.

1
2 A. As explained more fully in Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction briefing, the Act restricts
3 NetChoice members’ rights to disseminate protected speech—and users’ access to, and engage-
4 ment with, protected speech. *See* ECF 2 at 10-23; ECF 29 at 1-14. The Act’s parental consent
5 requirements to access protected speech, §§ 27001(a), 27002(b)(2), are unconstitutional. *See*
6 *Brown*, 564 U.S. at 794 (rejecting parental-consent requirement); ECF 2 at 12-15; ECF 29 at 9, 11.
7 Similarly, the Act’s default settings restrict speech and are subject to strict scrutiny. *See FEC v.*
8 *Cruz*, 596 U.S. 289, 305 (2022) (“When the Government restricts speech, the Government bears
9 the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.”); ECF 2 at 11-19; ECF 29 at 3, 11.
10 Compounding the constitutional defects, the Act restricts protected speech through a content-based
11 and speaker-based coverage definition of state-disfavored websites, which also triggers strict scru-
12 tiny. ECF 2 at 16-19; ECF 29 at 7-10. These challenged provisions are not the least restrictive
13 means to achieve the State’s interest, they are both over and underinclusive, and they fail any form
14 of First Amendment scrutiny. ECF 2 at 19-23; ECF 29 at 11-13. Likewise, the Act’s central cov-
15 erage provision is unconstitutional vague. ECF 2 at 24; ECF 29 at 14.

16 B. The Court’s contrary decision refusing to enjoin all of the Act’s speech restrictions was
17 based in large part on an erroneous interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in *Moody*. *See*
18 ECF 39 at 14-23. *Moody* holds that websites like those regulated by this Act necessarily engage in
19 First Amendment protected expression by presenting personalized, curated compilations of speech
20 created by others.

21 This Court’s holding conflicts with multiple passages from *Moody* showing that personal-
22 ized feeds of social media websites—including specifically the main feeds of “Facebook” and
23 “YouTube”—are protected First Amendment expression by the covered websites. *Moody*, 603
24 U.S. at 734-35, 739-40. This Court concluded that NetChoice “failed to meet its burden of demon-
25 strating . . . that most or all personalized feeds covered by SB 976 are expressive and therefore
26 implicate the First Amendment.” ECF 39 at 15. But *Moody* already decided that key point. Web-
27 sites like those covered by SB976, and expressly referenced by *Moody*, receive First Amendment
28 protection because their “personalized” and “individualized” feeds constitute protected expres-
sion—including when they use “algorithms” to implement their editorial policies, even if “most

1 often” websites choose to display speech based on a “user’s expressed interests”:
2

3 And whenever a user signs on, Facebook delivers a *personalized* collection of those stories.
4 Similarly for YouTube. . . . And any person opening the website or mobile app receives an
5 *individualized* list of video recommendations. The key to the scheme is prioritization of
6 content, achieved through the use of *algorithms*. Of the billions of posts or videos (plus
7 advertisements) that could wind up on a user’s *customized* feed or recommendations list,
8 only the tiniest fraction do. The selection and ranking is *most often based on a user’s ex-
pressed interests and past activities*. But it may also be based on more general features of
the communication or its creator. Facebook’s Community Standards and YouTube’s Com-
munity Guidelines detail the messages and videos that the platforms disfavor. The plat-
forms write *algorithms* to implement those standards—for example, to prefer content
deemed particularly trustworthy or to suppress content viewed as deceptive (like videos
promoting “conspiracy theor[ies]”).

9 *Moody*, 603 U.S. at 734-35 (emphases added). This language from *Moody* makes clear that when
10 websites—like NetChoice’s covered members—use “personalized” feeds to “[d]ecid[e] on the
11 third-party speech that will be included in” a feed and “organiz[e] and present[] the including
12 items” in that feed to users in a particular way, that “is expressive activity of [their] own.” *Id.* at
13 731. So governments “restricting use of personalized feeds . . . alter[s] the overall speech environ-
14 ment” on covered websites, which changes the “message” those websites convey to users and that
15 users receive from websites. ECF 39 at 19. Under *Moody*, personalized feeds thus constitute cov-
16 ered websites’ own expression, and that expression is disseminated to and accessed by websites’
17 users. The First Amendment protects all of this. Therefore, this Court’s holding is directly contrary
18 to both the Supreme Court’s decision in *Moody*, 603 U.S. at 734-35, 739-40; as well as Ninth
19 Circuit precedent following *Moody*, see *Children’s Health Def. v. Meta Platforms, Inc.*, 112 F.4th
20 742, 759 (9th Cir. 2024) (“When the platforms use their Standards and Guidelines to decide which
21 third-party content [their] feeds will display, or how the display will be ordered and organized,
22 they are making expressive choices. And because that is true, they receive First Amendment pro-
23 tection.” (quoting *Moody*, 603 U.S. at 740)).

24 The Supreme Court in *Moody* also held that its prior editorial-discretion precedents, like
25 the newspaper case, *Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo*, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), applied to
26 social media websites, *Moody*, 603 U.S. at 738. The Supreme Court explained that the “wealth of
27 choices about whether—and if so, how—to convey posts” gives a “feed a particular expressive
28 quality.” *Id.* (emphasis added). And this holds true both “[f]or a paper, and for a platform too.” *Id.*

1 This Court’s attempt to distinguish those cases like *Tornillo*, *Hurley*, and *PG&E* was thus squarely
2 rejected by *Moody*. *Id.* at 738-40.

3
4 Likewise, this Court’s reliance (ECF 39 at 16-17) on *PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins*,
5 447 U.S. 74 (1980), and *Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc.*, 547 U.S. 47 (2006),
6 is wholly misplaced under *Moody*. *Moody* explicitly recognized that “the key fact in those cases . . .
7 was that the host of the third-party speech was not itself engaged in expression,” but the exact
8 “opposite” was true for services such as “Facebook’s News Feed and YouTube’s homepage.”
9 *Moody*, 603 U.S. at 740.

10 This Court erred in reading far too much into *Moody* reserving judgment on the First
11 Amendment implications regarding “feeds whose algorithms respond *solely* to how users act
12 online” and largely limited its analysis of personalized feeds to that issue. ECF 39 at 18 (emphasis
13 added). To start, *Moody* made clear that the “personalized” feeds utilizing “algorithms” on “Face-
14 book” and “YouTube” are protected expression. *Moody*, 603 at 734 (“And whenever a user signs
15 on, Facebook delivers a *personalized* collection of those stories. Similarly for YouTube. . . . And
16 any person opening the website or mobile app receives an *individualized* list of video recommen-
17 dations. The key to the scheme is prioritization of content, achieved through the use of algorithms.”
18 (emphases added)). This Court thus fundamentally erred in refusing to enjoin the challenged pro-
19 visions—at a bare minimum—to the main feeds of Facebook and YouTube. This error likewise
20 infected the Court’s refusal to enjoin the challenged provisions as applied to personalized feeds
21 disseminated by other NetChoice members that similarly use community guidelines reflecting hu-
22 man-created editorial policies.² This Court assumed that the facial challenge was no different from
23 the as-applied challenge. ECF 39 at 31-32. But the as-applied challenge necessarily implicates this
24 record evidence about NetChoice’s members. The uncontested record evidence shows that covered
25 NetChoice members do *not* display content to users based “solely” on “how users act online.”
26

27 ² The Court was right to recognize that “an algorithm designed to convey a message can be ex-
28 pressive,” but that is true whether the algorithm’s creator designed it to “recommend[] interesting
posts” or to “maximize engagement.” ECF 39 at 20. Relatedly, the district court ignored *Moody*
by asserting that “mixed” feeds, ECF 39 at 21—*i.e.*, that both implement editorial policies while
also displaying speech based on user interest and activities—may not be protected by the First
Amendment. *Moody*, 603 U.S. at 734-35.

1
2 *Moody*, 603 U.S. at 736 n.5. As explained in Plaintiff’s reply in support of its motion for a prelim-
3 inary injunction, ECF 29 at 5, that is not how content-moderation algorithms work. The uncon-
4 tested record evidence shows that covered NetChoice members display content in feeds according
5 to their own editorial policies developed by humans, which include efforts to “prioritize minor
6 safety and display only age-appropriate content.” Cleland Decl. ¶ 8; *id.* ¶ 23 (detailing content-
7 moderation efforts); *e.g.*, Davis Decl. ¶¶ 12, 34-35; Veitch Decl. ¶¶ 21, 24-30.

8 Regardless, the Court erred in holding that “[w]hen it comes to feeds that recommend posts
9 based solely on prior user activity, there is no apparent message being conveyed.” ECF 39 at 19.
10 Displaying speech based on user preference is an editorial “choice[] about what third-party speech
11 to display and how to display it,” so it should be fully protected by the First Amendment. *Moody*,
12 603 U.S. at 716. After all, “it is hardly unusual for publications to print matter that will please their
13 subscribers,” and this does not vitiate free-speech rights. *Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc.*, 925
14 F.2d 703, 716 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc).

15 The Court’s erroneous interpretation of *Moody* and holding with respect to the expression
16 of personalized feeds also affects its incorrect holding regarding the Act’s restrictions on *users’*
17 access to protected speech. ECF 39 at 22. For the reasons explained above, the Court erred by
18 concluding that because “personalized feeds are not necessarily a form of social media platforms’
19 speech, so restricting personalized feeds does not restrict access to those platforms’ speech.” *Id.*
20 Likewise, the Court erred in concluding that users’ rights are not infringed because “all posts are
21 still, in fact, available to all users under SB 976.” *Id.* That statement misapprehends the full burden
22 of the Act. Users have a First Amendment right to access compilations of speech that websites
23 present in a manner according to their preferences. The Act infringes that.

24 C. At a minimum, this Court should have enjoined the personalized feed provisions as
25 applied to NetChoice’s members. The analysis for the as-applied challenge is different—it only
26 requires a court to analyze the Act’s effect on NetChoice’s covered members.

27 The Court erred in holding that NetChoice lacked associational standing to bring its as-
28 applied claims. ECF 39 at 32. Contrary to this Court’s holding, this challenge does not require the
participation of individual members. *Id.* At the very minimum, *Moody* requires that an injunction

1
2 be granted to Facebook and YouTube’s main feeds. *See Moody*, 603 U.S. at 734.

3 Moreover, as to NetChoice’s other covered members, the challenges to the Act’s person-
4 alized feed provisions do not “require deep factual inquiries into how a particular social media
5 feed works.” ECF 39 at 32. As explained above, the uncontested record evidence—submitted con-
6 temporaneously with Plaintiff’s preliminary-injunction motion—shows that these other covered
7 websites are in the materially identical position under *Moody* as Facebook and YouTube’s main
8 feeds. As explained in Plaintiff’s supplemental brief, this case can be decided “without the partic-
9 ipation of individual” members as parties because the Act “imposes relatively uniform require-
10 ments on all Plaintiff’s covered members.” ECF 33 at 3 (quoting *CCIA*, 2024 WL 4051786, at
11 *3).

12 **D.** NetChoice is also likely to succeed on the merits of its argument that the Act’s default
13 settings violate the First Amendment. The Court correctly enjoined the default setting for notifi-
14 cations, § 27002(b)(1), but it erred in declining to enjoin the remaining default settings. The default
15 settings restricting personalized feeds, § 27002(b)(2), (4), should be enjoined for the reasons ex-
16 plained above. As this Court recognized, those provisions “are effectively duplicative of SB 976’s
17 personalized feed . . . provisions.” ECF 39 at 28. Because the personalized feed provisions fail
18 under *Moody*, the duplicative default settings must be enjoined as well.

19 Likewise the default setting limiting a “child’s ability to view the number of likes or other
20 forms of feedback to pieces of media within an addictive feed,” § 27002(b)(3), should be enjoined
21 because it too restricts First Amendment expression. The Court stated that it “sees little apparent
22 expressive value in displaying a count of the number of total likes and reactions.” ECF 39 at 28.
23 But this runs headlong into *Moody*: this default setting on the number of likes or other feedback
24 violates covered websites’ First Amendment rights to display how many people like or otherwise
25 react to their posts. *See supra* pp.3-4. And the number of likes or other reactions—such as dislikes,
26 sad reactions—has clear expressive value, showing users how others have responded. Thus, far
27 from “virtually no speech being blocked,” ECF 39 at 29, a key aspect of expression is unavailable
28 by default for minor users’ accounts. And the fact that the underlying reactions are still available
does not make the restriction properly tailored. To the contrary, that shows it is underinclusive as

1
2 to preventing minors from seeing likes and reactions and overinclusive as to blocking all counting
3 of reactions (whether positive or negative reactions).

4 The “private mode” default setting, § 27002(b)(5), should be enjoined because it restricts
5 with whom a minor user can speak. As this Court noted, this provision “obviously regulates speech
6 because it limits the ability of users to speak with minors on social media platforms.” ECF 39 at
7 29. The Court nevertheless found this provision of the Act to be constitutional. But it cannot sur-
8 vive any level of heightened First Amendment scrutiny because it is not properly tailored. It is
9 overinclusive as it applies to all covered websites and minor users, regardless of why they are
10 using a particular service. For example, a high school athlete would be hindered from speaking
11 with recruiters on X and a 17-year-old running a pet sitting business could face hurdles to interact
12 with clients on Nextdoor. It is also underinclusive as it does not prevent strangers from requesting
13 to connect with minor users.

14 E. Finally, the Court erred in concluding that the Act’s coverage provision is not vague.
15 ECF 39 at 33. The Court did not grapple with the record evidence about the difficulties websites
16 face about what constitute “addictive feed[s]” requiring age verification and parental consent.
17 § 27000.5(b); *see* Cleland Decl. ¶ 27; Paolucci Decl. ¶ 12. This difficulty is precisely why other
18 district courts held similar terms unconstitutionally vague. *See Griffin*, 2023 WL 5660155, at *13,
19 *Fitch*, 2024 WL3276409, at *15; ECF 2 at 24.

20 * * *

21 For these reasons, NetChoice is likely to succeed on the merits that the Act’s restrictions
22 of personalized feeds violate the First Amendment. And even if the Court disagrees with Plaintiff
23 on the merits, the language from *Moody* cited above certainly demonstrates that Plaintiff meets the
24 low bar of “of making a *colorable* claim that [their] First Amendment rights have been infringed,
25 or are threatened with infringement.” *Meinecke*, 99 F.4th at 521 (citation omitted) (emphasis
26 added). In light of that standard at this stage of the proceedings and the holding of *Moody*, an
27 injunction pending appeal is “appropriate” here “even if the Court believed its analysis in denying
28 preliminary injunctive relief is correct.” *Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco*,
2016 WL 9184999, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2016).

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

II. Plaintiff’s members face irreparable injury without an injunction.

As explained in Plaintiff’s preliminary-injunction motion, NetChoice’s members and their users will all suffer irreparable harm if the Act’s challenged provisions are not enjoined. *See* ECF 2 at 25. The Act’s “nonrecoverable” compliance costs impose irreparable injury. *Ohio v. EPA*, 144 S. Ct. 2040, 2053 (2024) (citation omitted). Plaintiff and its members have detailed the changes to covered websites’ operations that compliance with the Act will require. *See* Cleland Decl. ¶¶ 28-32, 35; Veitch Decl. ¶¶ 41, 48-49, 52. For some websites, SB976’s costs may be insurmountable. Paolucci Decl. ¶ 27; *see id.* ¶¶ 13, 19, 23-26. Plus, “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” *Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo*, 592 U.S. 14, 19 (2020) (citation omitted); ECF 39 at 28 (holding that NetChoice would “suffer irreparable harm from First Amendment violations”).

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

III. The balance of equities and public interest support an injunction pending appeal.

The balance of equities and public interest favor NetChoice. The same equitable considerations the Court found with respect to the notification restrictions apply to the other provisions of the Act. *See* ECF 39 at 28 (“There is a strong public interest in protecting free speech.”). Injunctions protecting First Amendment rights are in the public interest. The Ninth Circuit has “consistently recognized the significant public interest in upholding First Amendment principles.” *Doe v. Harris*, 772 F.3d 563, 583 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). And the “fact that [Plaintiff] ha[s] raised serious First Amendment questions compels a finding that . . . the balance of hardships tips sharply in [Plaintiff’s] favor.” *Cnty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise*, 490 F.3d 1041, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).

23
24
25

At bottom, an injunction pending appeal would “preserve[] the status quo prior to the recent legislative action” while the Ninth Circuit considers these important First Amendment questions. *Feldman*, 843 F.3d at 369.

26

CONCLUSION

27
28

Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court enjoin Defendant’s enforcement of Sections 27001 and 27002(b)(2)-(5) pending appeal of this Court’s order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

DATED: January 1, 2025

Bradley A. Benbrook (SBN 177786)
Stephen M. Duvernay (SBN 250957)
BENBROOK LAW GROUP, PC
701 University Avenue, Suite 106
Sacramento, CA 95825
Telephone: (916) 447-4900
brad@benbrooklawgroup.com
steve@benbrooklawgroup.com

Joshua P. Morrow*
LEHOTSKY KELLER COHN LLP
408 W. 11th Street, 5th Floor
Austin, TX 78701
(512) 693-8350
josh@lkcfirm.com

Jared B. Magnuson*
LEHOTSKY KELLER COHN LLP
3280 Peachtree Road NE
Atlanta, GA 30305
(512) 693-8350
jared@lkcfirm.com

* Admitted *pro hac vice*.

s/ Scott A. Keller
Scott A. Keller*
Steven P. Lehotsky*
Jeremy Evan Maltz*
Shannon Grammel*
LEHOTSKY KELLER COHN LLP
200 Massachusetts Avenue, NW,
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20001
(512) 693-8350
scott@lkcfirm.com
steve@lkcfirm.com
jeremy@lkcfirm.com
shannon@lkcfirm.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff NetChoice