Analysis
CISA Report Obtained by EPIC Confirms Critical Vulnerabilities in U.S. Telecommunication Networks
November 19, 2026 |
Today, EPIC released a report obtained through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit that the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) tried to keep from the American public. The report, titled “U.S. Telecommunications Security 2022,” details some of the critical vulnerabilities in the Signaling System 7 (SS7) protocol as well as the Diameter protocol used by U.S. telecommunication networks, and makes recommendations to better secure the networks. This is the first time the report is being released publicly.
The existence of this report makes clear to the public that the government has been aware, since at least 2022, that 1) the SS7 protocol contain major vulnerabilities that put U.S. telecommunication networks at great risk, 2) these vulnerabilities have been and currently are being exploited by bad actors including foreign governments, and 3) the exploitation of these vulnerabilities has led to tangible, real world harms.
SS7 is a global protocol for telecommunications traffic, known by cybersecurity experts to have significant security weaknesses for more than a decade. The protocol was first developed in the 1970s for help with translating between different area codes when connecting phone calls. It was then leveraged to help connect calls when phones are outside of the carrier’s network, known as cellular roaming—a purpose it was not designed for. Exploitation of the weaknesses in the SS7 protocol can result in determining the physical location of a device, disrupting phone service, intercepting or blocking text messaging, and redirecting or eavesdropping on voice conversations. Although SS7 is a legacy protocol, it is still used for 2G and 3G networks today and some of the newer protocols remain connected with SS7 to maintain connectivity and provide seamless service. Because of this interoperability with SS7 and other structural issues, modern protocols like Diameter also suffer from cybersecurity weaknesses.
In 2022, CISA, a component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), commissioned an independent expert report that included discussion of SS7 vulnerabilities. The report covered the vulnerabilities in the U.S. telecommunication network, gives examples of potential threat activity on U.S. networks, and describes how the different telecommunication ownership structures increase the vulnerability of U.S. telecommunication networks.
Senator Ron Wyden, after seeing the report, wrote to then-President Biden on February 29, 2024 to urge the President to address the threat presented by the vulnerabilities in telecommunications protocols. Wyden, in noting CISA’s failure to do anything about the problem stated:
“CISA is actively hiding information about it from the American people. The agency commissioned an independent expert report on this topic in 2022 which it permitted my staff to read at CISA’s office in the fall of 2023. CISA refuses to publicly release this unclassified report, which includes details that are relevant to policymakers and Americans who care about the security of their phones.”
EPIC filed its FOIA request on March 12, 2024 for the report referenced by Wyden in his letter. After several months, CISA responded to EPIC’s request in November 2024 , stating that it had “determined that the 111 pages are withheld in their entirety pursuant to Title 5 U.S.C. § 552 Exemption Code: (b)(5), FOIA Exemption 5.” EPIC promptly appealed this determination due to the overbroad witholding, but after receiving no response to the appeal, EPIC filed suit on June 4, 2025.
CISA changed its stance several times on whether or not it would release this unclassified report. In late 2025, under pressure from Senator Wyden, CISA stated it would release the report but soon reversed course and decided to continue to keep the report from the public. EPIC moved forward with its lawsuit, putting pressure on the agency for over a year to release the report. After filing pre-motion statements in anticipation of motions for summary judgement, CISA finally relented and released a redacted version of the report.
The report raises some serious questions about why the government has not addressed the vulnerabilities in a timely manner and why the government would leave the security of critical infrastructure up to the whims of the telecommunications industry that has repeatedly failed to meet basic cybersecurity obligations. As the U.S. Telecommunications Security 2022 report indicates, it is often small, rural telecom operators that are targeted by bad actors as a weak point. This exploitation is not one-off bad actors, but instead a burgeoning cottage industry of surveillance as a service vendors. As a report by Citizens Lab found, commercial surveillance vendors are exploiting the security vulnerabilities in the telecom networks to sell interception and tracking services to various governments around the world. In other words: There is a whole business built around exploiting the insecurity in U.S. telecom networks.
It should be obvious that the problem cannot be solved by voluntary best practices or regulatory obligations without enforcement for inaction. Leaving the telecom industry to their own devices is how we got here in the first place. As was the case with SIM swapping attacks, data breach reporting requirements, and location data breaches, in the wake of Salt Typhoon the telecommunications lobby was quick to step in and urge the Federal Communications Commission to look the other way when carriers’ persistent security failures put Americans’ data and communications infrastructure at risk. Which is why the recent introduction of the Telecommunications Cybersecurity Resilience Act utterly fails to meet the moment. The bill suggests creating “Industry Best Practices” to govern telecom cybersecurity instead of a way to enforce cybersecurity standards that are long overdue.
The vulnerabilities in U.S. telecom networks have been well-known for a long time as the report released today by EPIC indicates. The fact that CISA and other relevant government agencies like the FCC, along with Congress, have failed to act should anger every American. No more ignoring the problem. Congress must act now to ensure the security of our telecom networks.
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