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SECRET UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT WASHINGTON, D.C.	Ъ6 Ъ7С
(S) Docket Number:	'b1 b3 b7E
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S REGARDING UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT	і : <sup>І</sup> Ъ71
The United States submits this Memorandum of Law in response to this Court's Order, directing the government to explain how, if at all,	
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50	Ъ71
United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1801, <u>et seq</u> . (FISA). As a threshold matter, interpreting SECRET	
Classified by: <u>James A. Baker, Counsel for</u> <u>Intelligence Policy, OIPR, DOJ</u> Reason: <u>1.4(c)</u> Declassify on: <u>X1</u>	

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criminal statutes is not controlling on this Court. Moreover, as	
described more fully below, because	ь71 .
both the plain meaning and legislative history of	i
the criminal pen register statute and misapplied certain canons	
of statutory construction, the government respectfully submits	
that this Court should decline to follow In	
addition, the 2006 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization	Ì
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 506, 120, Stat. 192, 248	· [
(2006), which enhanced the government's ability to obtain certain	1
routing and transmission information pursuant to pen register	1
surveillance under FISA, provides additional authority that was	1
not applicable in the under which the government can	ь7
obtain	
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The government further submits that both the plain text of	
the criminal pen register statute and its legislative history	
confirm that the government is authorized	ь7:
As explained more fully below, Congress has	
repeatedly recognized that	
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
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
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
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		Accordingly, it have	as	b7E
enacted a pen regi	ster statute			
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	which	reaches the untenal	ble	
result that the go	overnment must foreg	0		
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


2. This Memorandum responds to that Order.  $\mathbb{X}$ 



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## II. ARGUMENT (U)

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1. The Text of 18 U.S.C. \$ 3127(3) (U)

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Congress initially adopted the definition of "pen register" in 1986 as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 302, 100 Stat. 1848, (ECPA). As originally enacted, 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) defined pen register in terms of now out-dated telephone technology, referring to a "device" being attached to a "telephone line." Specifically, the earlier version of the pen register definition provided as follows:

18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2000). This definition remained unchanged until 2001, when Congress amended it in the USA PATRIOT Act, to clarify that the pen register provision applies to an array of modern communications technologies (e.g., the Internet) and not simply traditional telephone lines. <u>See H.R. Rep. No. 107-</u> 236(I), at 52-53 (2001); <u>see also</u> 147 Cong. Rec. S11,005-S11,014, S11,006 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001)(section-by-section analysis by



Sen. Leahy). The current definition of pen register now states, in pertinent part, as follows:

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the term "pen register" means a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (emphasis added). Thus, Congress amended the pen register definition in only two respects, both of which merely clarified the limits of existing law: (1) Congress broadened the language to include the recording or decoding of "dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information" in order to confirm the statute's proper application to tracing communications in an advanced electronic environment; and (2) Congress confirmed the proper purpose and scope of a pen register device: to obtain information used to process a wire or electronic communication, but not to obtain the "contents" of such communication. (U)


On their face, neither the original version of this definition nor the revised version as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act dictates the means by which a pen register device should function technologically. By its own terms, this provision is simply a definition. (Section 3127 is entitled "Definitions for Chapter").


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
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As discussed	
below, it is 18 U.S.C. § 3121, not § 3127, that sets forth the	
"general prohibition on pen register and trap and trace device	
use."	
{U}	
Importantly, in amending 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3), Congress	
clearly intended that through a pen register device, the	
government can lawfully obtain all non-content information "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information"	
transmitted by a targeted telephone.	•
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Congress first added the "limitation" section of the pen register statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c), in 1994 as an amendment to the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (CALEA). As originally enacted, that provision stated as follows:

(c) Limitation - A Government agency authorized to install and use a pen register under this chapter or under state law <u>shall use technology reasonably available to it that</u> <u>restricts</u> the recording or decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing and signaling information utilized in call processing.

CALEA, § 207, 108 Stat. 4292 (emphasis added). The plain text of this provision required the government to use, in pen register devices, "technology reasonably available to it" in order to "restrict[] the recording or decoding" to "dialing and signaling information" (i.e. digits) "utilized" to connect calls.





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Indeed, as discussed more fully below, any other reading of this provision would render the words "reasonably available to it" superfluous in violation of the simple rule of statutory construction that all words of a statute be given meaning, if possible. <u>See TRW, Inc. v. Andrews</u>, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citation omitted) ("It is a cardinal principal of statutory construction that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant.") Courts must strive to "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." <u>Id</u>. (citation omitted). Congress deliberately chose to make


In the 2001 USA FATRIOT Act, Congress also amended the limitation provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (1994) to conform to the revised language of the pen register definition. In fact, Congress made the same revisions to the limitation provision that it made to the pen register definition: (1) it clarified that the term "pen register" applies not only to traditional telephone lines, but to all manner of modern electronic communications; and (2) it clarified that the purpose of a pen register is to collect

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B. The Legislative History of the Pen Register Provisions	1
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1. 1994 Legislative History Regarding 18 U.S.C. 5 3121(c) Confirms that Congress Intentionally Created a Technology-Driven Minimization Scheme (U)	
In his opinion, cited hearing	
testimony from the 1994 congressional deliberations on CALEA,	
legislative history from the USA PATRIOT Act and secondary	
sources, asserting that the government's "fundamental premise"	
that 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c)	
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ignored, however, critical legislative history from the 1994	
enactment of the pen register As	
discussed below, that history confirms what the text of 18 U.S.C.	
§ 3121(c) plainly implies. (U)	
In 1994, Senator Leahy originally proposed 18 U.S.C.	
§ 3121(c) as part of S.2375, the "Digital Telephony Act of 1994."	
See 140 Cong. REC. 20,4444 (1994). Most of the provisions of	
S.2375, including 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c), were eventually adopted in	
CALEA.	b7E
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÷	Thus, Senator Leahy,	۱
	the primary architect of 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c), stated that the	
6×3	government was required to	i b
	In addition to Senator Leahy's statement, committee reports	
84	from both the House and Senate further confirm that Congress	
	originally intended to permit the government	b
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(c		Well	in advance	of the 1994		
enactment	of this provision					
both Titl	le III, enacted in	1968, and	FISA, enact	ed in 1978.	(U)	
	example, 18 U.S.C				\$	
relevant	part, that electr	onic survei	llance "be	conducted in	such	
	to minimize the i					
otherwise	subject to inter	ception un	der Title I	II. Under we	11-	
establish	ned precedent, Tit	le III "does	s not forbi	d the		
intercept	ion of all non-re	levant convo	ersations, 1	out, rather,		
instructs	the [government]	to conduct	the survei	llance in suc	ch a	
manner as	to minimize the	interception	n of such co	nversations.	"	
Scott v.	United States, 43	6 U.S. 128,	140 (1978)	(emphasis		
omitted).	(ט)					
Simi	larly, under FISA	, each appl:	ication for	electronic		
surveilla	ince submitted by	the governme	ent must con	ntain, among		
other thi	.ngs,					
2		50 U.S.C. §	1804(a)(5)	. FISA defin	es	
"minimiza	tion procedures,"	in part, as	s follows:			
in l	ific procedures, ight of the purpose eillance, to minim	se and tech	nique of the	particular		
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retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information.

50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1). Both federal case law and FISA legislative history demonstrate that the definition of minimization procedures under FISA was intended to take into account the realities of foreign intelligence collection, where the activities of individuals engaged in clandestine intelligence or international terrorism are often not obvious on their face, and an investigation develops over time. <u>See, e.g., United States v. Rahman</u>, 861 F. Supp. 247, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), <u>aff'd on</u> <u>other grounds</u>, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting the notion that the "wheat" could be separated from the "chaff" while the "stalks were still growing").

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When drafting 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) and its associated legislative history, Congress undoubtedly knew the legal meaning that the term "minimize" had acquired under Title III and FISA, electronic surveillance laws that had, at the time, existed for nearly three decades. In any event, Congress is presumed, as a matter of law, to have known the legal meaning of that word. <u>See</u> <u>United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family</u>, 879 F.2d 20, 25 (2d Cir. 1989) <u>relving on Goodvear Atomic Corp v. Miller</u>, 486 U.S. 174, 184-185 (1988) (As a matter of law, Congress is presumed to have been (a) knowledgeable about existing laws pertinent to later-enacted legislation, (b) aware of judicial interpretations given to sections of an old law incorporated into a new one, and (c) familiar with previous interpretations of specific statutory language).

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	C. The USA PATRIOT Act Legislative History Confirms that
	According to when Congress first codified the pen register law under ECPA, it did not address the question of
Ľ	PATRIOT Act legislative history, though scant, proves just the
	opposite:
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Nowhere in the legislative history of the USA PATRIOT Act did Congress suggest that the amendments to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121(c)


and 3127(3) were intended

Specifically, although the USA PATRIOT Act contains no definitive Congressional committee report, on October 11, 2001, the House Judiciary Committee reported on a predecessor bill, H.R. 2975, that proposed updating the language of sections 3127(3) and 3121(c) to confirm that pen registers apply to communications instruments other than traditional telephones.

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analysis of the Senate bill was also published in the record.

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b7E b7E has taken portions of Senator Leahy's remarks and used them out of context. In fact, Senator Leahy stated that his original proposal for the USA PATRIOT Act amendments to the pen register statute was threefold: (1) to give nationwide effect to pen register and trap and trace orders obtained by government attorneys and obviate the need to obtain identical orders in multiple federal jurisdictions; (2) to clarify that such devices can be used for computer transmissions to obtain electronic addresses, not just telephone lines; and (3) "as a guard against abuse," to provide for "meaningful judicial review of government

devices." 147 Cong. REC. \$10,990-\$11,060, \$10,999. Senator

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attorney applications for pen registers and trap and trace

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Leahy's third proposal was not adopted in the USA PATRIOT Act,

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In short, Senator Leahy had proposed that the criminal pen register application process should be subjected to heightened judicial review. Id. at S11000. Currently, under the criminal pen register statute, the government must certify that the information likely to be obtained by the installation of a pen register device will be "relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." Id. A court is required to issue an order upon seeing the certification and is not authorized to look behind the certification and evaluate the judgment of the prosecutor. Senator Leahy sought to amend this standard to require the government to include facts in its pen register certification. Id. Then, the court would grant the order only if it found that the facts supported the government's assertion of relevancy.

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necessary	to ensure t	hat the gover	nment was p	properly u	sing pen	л а
register	orders. <u>Id</u> .	A majority	of Congress	apparent	ly did not	
agree wit	h him, becau	se this propo	sed amendme	ent di <b>d</b> no	t become	
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we found no	instead to	his proposed	amendment t	the leg	al standard	į
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	the acknowledged status quo under which pen register devices
	capture all electronic impulses, non-content or otherwise, from
	the targeted facility. Had he believed that either his approach
	or the amended statute would have done so, he could have stated
	as much. In sum, argument that the USA
	PATRIOT Act amendments
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	D. has Misapplied Canons of Statutory Construction (U)
	1. No Clause or Words Should be Rendered Superfluous
	1. No Clause or Words Should be Rendered Superfluous (U)

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silent on the po	ssibility that (	the technology	may not ex	ist. In	
fact, the provis	ion expressly re	acognizes the	government '	8	
technological li	mitations. Hend	ce, it require	s the use o	of only	
technology "reas	onably available	e" to the gove	rnment.		1
co	nclusion that Co	ongress "assum	ed" that te	chnology	
would exist is n	ot supported by	the record.			
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§ 3127(3	) with 18 U.S.	C. § 3121(	c). He red	luced th	e gover	nment's	
interpre	tation to the	maxim,					
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as described above, is it consistent with long-standing judicial	
interpretations of the minimization requirements of Title III and	
FISA. Also, as noted above, this position would be particularly	i
inconsistent under FISA in light of the USA PATRIOT	5
Reauthorization Act amendments	ļ
(U) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
3. The Cannon of Constitutional Avoidance (U)	
At the conclusion of his opinion,	
invoked the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, which, he	
stated, "compels a court to construe a statute in a manner which	
avoids serious constitutional problems, unless such a	8
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." Id.	
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He determined that	
his interpretation of the statute, which bans the government from $\checkmark$	
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provi	ies th	at "if a	n otherw	ise ac	ceptable	construc	tion of a		
statu	te wou	ld raise	serious	const:	itutiona	1 problem	s, and whe	re an	e
alter	native	interpr	etation	of the	statute	is 'fair	ly possibl	e,′	1280
[the	court]	is oblig	gated to	const	rue the	statute t	avoid su	ch	
probl	ems,"	INS v.	St. Cyr,	533 U	.s. 289,	299-300			
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disregard Congressional intent and Congress's scheme for

addressing possible Fourth Amendment issues

Rather, the canon is "a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts." <u>Clark</u> <u>v. Martines</u>, 543 U.S. 371, 381, 125 S.Ct. 716 (2005). "The canon is thus a means of giving effect to congressional intent, not of subverting it." <u>Id</u>. (U)

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In addition, the legal basis underpinning

application of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance -

The Court stated, "Whether

safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is not a question presented by this case." <u>Katz</u>, 389 U.S. at 358. Furthermore, no other federal court has ever held that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applies



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to cases inv	olving foreign	$\Lambda$	agents of :	foreign powers.
See House Re	port 95-1283, I	?t. I at 17	-21.	
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4.				
The gov	vernment submits	s that the	scheme adoj	pted by Congress
in 18 U.S.C.	§§ 3127(3) and	a 3121(c),		
				The Fourth
Amendment p	cohibits "unreas	sonable sea	rches and	seizures" and
directs that	"no Warrants ;	shall issue	, but upon	probable cause,
			0.524	rly describing the
	search, and the	1. <del>-</del>	0	
				ew of government
	the Fourth Ame		•	
				<u>Acton</u> , 515 U.S.
646, 653 (15	95). Under the	e FISA pen :	register p	rovision, the

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government can on	ly obtain authority to install and	use such	1
devices for invest	rigations to obtain foreign intell	igence	
information not co	oncerning a United States person o	r to protect	ł
against internatio	onal terrorism or clandestine inte	lligence	
activities. For	purposes of pen register surveilla	nce under	3
FISA,			l
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•	(U)		i
Reasonablene	ss, in this context, must be asses	sed under a	
general balancing	approach, "'by assessing, on the	one hand, the	Î
degree to which it	t intrudes upon an individual's pr	ivacy and, on	
the other, the de	gree to which it is needed for the	promotion of	
a legitimate gove:	mment interest." <u>United States v</u>	<u>. Knights</u> , 534	
U.S. 112, 118-19	(2001) (quoting <u>Wyoming v. Houghto</u>	<u>n</u> , 526 U.S.	
295, 300 (1999)).			}
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
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Moreover, emergency exceptions to warrantless surveillance have been long recognized as a matter of statute (under both FISA and the criminal code) and as a matter of Fourth Amendment case law. <u>See</u>, <u>e.g.</u>, 50 U.S.C. § 1804(f) (allowing the Attorney General to authorize emergency employment of electronic surveillance when the Attorney General reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order authorizing such surveillance can with due diligence be obtained); 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (allowing certain high-ranking Justice Department officials to authorize emergency surveillance if a situation exists that involves



immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person, conspiratorial activities threatening the national security or conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime); <u>Mincev v. Arizona</u>, 437 U.S. 385, 393-394 (1978) ("[W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person unless the 'exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment") (citation omitted). (U)

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
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