

Subject: RE: AI Commission - Official Email Accounts

Date: Monday, April 15, 2019 at 3:17:10 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: Michael Gable

I did it.

From: Michael Gable [mailto:(b) (6)]

Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 11:59 AM

To: Safra Catz; Steve Chien, (b)(6); Mignon Clyburn, (b)(6); Christopher Darby, (b)(6); Kenneth Ford, (b)(6);

José-Marie Griffiths, (b)(6); Eric Horvitz, (b)(6); Andy Jassy, (b)(6); Gilman Louie, (b)(6);

William Mark, (b)(6); Jason Matheny, (b)(6); Katharina Mcfarland; Andrew Moore, (b)(6);

Eric Schmidt, (b)(6); Robert Work, (b)(6)

Cc: Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6); Chris Darby Support Staff, (b)(6); Ken Ford Support Staff, (b)(6); Jose-Marie Griffiths Support Staff, (b)(6); Jose-Marie Griffiths Support Staff, (b)(6);

Eric Horvitz Support Staff, (b)(6); Andy Jassy Support Staff, (b)(6); Gilman Louie Support Staff, (b)(6); Gilman Louie Support Staff, (b)(6); Bill Mark Support Staff, (b)(6);

Andrew Moore Support Staff, (b)(6); Eric Schmidt Support Staff, (b)(6)

Subject: AI Commission - Official Email Accounts

Dear Commissioners,

Shortly, you will receive an email requesting you to set up your nscai.gov email address. We've copied your staff on this email so they can assist you in the process. For convenience, the system is configured to permit you to add the account to your personal devices (after you have completed the 2-step verification process described below).

This is our official government email and file system, so all email sent or received through this system is subject to the Freedom of Information Act. Additionally, this is for **unclassified information only**.

Please follow the steps below to gain access to the system:

- 1 - When you receive the email, you will be asked to [log into our G Suite account](#) with the credentials provided. Your email address will be in the format of (b) (6).
- 2 - On your first login, you will be required to change your password. Passwords must be at least 10 characters including at least one upper case letter, one lower case letter, one number, and one symbol.
- 3 - Once you have logged in, select account, then security.
- 4 - You will need to set up 2-factor verification (2FV).
- 5 - Once you have set up 2FV, you will need to enable it for logon.
- 6 - We will be notified when you have completed your initial login and setup. After receiving that notification, we will transfer your account into the Commissioner domain which will give you access to email, document sharing, etc.

Please let NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6) or me know if you have questions or have issues with your account setup.

Very Respectfully,
Mike

MICHAEL GABLE
Chief of Staff
National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence

(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Subject: Re: Security Clearance Read In

Date: Wednesday, April 24, 2019 at 5:52:54 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: [REDACTED]

CC: Katharina McFarland, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Yll Bajraktari, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Michael Gable

Thank you

On Apr 24, 2019, at 2:46 PM, [REDACTED] wrote:

Ms. Catz and Ms. McFarland,

Upon your arrival Friday morning we will read you in to the necessary classified compartments for the IC briefing. We kindly ask that you arrive at 8:30am to allow time for the read in.

Our HR Director, [REDACTED], and a MITRE escort will meet you in the lobby of Building 3 and bring you to the briefing room where the Security Officer will read you in. Following the briefing they will bring to the primary meeting room.

Thank you in advance for your assistance with this process.

Best,
[REDACTED]

This message is private and may contain confidential information or other matter otherwise protected from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, please telephone or email the sender and delete this message and any attachment from your system; you must not copy or disclose the contents of this message or any attachment to any other person. Transmission of any material prepared by a third-party should not be construed to constitute an endorsement of that material or any analysis or commentary therein by the NSCAI.

Subject: Got my email up and running

Date: Tuesday, April 30, 2019 at 12:32:37 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Summary of Conclusions: Apr 26 Meeting - NSCAI National Security Working Group

Date: Tuesday, May 7, 2019 at 5:46:36 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), Ken Ford, Katharina Mcfarland, Steve Chien, (b)(6), Andy Jassy, (b)(6), Jassy Staff, (b)(6), Steve Chien Support Staff, (b)(6), Jason Matheny, Bob Work, Yll Bajraktari, Gable, Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6), Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6), Ken Ford Support Staff, (b)(6), Michael L CIV OSD OSD (USA), Michael Gable, Andy Jassy Support Staff, (b)(6), NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

Thank you.

To the extent any of the commissioners who weren't there have ideas regarding the plan, please don't hesitate to comment.

From: NSCAI Staff Member (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]

Sent: Friday, May 03, 2019 8:18 AM

To: Safra Catz; Ken Ford; Katharina Mcfarland; Steve Chien, (b)(6); Andy Jassy, (b)(6); Jassy Staff, (b)(6); Steve Chien Support Staff, (b)(6); Jason Matheny; Bob Work; Yll Bajraktari; Gable, Michael L CIV OSD OSD (USA); Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6); Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6); Ken Ford Support Staff, (b)(6); Michael Gable; Andy Jassy Support Staff (b)(6); NSCAI Staff Member (b)(6); (b)(6) NSCAI Staff Member (b)(6); NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6); NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

Subject: Summary of Conclusions: Apr 26 Meeting - NSCAI National Security Working Group

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you for participating in last week's National Security Working Group meeting. I've attached the draft summary of conclusions from that meeting for your review and approval.

Your discussion and insights were incredibly useful as we build out our proposed research framework for the next six months. (b)(6) and I will send that framework for your review by May 14 so we have it for the Plenary Session on May 20.

Best,

(b)(6)

NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

National Commission on Artificial Intelligence

(b)(6)

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Subject: Re: Research Framework for Call

Date: Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 4:46:00 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

CC: Safra Catz, Katharina McFarland, (b)(6) NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), Yli Bajraktari, Katharina McFarland, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

Thank you

On May 14, 2019, at 12:23 PM, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6) wrote:

Ms. Catz and Ms. McFarland,

During our conversation tomorrow, we would also like to briefly discuss the WG 2 read out for the plenary. Each working group will provide a brief overview outlining three key takeaways from their recent working group meeting and three next steps. Please find a draft for our group below.

Key Takeaways:

1. (b) (5)
2. (b) (5)
3. (b) (5)

Next Steps:

1. (b) (5)
2. (b) (5)
3. (b) (5)

Best,
(b) (6)

On May 13, 2019, at 4:56 PM, Safra Catz <(b) (6)> wrote:

Thank you.

From: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, May 13, 2019 1:55 PM
To: Safra Catz; Katharina McFarland, (b)(6); Yli Bajraktari; NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6); Katharina McFarland
Cc: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Research Framework for Call

Ms. Catz and Ms. McFarland,

Apologies for the resend, but I got an undeliverable on Ms. McFarland's ".gov" email and wanted everyone on the same note.

Per below, I've attached our draft research framework to facilitate our phone call at 1230 on Wednesday. (b) (6) will send out a calendar invite soon with the conference call information.

We look forward to discussing this with you and getting your guidance on how we structure the next six months.

If you have any questions, please let me know.

Thanks,

NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence

(b) (6)

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Subject: Re: Research Framework for Call

Date: Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 6:57:16 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

CC: Safra Catz, Katharina McFarland, (b)(6) NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), Yli Bajraktari, Katharina Mcfarland, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

Do we have a call in number?

On May 14, 2019, at 12:23 PM, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6) wrote:

Ms. Catz and Ms. McFarland,

During our conversation tomorrow, we would also like to briefly discuss the WG 2 read out for the plenary. Each working group will provide a brief overview outlining three key takeaways from their recent working group meeting and three next steps. Please find a draft for our group below.

Key Takeaways:

1. (b) (5)
2. (b) (5)
3. (b) (5)

Next Steps:

1. (b) (5)
2. (b) (5)
3. (b) (5)

Best,
(b) (6)

On May 13, 2019, at 4:56 PM, Safra Catz (b) (6) > wrote:

Thank you.

From: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, May 13, 2019 1:55 PM
To: Safra Catz; Katharina Mcfarland, (b)(6); Yli Bajraktari; NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6); Katharina Mcfarland
Cc: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Research Framework for Call

Ms. Catz and Ms. McFarland,

Apologies for the resend, but I got an undeliverable on Ms. McFarland's ".gov" email and wanted everyone on the same note.

Per below, I've attached our draft research framework to facilitate our phone call at 1230 on Wednesday. (b) (6) will send out a calendar invite soon with the conference call information.

We look forward to discussing this with you and getting your guidance on how we structure the next six months.

If you have any questions, please let me know.

Thanks,

NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence

(b) (6)

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Subject: Re: Invitation: NSCAI Working Group 2 Sync @ Wed May 15, 2019 12:30pm - 1:30pm (EDT)
(Safra Catz, (b)(6))

Date: Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 7:06:32 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: Yll Bajraktari, (b)(6)

CC: Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6), NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), **Katharina McFarland, (b)(6)**, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6),
Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6), NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

I just got it

On May 14, 2019, at 4:03 PM, Yll Bajraktari, (b)(6) wrote:

You have been invited to the following event.

NSCAI Working Group 2 Sync

[more details »](#)

When Wed May 15, 2019 12:30pm – 1:30pm Eastern Time - New York

Calendar **Safra Catz, (b)(6)**

Who

- NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6) - organizer
- Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6)
- Yll Bajraktari, (b)(6)
- NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)
- **Katharina McFarland, (b)(6)**
- Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6)
- NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)
- **Safra Catz, (b)(6)**

Conference Line: (b) (6)

Participant Code: (b) (6)

Leader Code (NSCAI Staff): (b) (6)

Going **Safra Catz, (b)(6)** ? [Yes](#) - [Maybe](#) - [No](#) [more options »](#)

Invitation from [Google Calendar](#)

You are receiving this courtesy email at the account **Safra Catz, (b)(6)** because you are an attendee of this event.

To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at <https://www.google.com/calendar/> and control your notification settings for your entire calendar.

Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. [Learn More](#).

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<mime-attachment.ics>

<invite.ics>

Subject: RE: Suggested Talking Points for our Key Take Aways and Next Steps
Date: Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 8:01:21 PM Eastern Daylight Time
From: Safra Catz
To: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), Katharina McFarland, Katharina McFarland, (b)(6)
CC: Yll Bajraktari, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

Looks good

From: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2019 3:55 PM
To: Safra Catz; Katharina McFarland; Katharina McFarland, (b)(6)
Cc: Yll Bajraktari; NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)
Subject: Suggested Talking Points for our Key Take Aways and Next Steps

Ms. Catz,

(b) (6) and I put together the attached suggested talking points to summarize some of the key points from our call and from the first working group meeting. We organized them under the corresponding take aways and next steps that will be displayed during the Plenary. We are not mass-distributing these, but thought they may be useful for you as you think through our group discussion over lunch and the working group out brief during the afternoon.

Best,

(b) (6)

NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)
National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence
(b) (6)

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Subject: RE: Thank you and a draft PA statement
Date: Tuesday, May 21, 2019 at 5:35:51 PM Eastern Daylight Time
From: Safra Catz
To: Yli Bajraktari, Robert Work
CC: Michael Gable, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

That's fine

From: Yli Bajraktari [mailto:(b) (6)]
Sent: Tuesday, May 21, 2019 10:33 AM
To: Safra Catz; Robert Work
Cc: Michael Gable; NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)
Subject: Thank you and a draft PA statement

Ms. Catz and Mr. Work,

Thank you so much for taking so much time from your busy schedules to attend the plenary meeting yesterday.

(b) (6) drafted the PA statement below that we would like to release. Can I kindly ask you to review it and ensure you are ok with it?

Many thanks in advance.

Best,

Yli

Draft Press Release -- May XX

The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) met for the second time on May 20 in Cupertino, California. The bipartisan commission received classified briefs on the status of the U.S. government's artificial intelligence strategies and examined overseas trends. Commissioner Safra Catz, CEO of Oracle, said the Commission's work was urgent, "there is a race on, someone is running it, and we are still stretching. We must get serious about artificial intelligence as a national security priority."

The NSCAI was created by the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act to examine the methods and means necessary to advance the development of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and associated technologies by the United States to comprehensively address the country's national security and defense needs. Within its broad mandate, the commission is focusing its efforts on how the United States can maintain global leadership in research and development, adopt AI applications for national security, prepare American citizens for an AI future, and ensure the United States continues to compete and cooperate to shape AI ethics, standards, and norms in the international arena. To date the Commission has received more than 50 classified and unclassified briefings in the working groups since it began its work over two months ago.

The commission's vice chair and former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work explained that the commission is working closely with the Department of Defense's ongoing AI efforts, "In an era of great power competition, the Pentagon and others in the national security community must take on the AI challenge with a sense of purpose and clear objectives." The commission is an independent federal

entity, but Work affirmed the Commissioners want their work to complement and strengthen ongoing work in the executive branch and Congress, while also making additional recommendations to integrate artificial intelligence into national security programs.

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Subject: Re: Research Framework for Call

Date: Wednesday, May 22, 2019 at 6:22:55 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

CC: Yll Bajraktari, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), Katharina McFarland, Katharina Mcfarland, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), Safra Catz

I think it should be the whole working group and follow on with more a focus on what they know about China AI

On May 22, 2019, at 3:09 PM, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6) wrote:

Ms. Catz,

Two questions as we set this up:

1. Do you want this as a smaller group stand-alone meeting or do you think there is value in including (b) (6) in our working group meeting on June 11th?

2. Are you looking for a general continuation of the discussion at the plenary or are there more specific topics / issues you're interested in that we can ask him to prep deeper dives on?

Thanks,

(b) (6)

NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence

(b) (6)

On May 22, 2019, at 5:30 PM, Yll Bajraktari (b) (6) wrote:

Of course. That's easy to arrange. I'll ask (b) (6) to work with you team regarding availability and organize with (b) (6)

On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 2:29 PM Safra Catz <(b) (6)> wrote:
| Hi guys. I think Katharina and I would like to meet with (b) (6) again sometime.

Subject: RE: NSCAI Working Group 2 June Date
Date: Wednesday, May 29, 2019 at 4:07:11 PM Eastern Daylight Time
From: Safra Catz
To: Katharina Mcfarland
CC: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), Yll Bajraktari

Hi guys, this proposal is to do it Monday or Wednesday of NEXT week. For me that is a non-starter. The 13th is not possible either as it's the Business Roundtable (I'm on the Board). Seems kind of late to move this now.

From: Andy Jassy Support Staff, (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2019 1:01 PM
To: Safra Catz; Kenneth Ford; Steve Chien; Katharina Mcfarland
Cc: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6) Yll Bajraktari
Subject: NSCAI Working Group 2 June Date
Importance: High

Ms. Catz, Commissioners-

Participation in the Commission and these working group meetings is a very high priority for Andy. He is very keen on participating and making contributions to the discussions; unfortunately the June 11 date does not work for him. Keeping his availability in mind, please consider moving this meeting to one of these three dates:

6/3 VTC 6am-1pm pacific/9am-4pm eastern

6/5 VTC 6am-1pm pacific/9am-4pm eastern

6/13 In person 9am-4pm eastern

Please advise if this adjustment can be made. Thank you.

(b) (6)
AWS

From: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, May 20, 2019 9:39 AM
To: Andy Jassy Support Staff, (b)(6); Katharina Mcfarland <(b) (6)>; Andy Jassy Support Staff, (b)(6)
Subject: NSCAI Working Group 2 June Date

All,

Confirming June 11 in DC for Working Group 2 next meeting.

Thanks!

(b) (6)

--
NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

NSCAI

(b) (6)

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Subject: Re: NSCAI - Status Update

Date: Thursday, May 30, 2019 at 4:27:32 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: Yll Bajraktari

Thank you!

On May 30, 2019, at 1:22 PM, Yll Bajraktari <(b) (6)> wrote:

We locked down June 11. Jassy can't make it. All good.

On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 12:52 PM Safra Catz <(b) (6)> wrote:

OK, just curious.

From: Yll Bajraktari [mailto:(b) (6)]
Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2019 9:52 AM
To: Safra Catz
Subject: Re: NSCAI - Status Update

Ma'am

Still working this, give us until cob today to resolve (or not).

On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 12:30 PM Safra Catz <(b) (6)> wrote:

Are we still on for June 11 or has that moved?

From: Yll Bajraktari [mailto:(b) (6)]
Sent: Tuesday, May 28, 2019 9:37 AM
To: Eric Schmidt; Robert Work; Safra Catz; Steve Chien; Mignon Clyburn; Chris Darby; Kenneth Ford; José Marie Griffiths; Eric Horvitz; Andy Jassy, (b)(6); Gilman Louie; William Mark; Jason Matheny; Katharina Mcfarland; Andrew Moore
Cc: NSCAI Staff, (b)(6)
Subject: NSCAI - Status Update

Dear Commissioners,

Attachments available until Jun 27, 2019

Thank you all for an excellent plenary meeting in California on the 20th.

Below is an update across all of our efforts prepared by (b) (6) on the Commission's staff. This email will cover:

1. Follow up from the May 20 plenary
2. Working Group updates
3. Outreach and engagement
4. Other

IMPORTANT: *Official email accounts:* Please establish your G-suite accounts, if you have not done so already (**ONLY TWO LEFT TO GO**). Going forward, all Commission business will be conducted through these accounts. (b) (5)

IMPORTANT #2: For breakfast and lunch at the May 20 plenary, please reimburse Mike Gable (\$35).

1 — May 20 Plenary Follow Up

Please see attached the following documents:

- [Summary of Conclusions](#)
- OSTP briefing slides
- OSTP suggested priority areas for NSCAI
- [Working list of alternative AI definitions](#)
- Liza Tobin article on China and global governance

Special Projects: To contribute to one or more of the three Special Projects now underway, please contact the following staff members:

- [Public-private partnerships](#) – NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)
- [Responsible use of AI](#) – NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)
- [Data to support AI](#) – NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

Next Plenary: July 11 in California. We will be in touch with your staffs on details and logistics.

2 — Working Group Updates

WG1 – Maintaining Global Leadership in AI Research (Moore, Schmidt, Horvitz)

Status: The next WG meeting (date TBD) (b) (5)

[Redacted]

WG2 – Maintaining Global Leadership in AI National Security Applications (Catz, Ford, McFarland, Jassy, Chen)

Status: Next meeting is planned for June 11 in DC. (b) (5)

[Redacted]

WG3 – Preparing Our Citizens for an AI Future (Griffiths, Work, Mark, Clyburn)

Status: Next meeting will be on June 7. (b) (5)

[Redacted]

WG4 – Ensuring International Competitiveness in AI (Matheny, Darby, Louie)

Status: Next meeting will be on June 20. (b) (5)

[Redacted]

SP / Partnerships – The Special Project on public-private partnerships will hold a meeting during the week of June 24-28 (date TBD) to discuss (b) (5)

SP / Ethics – The Special Project on ethics and responsible use of AI aims to hold an initial briefing in July. NSCAI has enlisted two leading AI ethicists to advise on this project: (b) (6) of the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab, and (b) (6) of Carnegie Mellon.

SP / Data – The Special Project on data to support AI will focus on the challenges of managing data to enable USG applications of AI technologies, and will be led by NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), Chief Technology Advisor to the Commission.

3 — Outreach and Engagement

In the past two weeks NSCAI staff has engaged with the Defense Innovation Board; Army Futures Study Group; DoD Joint AI Center; Office of Senator Gary Peters; Yale; Georgetown; National Security Innovation Network; DoD Office of Commercial and Economic Analysis; French Embassy; State Department . . . and many others.

4. — Other

- MITRE shared a report with us on “China AI Development Report 2018” - please see chapter 2, pages 33-44, which includes several views of AI talent, including: global talent, top talent per country, talent at universities, and research institutions, and at leading private sector companies across the globe.

- Deloitte and Uptake are putting together a conference on June 26th, (Ritz Carlton) and they have invited any of the Commissioners to speak. Please let us know if you are interested and we will work with you to provide talking points. etc.

[Click to Download](#)

NSCAI-OSTP-Suggestions-May-2019.pdf

283 KB

[Click to Download](#)

NSCAI-OSTP-May-2019.pdf

3.4 MB

[Click to Download](#)

TNSR-Vol-2-Issue-1-Tobin.pdf

692 KB

[Click to Download](#)

China_AI_development_report_2018.pdf

15.7 MB

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Subject: Re: NSCAI Working Group Meeting, June 11

Date: Monday, June 10, 2019 at 8:03:00 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

CC: Katharina Mcfarland, Yll Bajraktari, Gable, Michael L CIV OSD OSD (USA)

This is interesting. I'm going to need to think about it for a while to fully understand it.

On Jun 10, 2019, at 11:17 AM, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6) wrote:

Dear Commissioners and Representatives,

We would like to share a draft analytical framework for discussion during our Executive Session tomorrow. The "Diamond Framework" is based off of a model developed by Dr. Robert Grossman at the University of Chicago for assessing an organization's ability to adopt technological advancements (phrased as analytic maturity).

We believe an adapted version of this model can provide a useful framework as we seek to assess where individual U.S. government departments and agencies currently stand with respect to AI/ML application.

Please find our adapted framework and a paper outlining Dr. Grossman's model attached. We will provide a deeper overview tomorrow and look forward to your feedback.

Best,
(b) (6)

This message is private and may contain confidential information or other matter otherwise protected from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, please telephone or email the sender and delete this message and any attachment from your system; you must not copy or disclose the contents of this message or any attachment to any other person. Transmission of any material prepared by a third-party should not be construed to constitute an endorsement of that material or any analysis or commentary therein by the NSCAI.

<NSCAI Adapted Diamond Framework_061019.pdf>

<Grossman Organization Evaluation Framework.pdf>

On Jun 7, 2019, at 4:02 PM, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6) wrote:

Dear Commissioners and Representatives,

We look forward to seeing you next week on Tuesday, June 11, for our next Working Group Meeting at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).

During this Working Group Meeting, (b) (5)

(b) (5)

Here are a couple of questions to keep in mind during the briefs and to potentially ask the presenters:

1. (b) (5)

2. (b) (5)

3. (b) (5)

4. (b) (5)

Read Aheads:

- Final Agenda (attached)
- WG2 Framework (attached)
- There are no other unclassified read aheads

We have coordinated all of the logistics with your teams, but please let me know if you have any questions.

As a final note, NGA has been a tremendous partner in planning this meeting. They are hosting us the entire day, they helped identify and coordinate the outside speakers, and they are inviting you to their morning intelligence brief as well as a tour of operations center to see real time applications of what they do on a daily basis. Throughout the day, please take the opportunity to thank them when you can.

NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence

(b) (6)

<NSCAI Agenda v7.pdf>

<WG2_Framework Slides.pdf>

NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

Director for Research and Analysis
National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: Fwd: Thank You Letter for the NGA
Date: Wednesday, June 12, 2019 at 1:03:33 PM Eastern Daylight Time
From: Safra Catz
To: Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6)
Attachments: Thank You NGA Catz.docx, ATT00002.bin

Begin forwarded message:

From: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)
Date: June 12, 2019 at 10:50:48 AM EDT
To: Safra Catz <(b) (6)>
Cc: Yll Bajraktari (b) (6), NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6), Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6)
Subject: Thank You Letter for the NGA

Ms. Catz,

Please find attached a thank you note we would like to send from you to Vice Admiral Robert Sharp, the Director of the NGA, recognizing their exceptional support yesterday.

If you are able to sign it before leaving DC, I would be happy to come pick it up from your staff when available.

Thanks,

(b) (6)

NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence

(b) (6)



Vice Admiral Robert Sharp
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
7500 GEOINT Drive
Springfield, Virginia 22150

Dear Vice Admiral Sharp,

On behalf of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, please accept our sincere gratitude for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's invaluable support to our work.

Specifically, your team went above and beyond in their support for the Commission's June 11th working group meeting on maintaining global leadership in national security artificial intelligence application, which was hosted at your agency.

The exceptional efforts and partnership with your staff facilitated a series of productive presentations, discussions, and deliberations. We are exceptionally grateful to (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (6), and the entire team whose efforts helped ensure the success of the working group meeting.

The support from your agency and conduit into the broader intelligence community have already proven invaluable as the Commission assesses how best to ensure American leadership in artificial intelligence. We will continue to benefit from the intelligence community's support as we develop our recommendations in the broader context of United States national security interests and policies.

We hope to continue this level of collaboration to inform the work of the Commission and your agency, and remain available to brief you and your colleagues upon request. Please consider us as partners in your crucial mission.

Sincerely,

Safra Catz
Commissioner

Subject: You won't guess where European mobile data was rerouted for two hours. Oh. You can. Yes, it was China Telecom • The Register

Date: Wednesday, June 12, 2019 at 6:22:22 AM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: (b) (6)

https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/06/10/bgp_route_hijack_china_telecom/

Subject: Re: Thank You Letter for the NGA

Date: Wednesday, June 12, 2019 at 11:30:24 AM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

CC: Yll Bajraktari, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6), Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6)

Will do

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(b) (6)

NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence

(b) (6)

<Thank You NGA Catz.docx>

Subject: Fwd: Thank You Letter for the NGA
Date: Wednesday, June 12, 2019 at 11:35:28 AM Eastern Daylight Time
From: Safra Catz
To: Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6)
Attachments: Thank You NGA Catz.docx, ATT00002.bin

Begin forwarded message:

From: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)
Date: June 12, 2019 at 10:50:48 AM EDT
To: Safra Catz (b) (6)
Cc: Yll Bajraktari (b) (6), NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6) (b) (6)
Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6) >, Safra Catz Support Staff, (b)(6)
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(b) (6)

NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence

(b) (6)



Vice Admiral Robert Sharp
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
7500 GEOINT Drive
Springfield, Virginia 22150

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We hope to continue this level of collaboration to inform the work of the Commission and your agency, and remain available to brief you and your colleagues upon request. Please consider us as partners in your crucial mission.

Sincerely,

Safra Catz
Commissioner

Subject: Re: OCEA Follow Up
Date: Friday, July 12, 2019 at 5:25:07 PM Eastern Daylight Time
From: Safra Catz
To: Yll Bajraktari
CC: Safra Catz, Katharina McFarland, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

I think at our next working group

On Jul 12, 2019, at 1:31 PM, Yll Bajraktari (b) (6) wrote:

Of course. He is a great guy. If you want to see him before the Sept WG in one of your trips to DC let us know.

On Fri, Jul 12, 2019 at 3:51 PM Safra Catz <(b) (6)> wrote:

I'd like to see if we can schedule more time with (b) (6) on one of our working group meetings in DC. I think that he was quite rushed and I think we could benefit from a deeper discussion. Your thoughts?

From: (b) (6) [mailto:(b) (6)]
Sent: Thursday, July 11, 2019 8:41 PM
To: Safra Catz
Cc: (b) (6); (b) (6)
Subject: OCEA Follow Up

Ms. Catz,

Ma'am, a pleasure talking with you today at the NSCAI meeting. As promised, a quick follow up note and a standing offer for a deeper dive on OCEA at your convenience.

There was too much to cover in such a short period of time, but the next time we meet, OCEA would benefit greatly from your insights into how to address these challenges.

Standing by to support, ma'am.

v/r,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Office of Commercial and Economic Analysis

UNCLASS: (b) (6) / (b) (6)

Subject: Re: Article

Date: Monday, July 15, 2019 at 7:56:35 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: Katharina McFarland

Thank you

On Jul 15, 2019, at 3:24 PM, Katharina McFarland <(b) (6)> wrote:

You might find this article very interesting...

<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/08/henry-kissinger-the-metamorphosis-ai/592771/>

r
Katrina

Subject: RE: Article

Date: Tuesday, July 16, 2019 at 4:08:15 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: Katharina McFarland

I see Eric participated in the writing of this.

From: Katharina McFarland [mailto:(b) (6)]

Sent: Monday, July 15, 2019 3:25 PM

To: Safra Catz; Safra Catz

Subject: Article

You might find this article very interesting...

<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/08/henry-kissinger-the-metamorphosis-ai/592771/>

r
Katrina

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Subject: Re: Transition from the National Security Council

Date: Sunday, August 4, 2019 at 11:45:08 AM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: (b) (6)

Congratulations!

You are joining a great company.

We will miss you on the NSC.

Keep in touch,

Warm regards, Safra

Subject: Re: China Articles - August 11, 2019

Date: Sunday, August 11, 2019 at 1:01:23 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: (b) (6)

Thank you!!

On Aug 11, 2019, at 9:53 AM, (b) (6) wrote:

Friends,

In my former position, I sent out a weekly email with articles and reports on the malign behavior of the Chinese Communist Party from various media sources and think tanks around the world. This was meant to keep individuals informed of the Party's harmful activities. Enough people found it useful and asked that I continue to send a weekly email out as a private citizen and I've decided to add a number of people to the list as well.

If you'd like me to remove you from the list, just let me know, or if you think someone should be added, let me know as well.

A note on format: I find articles from the proceeding week and group them into categories with the full knowledge that the categories are imprecise. The email starts with a complete list of all the articles by category with a hyperlink and beneath that I break out each article with an excerpt to give you the gist (along with the web address in case my hyperlink fails). I will also attach a few reports in pdf format.

I hope you find this useful and as always I welcome suggestions.

(b) (6)

Opinion Pieces

1. Sydney Morning Herald, Andrew Hastie, [“We must see China – the opportunities and the threats – with clear eyes,”](#) (August 8, 2019)
2. Financial Times, Janos Kornai, [“Economists share blame for China’s ‘monstrous’ turn,”](#) (July 10, 2019)
3. Defense One, Jacob Stokes, [“China’s Credibility Problem,”](#) (August 6, 2019)
4. Washington Post, Anna Fifield, [“Paramount and paranoid: China’s Xi and the Communist Party face a crisis of confidence,”](#) (August 3, 2019)
5. Politico, Nahal Toosi, [“‘When Paradigms die’: China veterans fear extinction in Trump’s Washington,”](#) (July 28, 2019)

Chinese Communist Party’s High-Tech Authoritarianism and Influence Campaigns

6. CSBA, Ross Babbage, [“Winning Without Fighting: Chinese and Russian Political Warfare Campaigns and How the West Can Prevail,”](#) (July 24, 2019) – Attached
7. SCMP, Owen Churchill, [“For US and Chinese regional officials, economic summit was a chance to heal frayed ties. For the White House, it rang alarm bells,”](#) (August 9, 2019)
8. Coda, Charles Rollet, [“Western Academia Helps Build China’s Automated Racism,”](#) (August 6, 2019)

9. Reuters, [“China to Halt Individual Tourism Permits for Taiwan Amid Rising Tension,”](#) (July 31, 2019)
10. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, [“Chairman Risch Statement on Chinese Threats to Hong Kong’s Autonomy,”](#) (July 30, 2019)
11. South China Morning Post, William Zheng, [“China’s top television news show runs week of reports slamming Hong Kong protesters,”](#) (July 26, 2019)
12. Newsroom, Laura Walters, [“AUT scraps Tiananmen Square event,”](#) (August 3, 2019)
13. Stuff, Harrison Christian, [“Chinese consulate praises students in scuffle at Auckland University,”](#) (August 1, 2019)
14. Chinese Consulate in Auckland, NZ, [“Remarks by Spokesperson of Chinese Consulate General in Auckland on Recent Activities related to ‘Hong Kong Independence’ at University of Auckland,”](#) (August 1, 2019)
15. BBC, Frances Mao, [“Hong Kong Protests: ‘I’m in Australia but I feel censored by Chinese students’,”](#) (July 31, 2019)

The Belt and Road: the CCP’s Debt Diplomacy and Corrosive Capital

16. The Atlantic, Stephen Paduano, [“China’s Investments in Rwanda Raise Familiar Questions about Debt,”](#) (August 3, 2019)
17. Hellenic Shipping News, [“Egypt inks deal with China’s port giant to build container terminal in Abu Qir port,”](#) (August 8, 2019)
18. Quartz Africa, Abdi Latif Dahir, [“China wants to use the power of global media to dispel Belt and Road debt risks,”](#) (April 25, 2019)
19. Dialogo Chino, Genesis Lozano, [“Ecuador’s China-backed hydropower revolution,”](#) (July 25, 2019)
20. Dialogo Chino, Fermin Koop, [“Chinese port in Uruguay shelved,”](#) (July 23, 2019)

Chinese Communist Party’s Attempt to Dominate Global Telecommunications

21. Czech Radio, Tom McEnchroe and Jana Magdonova, [“Study of Chinese CVs points at ‘Deep and Lasting Relationship’ between Huawei Employees and the State,”](#) (August 7, 2019)
22. AP, Joe McDonald, [“Huawei unveils phone system that could replace Android,”](#) (August 9, 2019)
23. CNET, Dean Keane, [“Huawei’s Twitter followers think it’s owned by the Chinese Government,”](#) (August 6, 2019)
24. Chris Balding and Donald Clarke, [“Who Owns Huawei?”](#) (April 17, 2019) – Attached

CCP’s Economic Espionage, Industrial Policies and Harmful Commercial Activities

25. FireEye, [“APT 41: A Dual Espionage and Cyber Crime Operation,”](#) (August 7, 2019) – Attached
26. Forbes, Zak Doffman, [“Chinese State Hackers Suspected of Malicious Cyber Attack on U.S. Utilities,”](#) (August 3, 2019)
27. Reuters, [“Chinese Aluminum Billionaire Indicted for \\$2 Billion Tariff Evasion Scheme,”](#) (July 31, 2019)
28. Nikkei Asian Review, Masamichi Hoshi, [“China scrambles to stem manufacturing exodus as 50 companies leave,”](#) (July 18, 2019)
29. Nikkei Asian Review, Katsuji Nakazawa, [“China’s power struggle lies behind global market turmoil,”](#) (August 8, 2019)

Chinese Communist Party’s Abuse of Human Rights and Persecution of Religion

30. Adrian Zenz, [“Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Grand Scheme of Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,”](#) (July 12, 2019) – Attached
31. Irish Times, Peter Goff, [“Inside China’s Detention Centres: War on Terror or Cultural](#)

[Genocide?”](#) (August 3, 2019)

32. SBS News, [“Uighur man threatened with deportation to China arrives in US after urgent appeal,”](#) (August 7, 2019)

33. Reuters, [“China’s Capital orders Arabic, Muslim Symbols Taken Down,”](#) (July 31, 2019)

34. NYTs, Chris Buckley and Edward Wong, [“Doubt Greet China’s Claim that Muslims have been Released from Camps,”](#) (July 30, 2019)

35. Japan Times, Magdalena Osumi, [“As loved ones in China disappear amid crackdown, Uighurs in Japan speak out,”](#) (August 8, 2019)

CCP’s Military Modernization and Security Threats

36. Business Insider, Christopher Woody, [“Reports of a secret base deal are raising fears that Beijing is boxing in the South China Sea,”](#) (August 3, 2019)

37. The Diplomat, Elsa Kania, [“Innovation in the New Era of Chinese Military Power,”](#) (July 25, 2019)

38. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, [“Risch \(R-Idaho\), Menendez \(D-NJ\), Gardner \(R-CO\), Markey \(D-MA\) Statement on China’s Unlawful Activities in the South China Sea,”](#) (July 31, 2019)

39. VNExpress, Phuong Vu, [“Vietnam accuses China of serious violation of sovereignty at ASEAN meeting,”](#) (August 1, 2019)

40. NATO Defense College, [“Russia and China: ‘axis of convenience’ or ‘stable strategic partnership’?”](#) (July 2019) – Attached

Opinion Pieces

1. Sydney Morning Herald, Andrew Hastie, [“We must see China – the opportunities and the threats – with clear eyes,”](#) (August 8, 2019)

<https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/we-must-see-china-the-opportunities-and-the-threats-with-clear-eyes-20190807-p52eon.html>

- *Like many people across the world, I saw 9/11 as the geopolitical moment that would shape the 21st century. It shaped the next decade of my own life. But I was wrong.*
- *The most significant geopolitical moment of the 21st century had already happened, five months earlier. And most of us, distracted by more dramatic events, failed to see it. It came on April Fool’s Day, 2001.*
- *A J-8 fighter jet from the People’s Liberation Army Navy collided with a US Navy EP-3 signals intelligence aircraft, 70 kilometres off the coast of Hainan Island. Both planes began plummeting toward the South China Sea. The PLAN fighter pilot did not survive. The 24 crew of the badly damaged US EP-3 managed a hard landing on the island, and, after being offered water and cigarettes, were held for 11 days by the Chinese government.*
- *The crew was released to the US, but the aircraft was returned much later – in many*

small pieces – via a Russian Antonov cargo plane. This was an early test for the Bush administration, only 10 weeks old. It was faced with brinkmanship, intelligence plundering and technology transfer.

- *All this took place over what are now contested waters — where today the PLAN has forged unsinkable aircraft carriers, out of reefs and atolls.*
- *The Hainan Island incident laid down the contours for the present challenge facing Australia. It portended the agonising security and economic balancing act we must now perform. That clash, almost 20 years ago, has now grown into overt geopolitical rivalry across the Indo-Pacific. The US seeks to remain the dominant power in the region and the People's Republic of China works to supplant it.*
- *Australia must now, somehow, hold on to our sovereignty and prosperity. We must balance security and trade. But most importantly, we must remain true to our democratic convictions while also seeing the world as it is, not as we wish it to be.*
- *This will be immensely difficult. It is impossible to forsake the US, our closest security and investment partner. It is also impossible to disengage from China, our largest trading partner. This is the central point: almost every strategic and economic question facing Australia in the coming decades will be refracted through the geopolitical competition of the US and the PRC.*
- *The US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, made that much abundantly clear when he said "the world has been asleep at the switch".*
- *We must be clear-eyed about our position in the world. We are resetting the terms of engagement with China to preserve our sovereignty, security and democratic convictions, as we also reap the benefits of prosperity that come with our mutually beneficial trade relationship.*
- *Last year, the Coalition government secured bipartisan passage of laws countering espionage, foreign interference and influence. Tough decisions were made on our future 5G network to safeguard our digital sovereignty for the generations to come. Critical assets, such as ports and gas pipelines, are now monitored much more closely, in recognition of their importance to our national life together.*
- *But there is more to be done. Right now our greatest vulnerability lies not in our infrastructure, but in our thinking. That intellectual failure makes us institutionally weak. If we don't understand the challenge ahead for our civil society, in our parliaments, in our universities, in our private enterprises, in our charities — our little platoons — then choices will be made for us. Our sovereignty, our freedoms, will be diminished.*
- *The West once believed that economic liberalisation would naturally lead to democratisation in China. This was our Maginot Line. It would keep us safe, just as the French believed their series of steel and concrete forts would guard them against the German advance in 1940. But their thinking failed catastrophically. The French had failed to appreciate the evolution of mobile warfare. Like the French, Australia has failed to see how mobile our authoritarian neighbour has become.*

- *Even worse, we ignore the role that ideology plays in China's actions across the Indo-Pacific region. We keep using our own categories to understand its actions, such as its motivations for building ports and roads, rather than those used by the Chinese Communist Party.*
- *The West has made this mistake before. Commentators once believed Stalin's decisions were the rational actions of a realist great power. But the Princeton Professor of History, Stephen Kotkin, found otherwise, after years of sifting through the archives of top Soviet meetings. He discovered that Stalin and his advisers "said the same things as they said in their propaganda ... [using] all the Marxian categories, because it turns out the Communists were Communists! They believed in the ideas and it's only by taking the ideas and politics seriously, can you understand the phenomenon."*
- *We must be intellectually honest and take the Chinese leadership at its word. We are dealing with a fundamentally different vision for the world. Xi Jinping has made his vision of the future abundantly clear since becoming President in 2013. His speeches show that the tough choices ahead will be shaped, at least on the PRC side, by ideology – communist ideology, or in his words, by "Marxist-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought".*
- *Xi's view of the future is one where capitalism will be eclipsed and "the consolidation of and development of the socialist system will require its own long period of history ... it will require the tireless struggle of generations, up to 10 generations".*
- *With history as our guide, we have no reason to doubt President Xi Jinping. Our next step in safeguarding Australia's future is accepting and adapting to the reality of the geopolitical struggle before us – its origins, its ideas and its implications for the Indo-Pacific region.*
- *The next decade will test our democratic values, our economy, our alliances and our security like no other time in Australian history.*
- ***Andrew Hastie is the federal member for Canning and the chair of the parliamentary joint committee for intelligence and security.***

2. Financial Times, Janos Kornai, ["Economists share blame for China's 'monstrous' turn,"](https://www.ft.com/content/f10ccb26-a16f-11e9-a282-2df48f366f7d) (July 10, 2019)

<https://www.ft.com/content/f10ccb26-a16f-11e9-a282-2df48f366f7d>

- *The leaders of modern China won't be satisfied with turning their country into one of the leading powers of the multipolar world. Their aim is to become the hegemonic leader of the globe.*
- *The idea is not, of course, to station Chinese soldiers everywhere. The means of domination would be different in each country, just as it was in the British empire of old. Some countries would literally be under military occupation. Elsewhere it would be enough to form governments compliant to Chinese wishes.*
- *Chilling changes are taking place inside China. Former leader Deng Xiaoping*

sidestepped the question of capitalism versus communism, saying: "It does not matter if the cat is black or white so long as it catches mice."

- *But it does matter to China's present leader, Xi Jinping. He wants China to return to the classic communist system. His style is reminiscent of Stalinist times. Deng's status as paramount leader was not codified in the legal system. But Mr Xi changed the law to allow to him to serve as president for life.*
- *Mr Xi has required Communist party committees to be formed inside all sizeable institutions and companies. In certain areas, these can overrule management. Some readers may recall that during the civil war after the 1917 Soviet revolution, the commissar chosen by the party could oust the military commander appointed by the generals.*
- *Show trials are going on, marked by the characteristics of modern China. Anybody can be taken to court for corruption. Some people really are corrupt, other cases are not so clear. Prisoners are being tortured and executions have become common again.*
- *Thanks to the internet, the central government has not suppressed freedom of speech and press completely. Political discussions can take place in small groups, but the network of prohibitions is thickening, and the risks associated with criticism are growing.*
- *Are not western intellectuals also responsible for this nightmare? We not only watched China's transformation with approval but actively contributed to these changes. We are the modern version of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, the 19th-century tale of an experimenting scientist who brought a dead body to life using that era's technology: the electric shock. The resurrected creature became a murderous monster.*
- *Many of us already bear moral responsibility for not protesting against the resurrection of the Chinese monster, or even worse because we have taken on an active role as advisers. I include myself here: I took part in the Bashan conference in 1985. Seven western economists and leading Chinese policymakers were put on a luxurious boat floating on the Yangtze river. I lectured on how the country should be transformed into a market economy. When market reforms were taking off, my written and spoken ideas, including my book Economics of Shortage, had powerful effects.*
- *I was not alone. Many other western intellectuals gathered at conferences and shared their thoughts. We all agreed that new life would be brought to China, which had frozen under Mao, by the electric shock of marketisation and private property. All of us who advocated this plan were Frankensteins. Now, the fearsome monster is here.*
- *Many people ask "What should we do now?" Here are a few warnings. It is not possible to resist the Chinese expansion drive solely by raising tariffs. China is advancing on all fronts, by putting state of the art devices into the hands of the world's biggest army. Beijing is also quick to innovate and to use new technology to influence the political and economic life of its rivals.*
- *I oppose any government action and propaganda that treats individuals with suspicion on the basis of their facial features, family roots and genes. However, it is also a fact that the Chinese diaspora constitutes a huge pool of human resources from which*

the country's leaders can select their own men.

- *Investors worldwide are enthusiastic about investing in China. In their eyes a stable dictatorship is a more secure environment than a wobbly democracy. Luckily other capitalists have more active consciences, and are motivated by human solidarity.*
- *Everyone should think twice before helping China make devices which can be used in physical or digital warfare. The gates of universities should be open to Chinese students — except when they are seeking to learn how to build an arsenal for modern war.*
- *Back in the 1940s, the US diplomat George Kennan argued that the best way to oppose communism was “containment”. This far and no further! Or more precisely: no further in this direction! What has happened already cannot be undone. But here we must stop, and we must take far more care to avoid carrying on in the role of Frankenstein.*
- ***The writer is an economics professor emeritus of Harvard University and Budapest Corvinus University***

3. Defense One, Jacob Stokes, [“China’s Credibility Problem,”](#) (August 6, 2019)

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/08/chinas-credibility-problem/158956/>

- *U.S.-China relations are in a state of freefall not seen since before President Nixon went to Beijing in 1972. To arrest the deterioration, the two sides will need to establish a new modus vivendi. One underappreciated stumbling block stands in the way, however: China has a credibility problem.*
- *Since the late 1990s, Washington and its allies have taken steps to designed to accommodate China’s rise and give Beijing a say in shaping the post-Cold War global order. American leaders did so by making a series of agreements meant to address certain troubling aspects of China’s rise through negotiations instead of confrontation. But Beijing’s abrogation of those agreements has helped persuade a growing number of policymakers and analysts in the United States and beyond that those efforts have failed.*

4. Washington Post, Anna Fifield, [“Paramount and paranoid: China’s Xi and the Communist Party face a crisis of confidence,”](#) (August 3, 2019)

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/paramount-and-paranoid-chinas-xi-faces-a-crisis-of-confidence/2019/08/02/39f77f2a-aa30-11e9-8733-48c87235f396_story.html?noredirect=on

- *Chinese scholars and Communist Party cadres have a succinct way of describing the tectonic shifts taking place here: Deng Xiaoping made us rich, now Xi Jinping is making us strong.*
- *The phrase sums up China’s economic rise that began under Deng four decades ago, and the hopes for a similarly significant geopolitical realignment under the current*

president.

- *Xi has devoted his seven years in power to strengthening the ruling Communist Party, and by extension the country. He has relentlessly quashed dissent, sidelined rivals, and demanded absolute loyalty.*
- *After pledging to make the party “north, south, east, and west,” he has ensured that it is paramount not just in policymaking but in the military, business, education, and the law.*
- *Now, Xi is facing challenges on multiple fronts and the Communist Party, riven with paranoia at the best of times, is seeing threats at every turn.*
- *He has to contend not just with a slowing economy but also a protracted trade war with the United States, one that has entered a new confrontational phase with President Trump’s decision to impose more tariffs next month.*
- *He is facing escalating Western criticism of Chinese policies toward ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang, where as many as 3 million people have been put into reeducation camps. He is dealing with an increasingly assertive Taiwan at the same time as a pro-democracy movement swells in Hong Kong.*
- *All of these loom as dangers to Xi’s authority as the party’s general secretary and are heightening a sense of alarm within a party long fearful of external threats.*
- *“A strong party is the key to a successful China, in Xi’s eyes. It is also the only way to fend off enemies abroad, most notably the US,” said Richard McGregor, an expert on the party and the author of a new book about Xi’s leadership.*

5. Politico, Nahal Toosi, [“‘When Paradigms die’: China veterans fear extinction in Trump’s Washington,”](#) (July 28, 2019)

<https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/28/trump-china-veterans-foreign-policy-1438389>

- *President Donald Trump’s push to toughen U.S. policy toward China has won over much of the Washington establishment, touching off a seismic shift in how many Americans view Beijing.*
- *But one group is resisting — those who have spent decades pursuing diplomacy with China and who fear their approach might go extinct.*
- *These former officials, diplomats and scholars are wary about the rise of a younger foreign policy generation that is almost uniformly more skeptical of China, never having experienced the impoverished, isolated country it once was.*

Chinese Communist Party’s High-Tech Authoritarianism and Influence Campaigns

6. CSBA, Ross Babbage, [“Winning Without Fighting: Chinese and Russian Political Warfare](#)

[Campaigns and How the West Can Prevail,”](#) (July 24, 2019) – Attached

<https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/winning-without-fighting-chinese-and-russian-political-warfare-campaigns-and-how-the-west-can-prevail>

- *Political warfare operations have been central to the Chinese and Russian regimes’ international operations and strategic advances for the last two decades. Indeed, they have long featured prominently in Chinese and Russian strategic culture and practice. Both regimes are well-equipped, very experienced, and highly skilled in the conduct of these political warfare campaigns. The West, by contrast, largely abandoned high-level political warfare operations at the end of the Cold War. It has put the United States, its close allies, and its international partners at a disadvantage that needs to be remedied.*
- *Volume I of this report reviews the nature and track record of recent Chinese and Russian political warfare operations. Volume II considers the lessons from eight illustrative case studies. It then addresses a number of alternative strategies for countering such campaigns and reaches 12 key conclusions.*

7. SCMP, Owen Churchill, [“For US and Chinese regional officials, economic summit was a chance to heal frayed ties. For the White House, it rang alarm bells,”](#) (August 9, 2019)

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3022054/us-and-chinese-regional-officials-economic-summit-was-chance>

- The meeting was co-hosted by the US National Governors Association and a Chinese group thought to have ties to Beijing’s overseas propaganda wing.
- Conference brought together leaders and deputies from five US states, the Chinese provinces of Shaanxi, Jiangxi and Gansu and the city of Chongqing.

8. Coda, Charles Rollet, [“Western Academia Helps Build China’s Automated Racism,”](#) (August 6, 2019)

<https://codastory.com/authoritarian-tech/western-academia-china-automated-racism/>

- *Last summer, a respected U.S. academic journal about data mining published a study titled “Facial feature discovery for ethnicity recognition”, authored by four professors in China and one in Australia. The study found that an effective way to automatically predict the ethnicity of minorities in China was for facial recognition systems to focus on specific, T-shaped regions of their faces. In order to reach this conclusion, over 7,000 photographs were taken of 300 Uyghur, Tibetan, and Korean students at Dalian Minzu University in northeastern China.*
- *The study, which received funding from Chinese government foundations, attracted little attention when it was published, but went viral at the end of May when PhD student Os Keyes tweeted out its abstract, writing: “TIL [today I learned] there’s a shitton of computer vision literature in 2017-2018 that COINCIDENTALLY tries to build facial recognition for Uyghur people. How. Curious.” Keyes’ post was retweeted over 500 times.*

9. Reuters, "[China to Halt Individual Tourism Permits for Taiwan Amid Rising Tension](#)," (July 31, 2019)

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-tourism/china-to-halt-individual-tourism-permits-for-taiwan-amid-rising-tension-idUSKCN1UQQMW>

- *China will stop issuing individual travel permits for Taiwan to people in 47 mainland cities from Aug. 1, its culture and tourism ministry said on Wednesday, citing the state of ties with the self-ruled island, but gave no details.*

10. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "[Chairman Risch Statement on Chinese Threats to Hong Kong's Autonomy](#)," (July 30, 2019)

<https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/chairman-risch-statement-on-chinese-threats-to-hong-kongs-autonomy->

- *Washington, D.C. – Chairman Risch made the following statement regarding ongoing protests in Hong Kong, and in response to the Chinese government's July 29 press conference:*
- *"I am deeply concerned by the Chinese government's statements yesterday that further demonstrate a complete unwillingness to listen to the Hong Kong people. In their comments, Chinese government officials cited the importance of upholding the Basic Law – which China has routinely undermined through its growing encroachment on Hong Kong's autonomy.*
- *"The Hong Kong people are protesting in pursuit of legitimate rights and freedoms, and they deserve accountability from their government. As I have said before, the Hong Kong government should fully withdraw the extradition bill, and conduct an independent investigation of excessive force by the police. The people of Hong Kong, as all people, have the right to peaceful protest and the government's response of violence is unacceptable."*

11. South China Morning Post, William Zheng, "[China's top television news show runs week of reports slamming Hong Kong protesters](#)," (July 26, 2019)

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3020119/chinas-top-television-news-show-runs-week-reports-slamming-hong>

- *CCTV's prime-time evening programme takes aim at all aspects of recent marches and violent clashes*
- *Mainland journalist says media companies under strict orders to use only Communist Party approved content in reports on situation in Hong Kong.*
- *A journalist who works for the Guangzhou Daily group but asked not to be identified, said that newspaper editors in the mainland had been told they must toe the official line*

when reporting events in Hong Kong.

- *“On reports about Hong Kong, we are under strict orders to use copy provided by state media like Xinhua or CCTV, and we can only carry official statements released by official departments,” said the journalist, who asked not to be named.*

12. Newsroom, Laura Walters, [“AUT scraps Tiananmen Square event,”](#) (August 3, 2019)

<https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2019/07/30/705870/aut-scraps-tiananmen-square-event>

- *Chinese government officials have again ordered AUT (Auckland University of Technology) to shut down a contentious event on campus. This time it was a Tiananmen Square anniversary commemoration.*
- *Auckland University of Technology cancelled a Tiananmen Square anniversary event after Chinese Government officials contacted the university to tell them not to go ahead with the commemorations.*
- *The university said the event was cancelled due to a booking issue, not because of China’s request. This is not the first time representatives from the Chinese Government have tried to block a contentious event, and it’s not the first time a New Zealand university has cited booking issues as the reason for cancellation.*
- *Emails released to Newsroom under the Official Information Act show the Chinese Consulate General in Auckland contacted AUT to express their opposition to an event commemorating the 30th anniversary of Tiananmen Square, due to be held on June 3.*
- *Vice Consul General Xiao Yewen met with Vice Chancellor Derek McCormack on May 31.*
- *Following the meeting, AUT notified the staff member who had booked the room that the booking had been cancelled. Staff were instructed to put a sign on the door of the building and organise a “low impact security presence”. Two days later, event organisers wrote to attendees to let them know the new location at a council-owned facility.*
- *In an email to Xiao, following the meeting, McCormack reiterated the event was not a university event, and said a member of staff had booked a building on campus through the incorrect process, adding that the building in question would also be closed for the Queen’s Birthday public holiday.*
- *McCormack told Newsroom there was no further effort to correct the booking process, or facilitate the event at the university.*
- *“Happily, on this instance your concerns and ours coincided, and the event did not proceed at the university,” he wrote in the email to Xiao.*
- *“Nevertheless, I would like to take this opportunity to re-affirm that not only in the University, where academic freedom is taken very seriously, but also in New Zealand at*

large, freedom of speech and assembly are held as core democratic principles and fundamental values of our society.

- *“In all matters within New Zealand’s jurisdiction these freedoms must continue to be amongst our primary considerations as a public institution.”*
- *He went on to say the university had no wish to deliberately offend the government and people of China, adding he hoped to meet soon for “more positive discussions”.*
- *In an email to McCormack, Xiao thanked the university for “bringing the matter to a right direction”.*
- *“As a diplomat, I fully understand and respect the basic values such as freedom of speech and assembly; which however have nothing to do with the political agenda of certain forces attempting to change the political system of China,” he said in reference to the background to the Tiananmen Square massacre.*
- *Xiao went on to say: “The Consulate General wishes to be in close collaboration with you to work together to ensure the smooth growth of cooperation and exchanges between AUT and China under the principle of mutual respect, mutual understanding and mutual trust so as to achieve more beneficial results to both sides.”*

13. Stuff, Harrison Christian, [“Chinese consulate praises students in scuffle at Auckland University,”](https://www.stuff.co.nz/auckland/114669992/chinese-consulate-praises-auckland-university-students-in-scuffle-for-spontaneous-acts-and-deeds) (August 1, 2019)

<https://www.stuff.co.nz/auckland/114669992/chinese-consulate-praises-auckland-university-students-in-scuffle-for-spontaneous-acts-and-deeds>

- *The Chinese consulate has praised pro-Beijing students involved in a scuffle with Hong Kong democracy supporters at Auckland University.*
- *A Chinese bill proposing to extradite suspects from Hong Kong to mainland China has sparked mass protests in the Asian city and throughout the Chinese diaspora.*
- *This week, a dispute between pro-Hong Kong democracy and Beijing-supporting students turned physical on the Auckland University campus, with a woman pushed to the ground.*
- *In a statement issued on Wednesday, the Chinese Consulate General in Auckland expressed support for students involved in the confrontation.*
- *“The Consulate General praises the Chinese international students’ spontaneous acts and deeds out of their love of China and love of Hong Kong, and their actions to oppose splitting the country,” the statement said.*
- *“The Consulate General strongly condemns the use of the recent situation in Hong Kong, under the pretext of so-called academic freedom and freedom of expression, on the university campus to engage in smearing attacks on the Chinese government and the Hong Kong SAR government, inciting anti-China sentiment, and creating opposition*

between Chinese and Hong Kong students."

- The statement also said New Zealand media reports about the incident had been biased and painted a false picture of the situation in Hong Kong.

14. Chinese Consulate in Auckland, NZ, [“Remarks by Spokesperson of Chinese Consulate General in Auckland on Recent Activities related to ‘Hong Kong Independence’ at University of Auckland,”](#) (August 1, 2019)

<http://www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/eng/zlgxw/t1685206.htm>

- A few days ago, some protesters with content of "Liberate Hong Kong" and others related to "Hong Kong Independence" appeared on the campus of the University of Auckland, which triggered dispute among certain students. Some New Zealand media made reports about this, but with biased views and distorted descriptions of the recent situation in Hong Kong.
- Some Western anti-China politicians and individuals have made irresponsible remarks and played a disgraceful role. Their ulterior motives are to disrupt Hong Kong, change Hong Kong into a troublesome sore for China. And we would like to reiterate that Hong Kong is part of China, and its affairs are of domestic concern alone. The Chinese government absolutely does not allow any foreign forces to interfere in Hong Kong's affairs.
- The Consulate General expresses its appreciation to the students for their spontaneous patriotism, and opposes any form of secessionism. We strongly condemn those engaged in activities of demonizing the images of China and HKSAR government, inciting anti-China sentiment and confrontation between mainland and Hong Kong students, through distorting the factual situation in Hong Kong under the pretext of so-called freedom of expression.

15. BBC, Frances Mao, [“Hong Kong Protests: ‘I’m in Australia but I feel censored by Chinese students,’”](#) (July 31, 2019)

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-49159820>

- As the situation grows yet more tense, the impact is also being felt overseas, particularly among the hundreds of thousands of mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students studying in Australia.
- At the University of Queensland, the tensions spilled over into violent clashes last week, when a group staging a support rally for the Hong Kong demonstrators were confronted by pro-Beijing protesters.
- Hundreds of protesters faced off against each other, yelling insults and abuse as the Chinese national anthem was blasted from a speaker.
- Videos posted online showed pro-China supporters ripping posters from the hands of

opponents, prompting shoving and physical confrontations.

The Belt and Road: the CCP's Debt Diplomacy and Corrosive Capital

16. The Atlantic, Stephen Paduano, "[China's Investments in Rwanda Raise Familiar Questions about Debt,](#)" (August 3, 2019)

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/08/belt-and-road-rwanda/594928/>

- *The prime minister's office here is a shiny new complex in the heart of the capital that was inaugurated in April by the incumbent, Édouard Ngirente, who used the occasion to praise his country's relationship with its economic benefactor in recent years: China.*
- *The complex, built at a cost of \$27 million, was a gift from the Chinese government to Rwanda—or, as Ngirente put it, "yet another indicator of how ... the relationship between China and Rwanda is always growing stronger."*
- *Indeed, many testaments to the progress since the end of the Rwandan genocide—the seats of a stable government, the industrial complexes behind a growing economy, the housing for an emerging middle class—have been built by the Chinese. The projects have been marked by red flags, stars, and plaques, which have put in plain sight a rising, and worrying, trend for Rwanda and the region. Even as China invests more attention and resources in Africa's development, it sinks nations on the continent deeper into debt and dependence. Now many in the West—prominent politicians, generals, economists, and more—believe that the costs are outweighing the benefits and that Chinese investments are imperiling African prosperity and sovereignty in the process.*

17. Hellenic Shipping News, "[Egypt inks deal with China's port giant to build container terminal in Abu Qir port,](#)" (August 8, 2019)

18. Quartz Africa, Abdi Latif Dahir, "[China wants to use the power of global media to dispel Belt and Road debt risks,](#)" (April 25, 2019)

<https://qz.com/africa/1604677/china-is-using-african-media-to-back-belt-and-road-initiative/>

- *Beijing wants to deploy international media outlets to allay fears about its trillion-dollar global trade and infrastructure initiative.*
- *President Xi Jinping called on media outlets in the countries involved in the Belt and Road plan to fashion stories about the scheme in a way that boosts public support. Xi made the comments at the first council meeting of the Belt and Road News Network (BRNN), an association consisting of 182 media outlets from 86 countries which include China Daily newspaper, French daily La Provence, Russian news agency Tass and South Africa's Independent Media.*
- *The BRNN was first proposed by Xi in 2017 and is positioned as a platform to help*

nations along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to cooperate in news gathering, improve technological support and enhance cultural exchanges.

- Xi's comments come as almost 40 world leaders gather in Beijing today to show their support for his signature foreign-policy plan. As the sweeping infrastructure project has taken hold, it has faced increasing criticism, particularly over its long-term viability in Africa.
- There has also been a growing calls for caution on what has been termed "debt-trap diplomacy," with African nations getting warned mostly by Western leaders on the perils of taking on too much cheap Chinese debt. Critics have also warned about Beijing's debt relief or repayment processes, with many using Sri Lanka's handover of its strategic Hambantota Port to Beijing last year as example of the risks associated with taking Beijing's money.
- The Belt Road Initiative has faced scrutiny in countries like Kenya and Ghana and has instigated legal challenges spanning three continents in Djibouti.

19. Dialogo Chino, Genesis Lozano, "[Ecuador's China-backed hydropower revolution,](#)" (July 25, 2019)

<https://dialogochino.net/29133-ecuadors-china-backed-hydropower-revolution/>

- Ecuador's bet on hydro to clean its energy matrix and sell a surplus landed it in debt and inhibited wind and solar.

20. Dialogo Chino, Fermin Koop, "[Chinese port in Uruguay shelved,](#)" (July 23, 2019)

<https://dialogochino.net/29106-chinese-port-in-uruguay-shelved/>

- Amid a local backlash and IUU fishing fears, Shandong BaoMa abandons Montevideo port. But it's not over yet.

Chinese Communist Party's Attempt to Dominate Global Telecommunications

21. Czech Radio, Tom McEnchroe and Jana Magdonova, "[Study of Chinese CVs points at 'Deep and Lasting Relationship' between Huawei Employees and the State,](#)" (August 7, 2019)

- In July, a paper was published by Dr. Christopher Balding from the Fulbright University in Vietnam, which looked into the link between Huawei Technologies' employees and the Chinese intelligence and military establishment by analysing a unique dataset of CVs from unsecured Chinese databases and websites run by recruitment platforms leaked last year. In an interview with Czech Radio published on Wednesday, he said that Huawei employees appear to act on behalf of the Chinese interior ministry and army in their work for Huawei.

22. AP, Joe McDonald, "[Huawei unveils phone system that could replace Android,](#)" (August 9, 2019)

<https://www.apnews.com/e3fa46ddbd2d4b05801d92280ab40204>

- *Huawei on Friday unveiled a smartphone operating system that it said can replace Google's Android, adding to the Chinese tech giant's efforts to insulate itself against U.S. sanctions.*
- *The announcement of HarmonyOS highlights the growing ability of Huawei, the No. 2 global smartphone brand and biggest maker of network gear for phone carriers, to create technology and reduce its reliance on American vendors.*
- *U.S. curbs imposed in May threatened Huawei's smartphone sales by limiting access to Android and blocking Google, a unit of Alphabet Inc., from supporting music and other services based on the system.*

23. CNET, Dean Keane, "[Huawei's Twitter followers think it's owned by the Chinese Government,](#)" (August 6, 2019)

<https://www.cnet.com/news/huawei-asked-people-if-they-thought-it-was-linked-to-chinese-government//>

- *Huawei apparently decided that one way to address the controversy over its alleged links with the Chinese government was to run a poll on its official Twitter account, asking people who they think owns Huawei. The poll started Friday and got 56,790 votes before it closed down.*
- *"Who do you think owns Huawei? #WhoRunsHuawei," the Chinese phone manufacturer wrote.*
- *"The government" was the top choice at 42%, "employees" were at 26%, "financial institutions" got 17% of the vote and "consortiums" got 15%.*
- *A similar poll on Facebook yielded a different result: 77% voted for "employees" and 23% said "the government." Its Facebook page also pointed toward a website detailing its corporate structure, which states that the company is owned by 96,768 shareholding employees. Nearly 90% of these are current employees -- each of whom elected the company representatives in its collective leadership model -- while the others are "retired and restructured."*
- *However, research published in April suggests it's more complicated than that. Huawei's employees have contractual interests in a profit-sharing plan, but The New York Times noted in April that those shares can't be transferred to others or owned by nonemployees. If an employee under a certain level of seniority leaves the company, it buys the shares back.*
- *The company is apparently 100% owned by a holding company, around 1% of which is owned by Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei and 99% owned by a mysterious trade union committee -- which, the researchers say, due to the nature of Chinese trade unions essentially means Huawei is controlled by the state.*

- *Jiang Xisheng, chief secretary of the Huawei board of directors, told reporters that this is a matter of legal convenience and that the union doesn't influence business operations.*

24. Chris Balding and Donald Clarke, [“Who Owns Huawei?”](#) (April 17, 2019)

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3372669

- *As Huawei has come under increasing scrutiny over the last several months, the question of who really owns and controls it has come to the fore. Huawei calls itself “employee-owned,” but this claim is questionable, and the corporate structure described on its website is misleading. A number of pertinent facts about Huawei’s structure and ownership are in fact well known and have been outlined many times in the Chinese media, but the myth of Huawei’s employee ownership seems to persist outside of China. This article, drawing on publicly available sources such as media reports, corporate databases, and court cases, aims to refute this myth once and for all.*

- *In summary, we find the following:*

- *The Huawei operating company is 100% owned by a holding company, which is in turn approximately 1% owned by Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei and 99% owned by an entity called a “trade union committee” for the holding company.*
- *We know nothing about the internal governance procedures of the trade union committee. We do not know who the committee members or other trade union leaders are, or how they are selected.*
- *Trade union members have no right to assets held by a trade union.*
- *What have been called “employee shares” in “Huawei” are in fact at most contractual interests in a profit-sharing scheme.*
- *Given the public nature of trade unions in China, if the ownership stake of the trade union committee is genuine, and if the trade union and its committee function as trade unions generally function in China, then Huawei may be deemed effectively state-owned.*
- *Regardless of who, in a practical sense, owns and controls Huawei, it is clear that the employees do not.*

CCP’s Economic Espionage, Industrial Policies and Harmful Commercial Activities

25. FireEye, [“APT 41: A Dual Espionage and Cyber Crime Operation,”](#) (August 7, 2019) – Attached

- *Today, FireEye Intelligence is releasing a comprehensive report detailing APT41, a prolific Chinese cyber threat group that carries out state-sponsored espionage activity in parallel with financially motivated operations. APT41 is unique among tracked China-based actors in that it leverages non-public malware typically reserved for espionage campaigns in what appears to be activity for personal gain. Explicit financially-motivated*

targeting is unusual among Chinese state-sponsored threat groups, and evidence suggests APT41 has conducted simultaneous cyber crime and cyber espionage operations from 2014 onward.

26. Forbes, Zak Doffman, "[Chinese State Hackers Suspected of Malicious Cyber Attack on U.S. Utilities,](#)" (August 3, 2019)

- *The notorious Chinese state-sponsored hacking group APT10, which is believed to act for the country's Ministry of State Security, is the most likely culprit behind a cyber campaign targeting U.S. utility companies in July. The disclosure on August 1 was made by researchers at Proofpoint, who warned that "persistent targeting of any entity that provides critical infrastructure should be considered an acute risk—the profile of this campaign is indicative of specific risk to U.S.-based entities in the utilities sector."*
- *The spear-phishing campaign targeted company employees with emails purporting to be from the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying (NCEES), emails that claimed to be delivering professional examination results but which were actually delivering "malicious" Microsoft Word attachments. Threat researchers at Proofpoint broke the news and dubbed the command and control malware "LookBack."*
- *According to Proofpoint's Michael Raggi and Dennis Schwarz, once the emailed Microsoft Word attachment is opened, a malicious VBA macro drops files onto the host computer which then provide the malware with the command and control framework needed to access data on the machine. The malware can attack and mimic a wide range of processes on an infected machine—primarily, though, the objective is to steal data files and take operational screenshots.*

27. Reuters, "[Chinese Aluminum Billionaire Indicted for \\$2 Billion Tariff Evasion Scheme,](#)" (July 31, 2019)

<https://in.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-fraud/chinese-billionaire-indicted-in-u-s-for-alleged-1-8-billion-aluminum-tariff-evasion-idINKCN1UQ238>

- *A Chinese billionaire has been indicted by a grand jury on charges he schemed with the aluminum company he founded to evade \$1.8 billion of tariffs by smuggling huge amounts of the metal into the United States, federal prosecutors said on Wednesday.*
- *Liu Zhongtian, 55, and China Zhongwang Holdings Ltd ([1333.HK](#)), where he served as chairman and president, were among several defendants charged in a 24-count indictment by a Los Angeles grand jury.*

28. Nikkei Asian Review, Masamichi Hoshi, "[China scrambles to stem manufacturing exodus as 50 companies leave,](#)" (July 18, 2019)

<https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade-war/China-scrambles-to-stem-manufacturing-exodus-as-50-companies-leave>

- *China is racing to keep foreign enterprises in-country, dangling special benefits so*

that the advantages of staying outweigh the heavy tariffs imposed by the U.S.

- A year into the trade war with Washington, more than 50 global companies, including Apple and Nintendo, have announced or are considering plans to move production out of China, Nikkei research has found.
- And not just foreign companies. Chinese manufacturers, as well as those from the U.S., Japan and Taiwan, are part of the drain, including makers of personal computers, smartphones and other electronics.
- "We need permanent measures to avoid the risk of tariffs and be eligible for U.S. government procurement," said Kiyofumi Kakudo, CEO of PC maker Dynabook. The unit of Sharp is considering a plan to relocate production of its U.S.-bound notebook PCs to a new plant being built in Vietnam. Such PCs account for 10% of the unit's total notebook production.

29. Nikkei Asian Review, Katsuji Nakazawa, "[China's power struggle lies behind global market turmoil](https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/China-s-power-struggle-lies-behind-global-market-turmoil)," (August 8, 2019)

<https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/China-s-power-struggle-lies-behind-global-market-turmoil>

- The Chinese yuan fell below the 7-per-dollar level for the first time in 11 years soon after the Communist Party's annual conclave began at the seaside resort of Beidaihe, Hebei Province.
- "The government wants to promote exports and buoy business sentiment," a Chinese market participant explained. "But even so, intentionally letting the yuan pass the 7-per-dollar line, something they had been so vigilantly defending, was shocking."
- Chinese market players interpreted the currency move, which came on Monday, as an emergency response to U.S. President Donald Trump's threat of a further round of punitive import tariffs. The step most certainly received the greenlight from leaders staying in Beidaihe. But it backfired.
- "It's called 'currency manipulation'," Trump tweeted that day. Hours later, the Department of Treasury designated China a "currency manipulator."
- Addressing China's currency manipulation was an important item in a 150-page draft of a U.S.-China trade deal that existed until May.
- The escalation of tensions -- China also announced it was temporarily halting purchases of U.S. agricultural products -- rattled stock markets around the world. In China, the benchmark Shanghai Composite Index sank well below 2,900, the level that had been said to be Chinese authorities' defense line.
- To many, Trump and his many flip-flops on policy are the primary cause of the global market turmoil. But this reading misses the forest for the trees.

- "Most people do not understand the true nature of this phenomenon," a Chinese source involved in economic policy said. "What is happening now is based on the tug of war in Chinese politics that has continued for the past year and a half."
- In reverse chronological order, the U.S. and China held a fresh round of trade negotiations in Shanghai at the end of July. This followed a summit between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Osaka at the end of June.
- The Shanghai talks ended earlier than scheduled with neither side having much to offer. The round essentially broke down, with Beijing and Washington barely able to agree to meet again in the U.S. in September.
- No progress has been made since early May, when China slashed the draft text of a trade deal compiled during five months of talks from 150 pages to 105 and sent it back to the U.S.
- The crux of the matter, one Chinese political researcher said, is that the fourth plenary session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party, a key gathering which sets the basic five-year policy on economic management, has been delayed for nearly a year.
- "Under such circumstances," the researcher said, "it is difficult for China to bring negotiations with the U.S. to a conclusion."
- Astonishingly, China has gone almost a full year with no basic policy on future economic management. Such a plan cannot be formally adopted without holding the fourth plenary session.
- The Chinese Communist Party's 25-member Politburo meets every month. But announcements that come from these meetings are limited to the Politburo's views on the economic situation of the time and interim measures to cope with certain issues. They are not about basic policy.
- After tearing up the trade deal in May, Xi visited the historic launching point of the 1934-1936 Long March in Jiangxi Province. Standing at the sacred site, he called for a "new Long March" in preparation for a protracted battle with the U.S.
- In reality, however, the visit appears to have been an act of subterfuge to obscure the fact that China has no long-term economic strategy toward the U.S.

Chinese Communist Party's Abuse of Human Rights and Persecution of Religion

30. Adrian Zenz, ["Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Grand Scheme of Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,"](#) (July 12, 2019) – Attached

<https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/8tsk2/>

- *ABSTRACT: After recruiting a hundred or more thousand police forces, installing massive surveillance systems, and interning vast numbers of predominantly Turkic minority population members, many have been wondering about Beijing's next step in its*

so-called "war on Terror" in Xinjiang. Since the second half of 2018, limited but apparently growing numbers of detainees have been released into different forms of forced labor. In this report it is argued based on government documents that the state's long-term stability maintenance strategy in Xinjiang is predicated upon a perverse and extremely intrusive combination of forced or at least involuntary training and labor, intergenerational separation and social control over family units. Much of this is being implemented under the heading and guise of "poverty alleviation".

- Below, the author identifies three distinct flow schemes by which the state seeks to place the vast majority of adult Uyghurs and other minority populations, both men and women, into different forms of coercive or at least involuntary, labor-intensive factory work. This is achieved through a combination of internment camp workshops, large industrial parks, and village-based satellite factories. While the parents are being herded into full-time work, their children are put into full-time (at least full day-time) education and training settings. This includes children below preschool age (infants and toddlers), so that ethnic minority women are being "liberated" and "freed" to engage in full-time wage labor. Notably, both factory and educational settings are essentially state-controlled environments that facilitate ongoing political indoctrination while barring religious practices. As a result, the dissolution of traditional, religious and family life is only a matter of time. The targeted use of village work teams and village-based satellite factories means that this grand "poverty alleviation" and social re-engineering scheme penetrates into every corner of ethnic minority society with unprecedented pervasiveness.

- Consequently, it is argued that Beijing's grand scheme of forced education, training and labor in Xinjiang simultaneously achieves at least five main goals in this core region of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): maintain the minority population in state-controlled environments, inhibit intergenerational cultural transmission, achieve national poverty reduction goals, promote economic growth along the BRI, and bring glory to the Party by achieving all of these four aims in a way that is ideologically consistent with the core tenets of Communist thought - using labor to transform religious minority groups towards a predominantly materialist worldview, akin to the Reform Through Labor (劳改) program. Government documents outline that the transformation of rural populations from farming to wage labor should involve not just the acquisition of new skills, but also a thorough identity and worldview change in line with Party ideology. In this context, labor is hailed as a strategic means to eradicate "extremist" ideologies.

31. Irish Times, Peter Goff, ["Inside China's Detention Centres: War on Terror or Cultural Genocide?"](#) (August 3, 2019)

<https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/inside-china-s-detention-centres-war-on-terror-or-cultural-genocide-1.3973215>

- The Chinese say their centres are voluntary and aimed at eradicating extremism and terrorism. Others say they are an elaborate system to assimilate Muslims into Han China.

32. SBS News, ["Uighur man threatened with deportation to China arrives in US after urgent appeal,"](#) (August 7, 2019)

- *A Uighur man who issued a desperate plea for help to the world after being threatened with deportation to China has arrived safely in the US, according to advocates.*
- *Abulikemu Yusufu, 54, was detained by Qatari authorities at Doha's Hamad International Airport on Saturday after fleeing persecution in Pakistan where he had been living before attempting to enter Europe through Bosnia.*
- *There he was booked on an upcoming flight to Beijing, despite grave fears for his safety.*
- *According to a statement published in BuzzFeed News, a US State Department spokesperson confirmed Mr Yusufu was on his way to the US.*
- *"The United States is alarmed by China's highly repressive campaign against Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in Xinjiang," the spokesperson said.*
- *The decision to accept Mr Yusufu comes amid growing tensions between the US and China, with the State Department reportedly offering a powerful rebuke of their treatment of the Muslim-minority.*
- *"We will continue to call on China to reverse its counterproductive policies that conflate terrorism with peaceful religious and political expression, to immediately release all those arbitrarily detained, and to cease efforts to coerce members of its Muslim minority groups residing abroad to return to China to face an uncertain fate," the State Department added, according to BuzzFeed News.*

33. Reuters, ["China's Capital orders Arabic, Muslim Symbols Taken Down,"](#) (July 31, 2019)

- *Authorities in the Chinese capital have ordered halal restaurants and food stalls to remove Arabic script and symbols associated with Islam from their signs, part of an expanding national effort to "Sinicize" its Muslim population.*
- *Employees at 11 restaurants and shops in Beijing selling halal products and visited by Reuters in recent days said officials had told them to remove images associated with Islam, such as the crescent moon and the word "halal" written in Arabic, from signs.*
- *Government workers from various offices told one manager of a Beijing noodle shop to cover up the "halal" in Arabic on his shop's sign, and then watched him do it.*
- *"They said this is foreign culture and you should use more Chinese culture," said the manager, who, like all restaurant owners and employees who spoke to Reuters, declined to give his name due to the sensitivity of the issue.*

34. NYTs, Chris Buckley and Edward Wong, ["Doubt Greets China's Claim that Muslims have been Released from Camps,"](#) (July 30, 2019)

- *Chinese officials said Tuesday that most of the inmates in re-education camps for Muslim minorities — a vast network of detention centers estimated to have held one million people or more — have been released. But the United States, experts on Chinese*

policies, and ethnic Uighur Muslims abroad quickly contested the claim.

- They said that there was no evidence of mass releases from the camps across the Xinjiang region in China's northwest, and that people who had nominally been freed often effectively remained in captivity, including being forced into labor programs instead.
- The State Department and the Pentagon, which have criticized China's policies on Muslims for months, released the same long, forceful statement that said they were "unable to verify the vague claims" and that the Communist Party continued to show "extreme hostility to all religious faiths."
- The unexpected announcement in Beijing appeared intended to blunt growing international condemnation of the camps. It was made by two top officials in the regional government of Xinjiang, the northwest region where the Chinese Communist Party has set up the centers to hold Muslims, most of whom are Turkic-speaking Uighurs, and systems of electronic surveillance in towns and cities. The officials indicated that most inmates had "returned to society."
- The World Uyghur Congress, a Munich-based group that campaigns for self-determination, dismissed the two officials' claims as following "a predictable pattern of dubious statements."
- "Although there may be a kernel of truth to what we heard this morning, it's so buried in deception that it becomes unrecognizable," Dolkun Isa, the group's secretary-general, said in a statement.

35. Japan Times, Magdalena Osumi, ["As loved ones in China disappear amid crackdown, Uighurs in Japan speak out,"](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/08/08/national/social-issues/uighurs-japan-speak-plaint-kin-back-china/#.XVAH9pNKhTY) (August 8, 2019)

<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/08/08/national/social-issues/uighurs-japan-speak-plaint-kin-back-china/#.XVAH9pNKhTY>

- As the global outcry over China's crackdown on the Uighurs grows, members of the same ethnic minority in Japan are calling for help out of desperation to discover what has happened to their families back home.
- At a symposium in Tokyo last month, 10 ethnic Uighurs spoke out about their dilemma and the dangers they still face outside China.
- Deeply concerned about their families and their future, they are seeking international support to cast yet more light on Beijing's alleged persecution of the Uighurs.
- Afumetto Retepu, a 41-year-old Uighur from Tokyo who has lived in Japan since 2002, told the audience he has lost contact with 12 family members since July 2017, when they vanished and ended up in what China calls "free vocational centers" designed to "save" Muslim minorities from the lure of religious extremism.
- "Since that time I can't reach them. I have no idea what has happened to them," he

said at the symposium, which was aimed at raising awareness of the issue.

- *“But even if they went there on their own, as China says, would they willingly cut their connections with all their relatives without telling anyone where they went? It’s absurd. China tells the world the ‘training centers’ help them live a happy life but what they do is tear our families apart,” Retepu said.*
- *Last year, a United Nations human rights committee published a report saying it had received credible reports that 1 million ethnic Uighurs in China were being held in so-called re-education centers in Xinjiang.*
- *The U.N. panel alleged the interned Uighurs and other Muslims were being treated as “enemies of the state” solely on the basis of their ethno-religious identity, and that the camps were serving as indoctrination centers.*

CCP’s Military Modernization and Security Threats

36. Business Insider, Christopher Woody, [“Reports of a secret base deal are raising fears that Beijing is boxing in the South China Sea,”](#) (August 3, 2019)

- *Reports of a deal between China and Cambodia over a naval base have stoked concerns about Beijing’s ambitions in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean.*
- *China and Cambodia have denied the reports, but the news has the US and other countries reevaluating their relationships in the region.*

37. The Diplomat, Elsa Kania, [“Innovation in the New Era of Chinese Military Power,”](#) (July 25, 2019)

- *China’s State Council Information Office has just released a new national defense white paper, which is the first since the launch of major military reforms in 2015. This document includes an assessment of the international security situation and provides an official explanation of China’s defense policy, missions, military reforms, and defense expenditure. While unsparing in its critique of power politics and American “hegemonism,” the defense white paper also calls for China’s armed forces to “adapt to the new landscape of strategic competition.” In Xi Jinping’s “new era,” the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is urged to strengthen its preparedness and enhance combat capabilities commensurate with China’s global standing and interests. As the PLA pursues the objective of transforming into “world-class forces” by mid-century, the U.S. military may confront the unprecedented challenge of a potential adversary with formidable and rapidly advancing capabilities.*
- *As an attempt to reassure the international community of China’s commitment to “world peace,” this defense white paper may have limited utility, particularly juxtaposed against the strident signaling of resolve on the “Taiwan question.” This articulation of China’s national defense is direct and explicit in highlighting the willingness to use force to prevent and defeat any attempts at “Taiwan independence.” In particular, China’s quest to achieve “complete reunification” is described as threatened by the potential “interference of external forces,” implicitly the United States, which is often characterized as a powerful adversary in Chinese military writings not intended for an external*

audience. The U.S. military is the target and often the teacher for Chinese military modernization, and the PLA must be prepared to use “all necessary measures” in order to “safeguard national unity.”

38. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, [“Risch \(R-Idaho\), Menendez \(D-NJ\), Gardner \(R-CO\), Markey \(D-MA\) Statement on China’s Unlawful Activities in the South China Sea,”](#) (July 31, 2019)

<https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/risch-menendez-gardner-markey-statement-on-chinas-unlawful-activities-in-the-south-china-sea>

- *Washington, DC -- U.S. Sen. Jim Risch (R-Idaho) and Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), chairman and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, along with Sen. Cory Gardner (R-Colo.) and Sen. Edward Markey (D-Mass.), chairman and ranking member of the subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, made the following statements regarding China’s recent unlawful activities in the South China Sea as U.S. officials meet with ASEAN nations and other regional partners in Bangkok this week:*
- *“Surveying operations by a state-owned Chinese vessel inside Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone – and the deployments of China’s Coast Guard ships – are only the latest evidence of China’s willingness to use coercion to assert unlawful claims in the South China Sea,” said Risch. “Identifying concrete ways to push back on China’s aggressive activities in the South China Sea should be at the top of the United States’ agenda during ASEAN meetings in Bangkok this week. In addition to U.S. leadership, it is crucial that our partners in the region, particularly ASEAN countries, stand together and stand firm against China’s coercion. Without a stronger rebuke of its behavior, China will continue to act with impunity in the South China Sea, to the detriment of our shared interests in advancing a truly free and open Indo-Pacific and upholding the rule of law.”*
- *“It is critical that China be held to account for its behavior in the South China Sea,” said Menendez. “We need a strategy that reflects America’s deep and enduring interests in working with allies and partners to help build a South China Sea where international law is respected, freedom of navigation is ensured, commerce flows freely, multilateral regional organizations are central, and regional countries are not subject to coercion.”*
- *“China’s militarization of the South China Sea and hostile actions toward other claimant states are illegal, destabilizing, and contrary to international law,” said Gardner. “I expect that Secretary Pompeo will use this opportunity to emphasize that the United States will always stand by our ASEAN partners, and also call for a coordinated policy response to Beijing’s belligerence with our allies in the region, as required by the Gardner-Markey Asia Reassurance Initiative Act.”*
- *“China’s actions in the South China Sea – one of the most important bodies of water on the planet – are deeply troubling,” said Markey. “I strongly support diplomatic efforts to maintain peace there, and support our Southeast Asian allies and partners in their efforts, including at this week’s ASEAN Regional Forum. The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration made it clear years ago that China’s artificial island building violated international law, and all must respect freedom of navigation. The United States should ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, but until we do, we will act in accordance with it, and expect all other countries to do so as well.”*

39. VNExpress, Phuong Vu, "[Vietnam accuses China of serious violation of sovereignty at ASEAN meeting,](https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnam-accuses-china-of-serious-violation-of-sovereignty-at-asean-meeting-3961008.html)" (August 1, 2019)

<https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnam-accuses-china-of-serious-violation-of-sovereignty-at-asean-meeting-3961008.html>

- *Vietnamese Foreign Minister denounced illegal activities by a Chinese oil survey vessel in Vietnamese waters at an ASEAN meeting on Wednesday.*
- *"The situation in the East Sea is complicated, with unilateral actions including militarization, increasing military exercises, especially the activities of Chinese oil survey ship Haiyang Dizhi 8 and its escorts, which are infringing upon the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf of Vietnam with illegal survey activities," Vietnam's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Binh Minh said at the 52nd ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Bangkok, Thailand.*
- *Minh stressed that those actions of China seriously violated Vietnam's sovereignty and jurisdiction under the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).*

40. NATO Defense College, "[Russia and China: 'axis of convenience' or 'stable strategic partnership'?](http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=603)" (July 2019) – Attached

www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=603

- *Although the current direction of bilateral relations is towards cooperation, it is still a fragile sort. Because cooperation requires the participation of Russian and Chinese leadership, it could recede without their active promotion. In the long term much will depend on how the leadership navigates through the phases of cooperation, both military and economic. For NATO, this underscores the need to incorporate Far East developments into its strategic awareness of the Eastern Flank, particularly with respect to the convergence of political, military and economic forces.*

<20190417 Balding and Clarke Who Owns Huawei.pdf>

<20190711 Zenz Forced Labor.pdf>

<20190715 NATO Defense College Policy Brief Russia and China.pdf>

<20190724 CSBA Winning Without Fighting.pdf>

<20190807 FireEye Report on APT41.pdf>

Subject: Sent from the wrong email

Date: Monday, August 12, 2019 at 5:36:37 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

Please answer on the jaic to this email

Subject: Fwd: NSCAI Framework Beliefsv4.docx
Date: Monday, August 19, 2019 at 2:57:37 PM Eastern Daylight Time
From: Safra Catz
To: Yll Bajraktari, (b)(6), NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), Katharina McFarland, (b)(6)
CC: Safra Catz, (b)(6)
BCC: Safra Catz, (b)(6)
Attachments: NSCAI Framework Beliefsv4.docx, ATT00002.bin

Here are my comments on an attached document. It is entirely marked to show edits. Mostly reordering and small edits. Feel free to ignore.

Begin forwarded message:

From: Safra Catz <(b) (6)>
Date: August 19, 2019 at 11:54:24 AM PDT
To: Safra Catz, (b)(6)
Subject: NSCAI Framework Beliefsv4.docx

Subject: I found this very interesting.

Date: Monday, August 19, 2019 at 3:21:15 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: [REDACTED] NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6) Yll Bajraktari, [REDACTED] NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6), Katharina McFarland

<https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/a-guide-to-not-killing-or-mutilating-artificial-intelligence-research/>

Subject: Re: Monday

Date: Friday, September 6, 2019 at 1:05:33 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: Robert Work

CC: Griffiths, José Marie, Yll Bajraktari

I'd be thrilled, obviously

> On Sep 6, 2019, at 8:40 AM, Robert Work <(b) (6)> wrote:

>

> Dear Jose Marie and Safra,

>

> I hope you both had a relaxing summer—or as close to one that your busy schedules allowed!

>

> I am excited that the staff has worked hard to keep us busy this fall. And I want to thank you both again for agreeing to be Chairs of working groups.

>

> I am writing regarding the working group meetings on Monday. For the first time, we have two WG meetings on the same day. While I know that my reassigned role is with WG3, I have long promised to come in to WG2 and give them the background on the Third Offset Strategy. I am scheduled to do that at 8:00 am Monday.

>

> The original plan was for me to then shift over to WG3. But seeing that Safra is getting briefed from all the services on their activities, I wanted to check in with both of you and see if its ok for me to stay with WG2 all day. It would help me keep up to speed on exactly what the Department is up to in terms of AI applications.

>

> Please let me know if that is okay with you.

>

> Thank you both for your hard work in keeping these working groups on track and I look forward to seeing you both soon.

>

> Best, Bob

>

Subject: Re: Working Group 2 Meeting, Sept 9, 2019

Date: Sunday, September 8, 2019 at 11:59:25 AM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Safra Catz

To: NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

Yup we say the other url went to the same place as the other one.

On Sep 8, 2019, at 5:28 AM, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6) wrote:

Commissioners,

Correction: here is the link to the Defense Innovation Board Software Acquisition and Practices study report: (b) (6)

Thanks,

(b) (6)

NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence

(b) (6)

On Sep 6, 2019, at 12:10 PM, NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6) wrote:

Dear Commissioners,

We look forward to seeing you next week on Monday, September 9, for our next Working Group Meeting at the Pentagon. The Final Agenda is attached.

During this Working Group Meeting, we are focusing on (b) (5)

Here are a couple of questions to keep in mind during the briefs and to potentially ask the presenters:

1. (b) (5)

2. (b) (5)

3. (b) (5)

Priority Read Ahead:

- WG2 Research Memo (Executive Session discussion) (attached and link: [here](#))

Optional Prep Materials:

- Defense Science Board Summer Study on Autonomy (Session 1 from Bob Work)

link: [here](#)

- Defense Innovation Board Software Acquisition and Practices (SWAP) study report

(Executive Session Discussion: recommend you only read "Chapter 0. README Executive Summary") link: [here](#)

We have an extended Executive Session from 1430-1700 to allow you to: identify key take aways from the day, discuss the attached Research Memo, and discuss the November report key findings and timeline.

We have coordinated all of the logistics with your teams, but please let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks,

(b) (6)

NSCAI Staff Member, (b)(6)

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence

(b) (6)

<Agenda_NSCAI WG2 Meeting_20190909 FINAL.pdf>

<WG2 Research Memo_9.6.19.docx>

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